The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
Open accessAbstract
This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171753 · Cited by 7,081
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330757 · Cited by 3,255
Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004 · Cited by 2,909
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.002 · Cited by 2,888
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Manne, H. G. (1965) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259000 · Cited by 2,364
Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives
Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.02.002 · Cited by 2,170
Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance
Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2008) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2008.83.1.61 · Cited by 2,107
Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?
Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Shevlin, T. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.02.003 · Cited by 2,050
The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance
Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2010) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2010.85.4.1163 · Cited by 1,588
Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting
Frank, M. M., Lynch, L. J., & Rego, S. O. (2009) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.2.467 · Cited by 1,523
Self-citationThe use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels
Core, J., & Guay, W. (1999) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1 · Cited by 1,456
The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants
Guay, W. R. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00016-1 · Cited by 1,388
Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: Evidence from longitudinal data
Gupta, S., & Newberry, K. J. (1997) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/s0278-4254(96)00055-5 · Cited by 1,261
Hanlon, M., & Slemrod, J. (2009) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.004 · Cited by 1,109
An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants
Wilson, R. J. (2009) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.969 · Cited by 1,105
Self-citationTax‐Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations*
Rego, S. O. (2003) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1506/vann-b7ub-gmfa-9e6w · Cited by 1,030
Self-citationAgency Costs of Overvalued Equity
Jensen, M. C. (2005) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00090.x · Cited by 973
Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking
Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00042-3 · Cited by 863
The power of the pen and executive compensation
Core, J. E., Guay, W., & Larcker, D. F. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.001 · Cited by 845
Zimmerman, J. L. (1983) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(83)90008-3 · Cited by 814
Tax shelters and corporate debt policy
Graham, J. R., & Tucker, A. L. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.09.002 · Cited by 796
Earnings Management: New Evidence Based on Deferred Tax Expense
Phillips, J., Pincus, M., & Rego, S. O. (2003) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2003.78.2.491 · Cited by 725
Self-citationThe Influence of Tax and Nontax Costs on Book-Tax Reporting Differences: Public and Private Firms
Mills, L. F., & Newberry, K. J. (2001) · Journal of the American Taxation Association · doi:10.2308/jata.2001.23.1.1 · Cited by 579
Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives
Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.532702 · Cited by 538
Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives
Phillips, J. D. (2003) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.847 · Cited by 524
Corporate tax evasion with agency costs
Crocker, K. J., & Slemrod, J. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.003 · Cited by 490
Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?
Hanlon, M., Rajgopal, S., & Shevlin, T. (2003) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.10.008 · Cited by 474
Performance Measurement of Corporate Tax Departments
Robinson, J. R. C., Sikes, S. A., & Weaver, C. D. (2010) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2010.85.3.1035 · Cited by 362
Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance
McGuire, S. T., Wang, D., & Wilson, R. J. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1761994 · Cited by 341
Self-citationAn Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax Noncompliance
Hanlon, M., Mills, L., & Slemrod, J. (2007) · Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510823.014 · Cited by 190
Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs
Crocker, K. J., & Slemrod, J. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10690 · Cited by 93
CEO After-Tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax AvoidancePreprint
Gaertner, F. B. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1524390 · Cited by 82
CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives
Williams, M. A., & Rao, R. P. (2006) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.01357.x · Cited by 78
An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax NoncompliancePreprint
Hanlon, M., Mills, L. F., & Slemrod, J. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.891226 · Cited by 60
Cited by
Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance
Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., Jagolinzer, A. D., & Larcker, D. F. (2015) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.003 · Cited by 1,064
Hoi, C. K., Wu, Q., & Zhang, H. (2013) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-50544 · Cited by 923
Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field
Graham, J. R., Hanlon, M., Shevlin, T. J., & Shroff, N. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2148407 · Cited by 867
Incorrect Inferences When Using Residuals as Dependent Variables
CHEN, W., HRIBAR, P., & MELESSA, S. (2018) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12195 · Cited by 701
Hasan, I., Hoi, C. K. (., Wu, Q., & Zhang, H. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.03.004 · Cited by 653
Metadata
- Authors
- REGO, S. O., & WILSON, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-03-05
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 775-810
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W2138173710
- Cited by
- 995
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 172.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.