The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lending Booms and Lending Standards
Open accessAbstract
We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885326 · Cited by 4,987
The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems
Kaminsky, G. L., & Reinhart, C. M. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.3.473 · Cited by 4,978
Kiyotaki, N., & Moore, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262072 · Cited by 4,694
Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00505 · Cited by 2,150
How does foreign entry affect domestic banking markets?
Claessens, S., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (2001) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(00)00102-3 · Cited by 1,644
Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00223 · Cited by 1,590
Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
DEGRYSE, H., & ONGENA, S. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00729.x · Cited by 1,563
(1985) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,432
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J.-F. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912320 · Cited by 1,397
Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2002) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00171-x · Cited by 1,371
Competition and Financial Stability
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2004) · Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2004.0038 · Cited by 1,137
A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
Wilson, C. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90004-7 · Cited by 1,035
Relationship Lending within a Bank-Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data
Degryse, H., & Van Cayseele, P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.1999.0278 · Cited by 971
Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets
Besanko, D., & Thakor, A. V. (1987) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526573 · Cited by 964
The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems
Kaminsky, G. L., & Reinhart, C. M. (1996) · International Finance Discussion Papers · doi:10.17016/ifdp.1996.544 · Cited by 950
Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information
Meza, D. D., & Webb, D. C. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885064 · Cited by 879
Lending relationships in Germany – Empirical evidence from survey data
Harhoff, D., & Körting, T. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00061-2 · Cited by 808
Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence
Rajan, R. G. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118468 · Cited by 806
Information Sharing in Credit Markets
PAGANO, M., & JAPPELLI, T. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05125.x · Cited by 767
The Credit Cycle and the Business Cycle: New Findings Using the Loan Officer Opinion Survey
Lown, C. S., & Morgan, D. P. (2006) · Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2006.0086 · Cited by 604
Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.223461 · Cited by 601
Credit-Worthiness Tests and Interbank Competition
Broecker, T. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938210 · Cited by 589
Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence
THAKOR, A. V. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05210.x · Cited by 586
The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behavior
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (2004) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2004.06.006 · Cited by 580
Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks
Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696390 · Cited by 504
Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse
von Thadden, E.-L. (2004) · Finance Research Letters · doi:10.1016/s1544-6123(03)00006-0 · Cited by 462
Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking Industry: Table 1
Marquez, R. (2002) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/15.3.901 · Cited by 417
Self-citationEndogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives
Padilla, A. J., & Pagano, M. (1997) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/10.1.205 · Cited by 409
Bank Competition and Credit Standards
Ruckes, M. (2004) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhh011 · Cited by 400
Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry
Dell'Ariccia, G., Friedman, E., & Marquez, R. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556061 · Cited by 342
Self-citationCompetition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance
Matutes, C., & Vives, X. (1996) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.1996.0010 · Cited by 297
Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ∗
Hellwig, M. (1987) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(87)90046-8 · Cited by 293
Shaffer, S. (1998) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.1998.0251 · Cited by 286
Asymmetric information and the structure of the banking industry
Dell'Ariccia, G. (2001) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00085-4 · Cited by 256
Self-citationAsea, P. K., & Blomberg, B. (1998) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(97)00066-3 · Cited by 150
Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy BanksPreprint
Manove, M., Padilla, J. A., & Pagano, M. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.141051 · Cited by 137
Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking IndustryPreprint
Marquez, R. S. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.264531 · Cited by 122
Self-citation
Cited by
Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?
Borio, C., & Zhu, H. (2012) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2011.12.003 · Cited by 1,796
(2014) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10104 · Cited by 1,325
Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications
Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J.-L., & Saurina, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.5.2301 · Cited by 1,070
Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity
Beck, T., De Jonghe, O., & Schepens, G. (2013) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2012.07.001 · Cited by 1,021
Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Demyanyk, Y., & Van Hemert, O. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp033 · Cited by 989
Metadata
- Authors
- DELL'ARICCIA, G., & MARQUEZ, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-09-19
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2511-2546
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3121330589
- Cited by
- 877
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 49.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.