Naturalizing Subjective Character
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this “bluish way it is like for me”: (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth.
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Citations
Cites
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Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 2×
“For criticism, see Rey (1988); Aquila (1990); Dretske (1993, 1995); Goldman (1993); Natsoulas (1993); Block (1995); Guzeldere (1995); Byrne (1997); Neander (1998); Carruthers (2000); Moran (2001); and Kriegel (2002b, 2003a, 2003b).”
BackgroundGrice, H. P. (1957) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2182440 · Cited by 2,824
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Tye, M. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001 · Cited by 1,718
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes
Dretske, F. (1988) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2927.001.0001 · Cited by 1,512
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409 · cited 1×
“The representationalist approach to qualitative character is the more popular nowadays—see, e.g., Harman (1990); Dretske (1995); Tye (1995, 2000)—probably because of the dead-end into which functionalist accounts ran, in attempt to accommodate inverted and absent qualia.”
BackgroundRosenthal, D. M. (1986) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00355521 · Cited by 1,019
Rosenthal, D. M. (2005) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198236979.001.0001 · Cited by 993
Cited by
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Millière, R. (2017) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245 · Cited by 206
“It is worth remarking that some phenomenologists who are reluctant to ‘‘naturalize’’ their project are not committed to the assumption that pre-reflective self-awareness can be explained in terms of bodily processes (on this debate see Zahavi, 2004; Kriegel, 2005).”
BackgroundThe higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144
“Lycan tells me he was never an ambitious theorist. awareness of itself (Brentano 1874/1924, Burge 1997, 2006, Byrne 2004, Caston 2002, Uriah Kriegel 2005, Uriah Kriegel & Williford 2006, Levine 2001, 2006, Metzinger 2003, Ross 1961, Smith 1986).”
Evolving across the explanatory gap.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2019) · Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology · doi:10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001 · Cited by 55
“Kriegel (2005) argues that explaining the subjective character of experience requires explaining “how a mental state may include within it an awareness of itself ” (30)—how such a state can represent a feature of the environment and itself at once.”
BackgroundSubjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self
Howell, R. J. (2010) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2010.10716731 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- KRIEGEL, U.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-07
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-57
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W1980190165
- Cited by
- 95
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 8.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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