The DOI matches its Crossref record; 153 of the 159 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 42 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
Open accessAbstract
Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the U.S. airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is presumed likely to enhance market power by antitrust authorities. Within-route changes in common ownership concentration robustly correlate with route-level changes in ticket prices.
Overview
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Claims the paper makes
89 Own result · 61 Own interpretation · 35 No basis given · 17 No full text of the sources · 12 Own method · 11 Sources not found · 2 Not checked yet · 1 Supported · 1 Supported so far
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Fichtner, Heemskerk, and Garcia-Bernardo (2016) calculate that the combined holdings of BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street make them the largest investor of 88% of all firms in the S&P 500.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Fichtner, Heemskerk, and Garcia-Bernardo (2016) source
The Conclusion (p. 25) states that BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, taken together, constitute the largest shareholder in 88 percent of S&P 500 firms. This directly supports the attributed calculation. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, the average MHHI delta in the airline industry generated by common ownership in 2014Q4 implies increases in concentration that are more than 10 times higher than the threshold that would likely generate antitrust concerns according to the guidelines, if consequentially applied to MHHI.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 4.3 Quantifying Economic Incentives Using the MHHI
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- The authors state this as an assumption: Control is proportional in the fraction of votes held.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Similarly, going from the 25th to the 75th percentile increases prices by 4.3%.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.2 Panel Regression Results
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The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Going from the 10th to the 90th percentile of routes by MHHI delta indicates an 8.2% increase in fares.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.2 Panel Regression Results
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The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The stark increase in MHHI delta in 2009 coincides with BlackRock's acquisition of Barclays Global Investors that we will later use in one of our identification strategies.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 4.3 Quantifying Economic Incentives Using the MHHI
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In the paper
“the same fund family is often the single largest shareholder of several firms in the same industry, with similarly diversified investors following suit.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The correlation between the MHHI and the HHI is 0.87.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 4.3 Quantifying Economic Incentives Using the MHHI
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We also show in several placebo tests that variation in MHHI delta driven by changes in ownership by shareholders with little effective control does not correlate with price changes.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.1 Panel Regression Methodology
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In the paper
“If this theory is correct, an instrumented version of the above regression should produce higher estimates of β, which is a hypothesis we later test and find support for.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.1 Panel Regression Methodology
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In the paper
“are more than ten times larger than what the FTC/DOJ 2010 horizontal merger guidelines presume”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- The authors state this as an assumption: Control is proportional in the fraction of votes held.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 42
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The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“A long theoretical literature in industrial organization predicts that partial common ownership of natural competitors by the same investors can reduce firms' incentives to compete”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Rotemberg, 1984
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Farrell, 1985 source
- Supportedcites Gordon, 1990 source
The Conclusions (page unavailable) explain that shareholders invested across firms want each firm to account for effects on other firms’ value. The paper identifies competitive actions that reduce industry profits and says accounting for those effects could make collusion easier, supporting the claim that common ownership can reduce incentives to compete. (LLM, conf=0.91)
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- Not matched
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This effect of common ownership alone is similar in magnitude and comes on top of the effect of the traditional HHI measure of market concentration as well as other commonly used controls.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
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In the paper
“and find that the effects are stronger for larger markets and for more concentrated markets.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“we find that the results are driven by the top-ranked shareholders at each firm, and by long-term shareholders.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The average MHHI delta was around 1,400 at the beginning of the period, declined to around 1,000 in 2006-2007 when concentrated owners acquired relatively large stakes in the industry amid its low profitability, and then increased to about 2,500 in 2014.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 4.3 Quantifying Economic Incentives Using the MHHI
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- The authors state this as an assumption: Control is proportional in the fraction of votes held.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We also document significant effects from both firm-level and market-level variation in common ownership over time”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Note that American Airlines' top-seven shareholders (who jointly control 49.55% of the stock) are also among the top-10 investors of Southwest Airlines and various other competitors.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 4.2 Data on Airline Ownership
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In the paper
“In turn, each of Southwest's largest six shareholders is also among the top-10 shareholders of American and Delta, and five of them are among the top-10 holders of United as well.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 4.2 Data on Airline Ownership
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The coefficients on the control variables have the expected signs: a larger number of nonstop competitors, Southwest's and other LCC's nonstop presence are all associated with lower fares.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.2 Panel Regression Results
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In the paper
“Untabulated, the average fraction of institutional ownership is 72%; the median is 81%.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 4.1 Data on Ticket Prices and Market Shares
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The effect for the average or the four periods is positive and highly statistically significant, with a coefficient of 0.542, which is markedly higher than the effects estimated in panel regressions.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > IV Design
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In the paper
“Similarly, the coefficient on the carrier-level MHHI delta is statistically significant and large; it ranges from 0.91 to 1.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.5 What Else Can We Learn About the Mechanism?
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In the paper
“Generally speaking, disregarding control rights by shareholders below the top five only slightly attenuates the point estimate, and does not affect statistical significance: the”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.3.1 Effect of Common Ownership by Shareholder Rank
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- The authors state this as an assumption: In specifications estimating effects by shareholder rank, control is assumed to be exercised only by the largest 10, largest 5, largest 3, or single largest shareholder, with zero control assigned to all shareholders outside the top N ranks.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The coefficient on the average carrier-level MHHI delta of other carriers is positive but not statistically significant.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.5 What Else Can We Learn About the Mechanism?
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In the paper
“We find that the estimated coefficient of MHHI delta is lower than in the baseline but still highly statistically significant, suggesting that some, but not all, of the baseline effects derive from route-level variation.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.5 What Else Can We Learn About the Mechanism?
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In the paper
“Table 1 makes clear that much common ownership is driven by large institutional investors, and specifically by large mutual fund families.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.1 The Indirect Channel: Doing Nothing
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In the paper
“The effect of MHHI delta on fares is positive and statistically significant in most years and similar in magnitude in almost all years, but the effect of MHHI delta is slightly more volatile.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.3 Robustness of the Baseline Analysis
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In the paper
“The coefficient on the HHI ranges from -0.496 to -0.583, whereas the coefficient on MHHI delta ranges from -0.665 to -0.213 in the most saturated specification.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.3 Effect of Common Ownership Concentration on Passenger Volume
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In the paper
“The same is true for the Ranked-1-or-2 specifications.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.3.3 Effect of Common Ownership by Shareholder Horizon
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In the paper
“However, the effect of the MHHI delta remains significant and the estimated coefficients are almost unchanged.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.4 Robustness to the Mode of Competition
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In the paper
“Table C.7 shows that the coefficient on the route-level MHHI delta is highly statistically significant but the point estimate is lower than in the baseline estimates.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.5 What Else Can We Learn About the Mechanism?
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In the paper
“By contrast, BGI also held a large stake in American Airlines before the merger, but BlackRock did not.As a result, merging BlackRock and BGIs equity portfolios had no effect on American's ownership structure.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.2 Using Variation from the BlackRock-BGI Acquisition Background on BlackRock's Acquisition of Barclays Global Investors
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In the paper
“The effect of MHHI delta is statistically significant for all market size percentiles, except the very smallest and the very largest markets, for which the error bands become very wide.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.5 What Else Can We Learn About the Mechanism?
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In the paper
“Specifications (4) to ( 6) are analogous to specifications (1) to ( 3), but aggregated at the market level instead of at the market-carrier level.We find qualitatively similar results, but the coefficients of both the MHHI delta and the HHI are higher.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.2 Panel Regression Results
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In the paper
“In all specifications, both the HHI and the MHHI delta have a negative and significant effect on market passengers, although the mag-nitude of the coefficients is less stable across specifications than in the price regressions.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.3 Effect of Common Ownership Concentration on Passenger Volume
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In the paper
“The trend changes after the announcement of the acquisition, and the coefficients are significantly positive for most periods after the completion of the acquisition.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Difference-in-Differences Design
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In the paper
“Whereas the difference between treatment and control fluctuates around zero to some extent during the pre-period, the overall trend before the announcement is flat.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Difference-in-Differences Design
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In the paper
“We find a positive and economically sizable but not statistically significant effect of the change in MHHI delta on the change in log average airfares in 2010Q1, 2011Q1 and 2013Q1, and positive and statistically significant coefficients for 2012Q1, and 2014Q1.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > IV Design
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In the paper
“Untabulated regressions with three leads and lags of the MHHI deltas and the HHI indicate that the leads of both MHHI delta and HHI are jointly insignificant, whereas the lags are jointly highly statistically significant.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.1 Panel Regressions with Leads and Lags of MHHI delta and HHI
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In the paper
“We find that the coefficient on the route-level continues to be statistically significant, but again lower than in the baseline.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.5 What Else Can We Learn About the Mechanism?
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“MHHI delta, either in discrete or continuous version, is a strong instrument for the actual change in the MHHI delta.Specifically, the F-stats from weak identification tests range from 59 to 290.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > IV Design
boostedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For example, Barclays was the fifth-largest and BlackRock was the 17th-largest shareholder of Airtran Airways in 2009Q1, but a hypothetically combined BlackRock-BGI entity would have been the second-largest shareholder of the firm in 2009Q1, and correspondingly much more powerful.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.2 Using Variation from the BlackRock-BGI Acquisition Background on BlackRock's Acquisition of Barclays Global Investors
hedgedSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Table 5 shows that the coefficients of lags of MHHI delta are correlated with prices, whereas the coefficients on leads of MHHI delta are not significantly different from zero.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.1 Panel Regressions with Leads and Lags of MHHI delta and HHI
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Table 4 specification (6) shows that the effect of the carrier-route-level common ownership measure is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, but the t-stats are lower than those in the baseline specification for the MHHI delta, as expected.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.4 Robustness to the Mode of Competition
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“MHHI delta (Top 1 Shareholder) 0.0717*** 0.0889*** (0.0220) (0.0198)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Market Passengers)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“MHHI delta (Shareholders Ranked Below Top 10) -0.0436 -0.0312 (0.0314) (0.0275)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare) Market-carrier level
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“MHHI delta 0.0383 0.156*** 0.134*** 0.177*** 0.188*** 0.252*** (0.0711) (0.0404) (0.0350) (0.0578) (0.0412) (0.0488)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > (continued). Effect of Common Ownership on Airline Ticket Prices: IV Regressions Using Discrete Treatment: Second Stage.
plain- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“| Share AA × Share US in 2009Q1 | 0.437** | 0.338 | 0.821*** | 0.831*** | 1.304*** | 0.705*** |”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“MHHI delta (Top 10 Shareholders) 0.149*** 0.198*** (0.0373) (0.0352)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Market Passengers)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Correlation Between HHI and MHHI delta: -0.69”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“| MHHI delta | 0.110 | 0.104 | 0.0452 | 0.181* | 0.159** | 0.0802 |”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“| Change in MHHI delta 2009Q1-Post | 0.193 | 0.256 | 0.816*** | 0.413 | 0.963*** | 0.542*** |”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“| MHHI delta -Lag | 0.159** | 0.170*** | 0.161*** | 0.178** 0.177*** | 0.162*** |”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Change in MHHI delta 2009Q1-Post 0.142 0.199 0.765*** 0.357 0.824*** 0.462** (0.151) (0.275) (0.196) (0.279) (0.234) (0.186)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > (continued). Effect of Common Ownership on Airline Ticket Prices: IV Regressions Using Discrete Treatment: Second Stage.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
- Rests on an assumption: The pre-period 2009Q1 is before the Barclays BGI acquisition by BlackRock was announced.
- Rests on an assumption: The counterfactual MHHI delta combining the holdings of Barclays and BlackRock represents the change in common ownership caused by the acquisition.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“| HHI -Lag | 0.218*** 0.220*** | 0.182*** | 0.274*** 0.256*** | 0.214*** |”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“MHHI delta (Top 3 Shareholders) 0.114*** 0.145*** (0.0333) (0.0310)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Market Passengers)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Treatment (Discrete) 0.0871*** 0.0492*** 0.0716*** 0.0534*** 0.0681*** 0.0659*** (0.00511) (0.00642) (0.00661) (0.00639) (0.00904) (0.00599)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > B.2 Variable Definitions
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Rests on an assumption: The pre-period 2009Q1 is before the Barclays BGI acquisition by BlackRock was announced.
- Rests on an assumption: The counterfactual MHHI delta combining the holdings of Barclays and BlackRock represents the change in common ownership caused by the acquisition.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“| Share UA × Share CO in 2009Q1 | 0.120 | 1.033*** | 1.166*** | 1.642*** | 1.718*** | 1.092*** |”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“| Share FL × Share WN in 2009Q1 | -0.0478 | 0.222 | 1.293*** | 0.823*** | 1.236*** | 0.647*** |”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We find that when firms have reduced incentives to compete due to common ownership, prices are higher and output is lower.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 7 Conclusion
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“MHHI delta (Top 5 Shareholders) 0.136*** 0.173*** (0.0368) (0.0340)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Market Passengers)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Change in MHHI delta 2009Q1-Post 0.142 0.199 0.765*** 0.357 0.824*** 0.462** (0.151) (0.275) (0.196) (0.279) (0.234) (0.186)”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > (continued). Effect of Common Ownership on Airline Ticket Prices: IV Regressions Using Discrete Treatment: Second Stage.
plain- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: The pre-period 2009Q1 is before the Barclays BGI acquisition by BlackRock was announced.
- Rests on an assumption: The counterfactual MHHI delta combining the holdings of Barclays and BlackRock represents the change in common ownership caused by the acquisition.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Correlation Between HHI and MHHI: 0.87”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“No study prior to the present one has examined effects of common ownership on product prices.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 2 Related Literature
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Theory thus predicts that common ownership implies reduced incentives to compete, pushes product markets toward monopolistic outcomes, and implies a deadweight loss for the economy and particularly adverse consequences for consumers.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A literature in finance and industrial organization, reviewed above, predicts that shareholder diversification can lead to lessened competition in portfolio firms' product markets.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 3 Hypothesis Development
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“highly diversified mutual fund families and other institutional investors now hold a high (70%-80%, ICI, 2015) and increasing share of US publicly traded firms.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites ICI, 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Theory thus predicts that common ownership implies reduced incentives to compete, pushes product markets toward monopolistic outcomes, and implies a deadweight loss for the economy and particularly adverse consequences for consumers.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“One should thus expect less competition, compared to the standard model, to the extent shareholders are diversified across natural competitors, and to the extent portfolio firms act in their diversified shareholders' interest.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 3 Hypothesis Development
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We then provide a large number of placebo and robustness tests to examine the empirical validity of a large number of concerns regarding functional form, market definition, confounding mergers and bankruptcies, reverse causality, the assumption that control is proportional in the fraction of votes held, and the model of competition.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 1 Introduction
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Control is proportional in the fraction of votes held.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In our baseline result we address various of such omitted variable concerns with explicit controls and a large number of fixed effects.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1 Panel Regressions of Product Prices on Common Ownership
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These are non-trivial changes in market concentration, for which we can reasonably expect to find increases in market prices.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Difference-in-Differences Design
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Moreover, US airline stocks of course comprised only a small share of BGI's portfolio.This fact makes it unlikely that airlines were pivotal in BlackRock's decision to acquire BGI, much less route-level variation in expected ticket price changes, thus alleviating reverse causality concerns.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.2 Using Variation from the BlackRock-BGI Acquisition Background on BlackRock's Acquisition of Barclays Global Investors
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Indeed, any such notion is neither implied by our empirical results thus far, nor do the results depend on it, nor does the underlying theory suggest collusive behavior.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.1 The Indirect Channel: Doing Nothing
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Indeed, any such notion is neither implied by our empirical results thus far, nor do the results depend on it, nor does the underlying theory suggest collusive behavior.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.1 The Indirect Channel: Doing Nothing
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the claim that common ownership causes higher prices is very different from the claim that any shareholder actively and consciously pursues an anticompetitive agenda, communicates with managers of portfolio firms to compete less aggressively against each other, or even incites collusion.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.1 The Indirect Channel: Doing Nothing
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In addition, the findings illustrate why the anti-competitive effects of common ownership have welfare implications: the deadweight loss to the economy comes from reduced output that accompanies higher consumer prices.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.3 Effect of Common Ownership Concentration on Passenger Volume
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We find that the estimated coefficient of MHHI delta is lower than in the baseline but still highly statistically significant, suggesting that some, but not all, of the baseline effects derive from route-level variation.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.5 What Else Can We Learn About the Mechanism?
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These results indicate that increasing demand and reverse causality are unlikely to be the driver of the price effects.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2.3 Effect of Common Ownership Concentration on Passenger Volume
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Nevertheless, several other significant limitations remain at this stage, driven by the potential endogeneity of both market shares and ownership, as well as various forms of model misspecification.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.4 Limitations of the Baseline Analysis
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We conclude that the baseline results are not driven by an unusual sub-period within the sample in general or by bankruptcies in particular.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.3 Robustness of the Baseline Analysis
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Lundin (2016) shows that joint profit maximization of commonly owned Swedish power plants best matches the data on maintenance decisions, and hence output, compared to unilateral profit maximization.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.6 External Validity
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Lundin (2016) source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A claim is checked only against the cited paper’s full text, never its abstract, and none is available for its sources.
In the paper
“However, since making our study available online, similar results have been found in other industries and with other econometric methods, which may enhance confidence in the external validity of our results.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.6 External Validity
What the sources say
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We offer three sets of tests to examine and reject the hypothesis that the baseline results are due to chances in ticket pricing causing changes in ownership, rather than the other way around.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.2 Responses to Reverse Causality Concerns
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The quote only partly states this claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The bottom line is that the effect is generally weaker in markets and at times affected by bankruptcies, consistent with shareholders not being in control during such times.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5.1.3 Robustness of the Baseline Analysis
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“The DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Difference-in-Differences Design
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Indeed, any such notion is neither implied by our empirical results thus far, nor do the results depend on it, nor does the underlying theory suggest collusive behavior.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.1 The Indirect Channel: Doing Nothing
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As an alternative gauge of economic significance, note that the average implied MHHI deltais about 91 HHI points; our estimates thus indicate that ticket prices on the average U.S. airline route increased by about 0.5% as a direct result of the BlackRock-BGI acquisition.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > IV Design
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus-caused declines in stock prices would have obvious direct consequences for managerial incentives.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.3.2 Incentives
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These results suggest both a large deadweight loss (i.e.decreased efficiency of the economy) and a large transfer from consumers to producers due to common ownership.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 7 Conclusion
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Institutional Shareholder Services recommends to support the activist's campaign, but BlackRock, Vanguard, and StateStreet cast decisive votes against.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.4 Summary
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Schmalz (2015)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For example, increased payouts imply reduced investment (at least in the long-run), but reduced investment in production capacity can imply less competitive product markets.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.2 Effects of Influence on Corporate Financial Decisions
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“F-stat (Weak Identification Test) 316.9 47.58 127.4 75.54 59.82 125”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > B.2 Variable Definitions
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The quote only partly states this claim.
- Rests on an assumption: The pre-period 2009Q1 is before the Barclays BGI acquisition by BlackRock was announced.
- Rests on an assumption: The counterfactual MHHI delta combining the holdings of Barclays and BlackRock represents the change in common ownership caused by the acquisition.
In the paper
“Kwon (2016) challenges existing theory and empirical findings using alternative samples, industry definitions, and empirical specifications, claiming qualitatively opposite results on pay-performance sensitivities, and documents a link between common ownership and the explicit use of relative performance in compensation contracts.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.3.3 Vote
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Kwon (2016)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Director candidates may be able to credibly signal for which type of competitive strategy they stand.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.3.3 Vote
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“Schmalz (2015) provides a case study that illustrates all four elements.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.4 Summary
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Schmalz (2015)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
In the paper
“Antón, Ederer, Giné, and Schmalz (2016) provide panel and IV evidence that management pay becomes less sensitive to performance relative to industry rivals when the industry becomes more”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Antón, Ederer, Giné, and Schmalz (2016) source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A caveat is that explicit incentives are only in place as long as the manager is not fired.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.3.2 Incentives
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The first two goals benefit shareholders.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 7 Conclusion
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Whereas this paper emphasizes anti-competitive effects of common ownership, in theory, common ownership can also have efficiency-enhancing effects.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 7 Conclusion
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We find that voice, incentives, and vote -as well as the simple omission to push for more aggressive competition -can plausibly implement the anticompetitive incentives of investors that hold large stakes in natural competitors.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.4 Summary
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In theory, the additional concentration that results from cumulating many small common ownership interests should get reflected in higher prices.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 7 Conclusion
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“Our results can be viewed as challenging this assumption, and thus make an empirical case for taking seriously the theoretical insight (perhaps most clearly stated in Hart, 1979) that shareholders do not agree on profit maximization as an objective when firms are not price takers.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 7 Conclusion
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hart, 1979 source
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“However, CEO turnover also does not feature strong elements of relative performance evaluation, and is therefore sensitive to industry performance (Jenter and Kanaan, forthcoming).”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.3.2 Incentives
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Jenter and Kanaan, forthcoming
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
In the paper
“An activist investor with concentrated holdings in a target voices a demand for greater efforts at increasing market share vis-à-vis the target's competitors, as well as a greater use of relative performance evaluation to give management appropriate incentives to maximize the target's value, among other things.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.4 Summary
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Schmalz (2015)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We also control for potential confounding events using the implied HHI delta in the route from the DL-NW, UA-CO, AA-US, and FL-WN mergers, the share in the route of AA in 2009Q1, and the change in log per capita income in the route from the start of the Great Recession until 2009Q1, each interacted with year-quarter fixed effects.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 5: Effect of Common Ownership on Airline Ticket Prices: Distributed-Lags Regressions.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“By contrast, the decline in product market competition implied by an improved implementation of the first two goals is a social cost that has thus far been largely ignored.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 7 Conclusion
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“F-stat (Weak Identification Test) 290.4 58.88 117.3 69.79 56.78 121”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > B.2 Variable Definitions
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Rests on an assumption: The pre-period 2009Q1 is before the Barclays BGI acquisition by BlackRock was announced.
- Rests on an assumption: The counterfactual MHHI delta combining the holdings of Barclays and BlackRock represents the change in common ownership caused by the acquisition.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The effects of shareholder engagement on product market outcomes can therefore be very subtle.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 6.2 Effects of Influence on Corporate Financial Decisions
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“empirical results indicative (but of course not conclusive) of a causal link between common ownership and higher product prices.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 7 Conclusion
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The authors focused on partial ownership acquisitions in competitors (cross-ownership), but their model can be applied to a situation in which the same investors hold shares in natural competitors (common ownership).”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Dependent Variable: Log(Average Fare)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
The authors state this as an assumption.
Institutions with less than 0.5% of shares have no weight in the objective function of the firm.
“Doing so amounts to assuming that institutions with less than 0.5% have no weight in the objective function of the firm; weconsider variations later.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Wells Fargo's CEO understands that it is not in his largest shareholders' best interest to compete aggressively for market share against Bank of America, even without explicit communication.
“it seems reasonable to assume that Wells Fargo's CEO understands that it is not in his largest shareholders' best interest to compete aggressively for market share against Bank of America, even without explicit communication with either shareholders or competitors' managers.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Top management teams of the largest US airlines learned about major shifts in the ownership structure of the industry even without being personally informed by Warren Buffett.
“We find it equally likely that the top management teams of the United States' largest airlines also learned about major shifts in the ownership structure of the industry even without being personally informed by Warren Buffett.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Bank of America and JP Morgan are well-informed about these interests.
“We feel equally assured that not only Bank of America, but also JP Morgan is well-informed about these interests”
The paper relies on this without support.
The fund families' incentives are primarily determined by the value of their total assets under management.
“the fund families' incentives, which -consistent with the incentives of their investors -are primarily determined by the value of their total assets under management.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Each route can be considered as a separate market.
“each route can be considered as a separate market.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Control is proportional in the fraction of votes held.
“the assumption that control is proportional in the fraction of votes held”
The paper relies on this without support.
MHHI delta is a reduced-form measure of reduced incentives to compete due to common ownership.
“we do not estimate the model, but use MHHI delta as a reduced-form measure of reduced incentives to compete due to common ownership.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Smaller shareholders have no significant say in corporate strategy.
“In the baseline specifications reported previously, we calculated the MHHI delta using all shareholders larger than 0.5%, assuming that smaller shareholders have no significant say in corporate strategy.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The cross-sectional distribution across US airline routes in the implied increase in common ownership from a hypothetical pre-merger combination of BlackRock and BGI's equity portfolios is uncorrelated with errors of the ticket price regression, conditional on controls.
“More formally, the exclusion restriction is that the cross-sectional distribution across US airlines routes in the implied increase in common ownership from a hypothetical, pre-merger combination of BLK and BGI's equity portfolios is uncorrelated with errors of the ticket price regression, conditional on controls.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
In specifications estimating effects by shareholder rank, control is assumed to be exercised only by the largest 10, largest 5, largest 3, or single largest shareholder, with zero control assigned to all shareholders outside the top N ranks.
“To further explore this idea, we now estimate specifications that assume control, for a given carrier and quarter, only by the largest 10, largest 5, largest 3, and only the single largest shareholder in the calculation of the MHHI delta.These specifications assign zero control to all shareholders outside the top N ranks, but keeps ownership rights for all shareholders.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
In the placebo test, only shareholders ranked below the top 10 are assumed to control the firm, with zero control assigned to the top 10 shareholders.
“As a complement to the top-shareholder analysis, we now run a placebo test which does the opposite: we calculate the MHHI delta as if only shareholders ranked below top 10 controlled the firm.That is, for each carrier at each period in time, we assign zero control to the top 10 shareholders, and then re-calculate the MHHI deltas accordingly.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Shareholder control is proportional to the number of shares they own.
“In our calculation of the MHHI deltas, we have assumed thus far that shareholder control is proportional to the number of shares they own.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Increasing market share may require costly managerial effort.
“To see why doing nothing can be a sufficient mechanism by which common ownership can cause higher prices, assume that increasing market share may require costly managerial effort.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Firms internalize externalities imposed on commonly owned firms.
“Freeman (2016) finds an effect of common ownership on the longevity of customer-supplier relationships, which corroborates the assumption of the various theoretical models motivating our empirical analysis that firms internalize externalities imposed on commonly owned firms.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The past three decades have witnessed a shift from the low-common-ownership to the high-common-ownership equilibrium, because diversified institutions have increasingly crowded out concentrated owners as the most powerful shareholders of firms.
“The past three decades have witnessed a shift from the low-common-ownership to the high-common-ownership equilibrium, because diversified institutions have increasingly crowded out concentrated owners as the most powerful shareholders of firms.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The merger of two large asset managers occurred for reasons unrelated to expected route-level differences in US airline ticket prices.
“We then exploit variation in common ownership concentration generated by the merger of two large asset managers that arguably occurred for reasons unrelated to expected route-level differences in US airline ticket prices”
The paper relies on this without support.
The counterfactual world in which firms are separately owned, or in which firms entirely ignore their owners' anti-competitive incentives caused by common ownership, is a valid comparison for estimating the effect of common ownership on airline ticket prices.
“compared to a counterfactual world in which firms are separately owned, or in which firms entirely ignore their owners' anti-competitive incentives caused by common ownership.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The control variables included in the regressions are sufficient to address confounding from the listed events and other factors.
“We also control for potential confounding events using the implied HHI delta in the route from the DL-NW, UA-CO, AA-US, and FL-WN mergers, the share in the route of AA in 2009Q1, and the change in log per capita income in the route from the start of the Great Recession until 2009Q1, each interacted with year-quarter fixed effects.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The pre-period 2009Q1 is before the Barclays BGI acquisition by BlackRock was announced.
“The pre-period is 2009Q1 (the quarter before the Barclays BGI acquisition by BlackRock was announced).”
The paper relies on this without support.
The counterfactual MHHI delta combining the holdings of Barclays and BlackRock represents the change in common ownership caused by the acquisition.
“we calculate a counterfactual MHHI delta in 2009Q1 combining the holdings of Barclays and BlackRock”
The paper relies on this without support.
The Thomson-Reuters dataset is incomplete and features various other inaccuracies.
“The Thomson-Reuters dataset is well-known to be incomplete and feature various other inaccuracies.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Capacity pre-commitments typically happen about one year before the flight.
“which typically happen about one year before the flight”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The paper abstracts away from frictions associated with imperfect vertical integration.
“We thus abstract away from frictions associated with imperfect vertical integration(Forbes and Lederman, 2009, 2010).”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > IV Design
“The effect for the average or the four periods is positive and highly statistically significant, with a coefficient of 0.542”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > IV Design
“We use 2010Q1, 2011Q1, 2012Q1, 2013Q1, and 2014Q1 as the post-periods (we follow the literature by using the same quarter as the pre-period to rule out effects of seasonality), and then an average for the five quarters 2010Q1-2014Q1.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > 4.2 Data on Airline Ownership
“To illustrate the extent of common ownership in the present-day US airline industry, we provide the top-10 shareholders and their ownership percentage as of the fourth quarter of 2016 for a sample of airlines in Table 1.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > Table 1: Illustrative Cases of Within-industry Common Ownership Links.
“This table shows the largest (institutional and non-institutional) beneficial owners and corresponding stakes for an illustrative sample of US publicly traded natural competitors as of 2016Q2.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > IV Design
“Specifically, the F-stats from weak identification tests range from 59 to 290.”
§ ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP > B.2 Variable Definitions
“F-stat (Weak Identification Test) 316.9 47.58 127.4 75.54 59.82 125”
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Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross‐Fund Subsidization
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Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds
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Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion
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Actual, Adjacent, and Potential Competition Estimating the Full Effect of Southwest Airlines
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Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition
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Self-citationUltimate ownership and bank competition
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Self-citationVertical Integration and Input Flows
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CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment FrameworkPreprint
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Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation
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Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the US Health Insurance Industry
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The Price Effects of International Airline Alliances
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Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly
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Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion
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Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control
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Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis of the Airline Industry
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“Doing so, we follow Hastings and Gilbert (2005); Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012) and many predecessors in the industrial organization literature, inside and outside the airline industry.”
Jiang, W., Li, K., & Wang, W. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01724.x · Cited by 221
Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting☆
Matvos, G., & Ostrovsky, M. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.03.014 · Cited by 217
Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry
Forbes, S. J., & Lederman, M. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.5.1831 · Cited by 207 · cited 1×
“The availability of high-quality route-level price and quantity data enables us to more cleanly identify the effect of common ownership on product prices than would be possible in firm-level studies across industries.”
BackgroundAirline competition and domestic US airfares: A comprehensive reappraisal
Brueckner, J. K., Lee, D. N., & Singer, E. (2012) · Economics of Transportation · doi:10.1016/j.ecotra.2012.06.001 · Cited by 197
Vote Buying: General Elections
Dekel, E., Jackson, M. O., & Wolinsky, A. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/587624 · Cited by 192 · cited 1×
“Third, the present paper relates to the empirical literature on the effect of market structure on pricing in the airline industry.”
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Posner, E. A., Morton, F. S., & Weyl, E. G. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2872754 · Cited by 190
Corporate Control, Insider Trading, and Rates of Return
Demsetz, H. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 189
Ciliberto, F., & Williams, J. W. (2014) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12070 · Cited by 186
Does vertical integration affect firm performance? Evidence from the airline industry
Forbes, S. J., & Lederman, M. (2010) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00120.x · Cited by 184 · cited 1×
“Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2013) provide a comprehensive study of the effect of market characteristics on fares; see also Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and Dai, Liu, and Serfes (2014).”
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“Benmelech and Bergman (2008) study corporate finance questions using the airline industry as a laboratory.”
The Power of Shareholder Votes: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections
Aggarwal, R., Dahiya, S., & Prabhala, N. (2015) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2609532 · Cited by 167
The power of shareholder votes: Evidence from uncontested director elections
Aggarwal, R., Dahiya, S., & Prabhala, N. R. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.12.002 · Cited by 167
Collusive behavior and partial ownership of rivals
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Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms
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Shareholder democracy in play: Career consequences of proxy contests
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The effects of mergers on price and output: Two case studies from the airline industry
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BackgroundA new finance capitalism? Mutual funds and ownership re‐concentration in the United States
Davis, G. F. (2008) · European Management Review · doi:10.1057/emr.2008.4 · Cited by 151 · cited 9×
“The stark increase in MHHI delta in 2009 coincides with BlackRock’s acquisition of Barclays Global Investors that we will later use in one of our identification strategies. To put these numbers in perspective, the DOJ/FTC 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that, in highly concentrated markets (i.e., markets with…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCommon Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Anton, M., Ederer, F., Gine, M., & Schmalz, M. C. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2802332 · Cited by 150
Self-citationOn Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies
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The product market effects of hedge fund activism
Aslan, H., & Kumar, P. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.016 · Cited by 138
How Do Firm Financial Conditions Affect Product Quality and Pricing?
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“Empirically, many papers have studied networks of common ownership generated by diversified institutional investors (see, e.g., Faccio and Lang, 2002; Davis, 2008; Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, 2011; Azar, 2012; Davis, 2013), but few have focused on product market outcomes.”
BackgroundPricing Strategy and Financial Policy
Dasgupta, S., & Titman, S. D. (1998) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/11.4.705 · Cited by 132
Lederman, M. (2007) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00129.x · Cited by 131 · cited 3×
“Relatedly, because we employ route-fixed effects, market power on specific routes exerted through frequent-flyer programs (Lederman, 2007) is differenced out in our regressions.”
BackgroundMethodThe Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool
Ashenfelter, O. C., Hosken, D. S., & Weinberg, M. C. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.5.1.239 · Cited by 111
Dai, M., Liu, Q., & Serfes, K. (2013) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00362 · Cited by 108
Bankruptcy and Pricing Behavior in U.S. Airline Markets
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Mullainathan, S., & Scharfstein, D. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.2.195 · Cited by 96
Distracted Shareholders and Corporate ActionsPreprint
Kempf, E., Manconi, A., & Spalt, O. G. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2356163 · Cited by 93 · cited 1×
“For example, Kim and Singal (1993) find that airline mergers during the less tightly regulated period 1985-1988 (all approved by the Department of Transportation) increased airfares in affected routes by 9.”
Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
DeMarzo, P. M. (1993) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298132 · Cited by 93
The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment
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“If you owned two firms in the same industry, would you make them compete with each other? What if you and three acquaintances jointly controlled all firms in a given industry? Industrial economists and policy markers have long realized that common ownership reduces incentives to compete (Rotemberg, 1984; Gordon, 1990;…”
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A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification
Azar, J. (2012) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1993364 · Cited by 87 · cited 4×
“, Faccio and Lang, 2002; Davis, 2008; Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, 2011; Azar, 2012; Davis, 2013), but few have focused on product market outcomes. The closest paper in that respect is Azar (2012), who studies the effect of common ownership on firm-level profit margins. Azar (2012) also introduces the policy “t…”
InfluentialSelf-citationFinancial Transaction Costs and Industrial Performance
Rotemberg, J. J. (2011) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 86
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“%) and increasing share of US publicly traded firms (McCahery, Starks, and Sautner, 2014; Rydqvist, Spizman, and Strebulaev, 2014), reflecting the benefits they generate for retail investors.”
The Product Market Impact of Minority Stake Acquisitions
Nain, A. S., & Wang, Y. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2575 · Cited by 81
The Price Effects of the Delta/Northwest Airline Merger
Luo, D. (2013) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-013-9380-1 · Cited by 75 · cited 2×
“Several earlier papers study the price effect of airline mergers and other route characteristics (Borenstein, 1990; Werden, Joskow, and Johnson, 1991; Kim and Singal, 1993; Borenstein and Rose, 1994, 1995; Peters, 2006; Luo, 2014).”
BackgroundOptimal Cross Holding with Externalities and Strategic Interactions
Clayton, M. J., & Jorgensen, B. N. (2005) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/430867 · Cited by 62
Horizontal shareholding interlocks
Flath, D. J. (1992) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.4090130109 · Cited by 59
Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes
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Do Publicly Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?
Gordon, R. H. (2003) · Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy · doi:10.2202/1538-0637.1013 · Cited by 50 · cited 2×
“A long theoretical literature in industrial organization recognizes that common ownership of natural competitors by the same investors reduces incentives to compete: the benefits of competing aggressively to one firm – gains in market share – come at the expense of firms that are part of the same investors’ portfolio…”
Do Publicly Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?
Gordon, R. (1990) · doi:10.3386/w3303 · Cited by 50
A re-examination of incumbents’ response to the threat of entry: Evidence from the airline industry
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Owner-consumers and efficiency
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BackgroundMethodFrom the Fringe to the Forefront: Low Cost Carriers and Airline Price Determination
Kwoka, J. E., Hearle, K., & Alepin, P. (2016) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-016-9506-3 · Cited by 46
Baker, J. B. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2746874 · Cited by 46 · cited 1×
“As for the fast-growing literature on the implications of our findings for antitrust and corporate law, we refer the reader to Elhauge (2015); Baker (2016) and various responses to those papers.”
BackgroundUnilateral effects of mergers with general linear demand
Hausman, J. A., Moresi, S., & Rainey, M. (2010) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.10.015 · Cited by 45
Forbes, S. J., Lederman, M., & Tombe, T. (2015) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20130164 · Cited by 44 · cited 2×
“He and Huang (2014) examine the relation between a binary common ownership dummy and firm-level market shares and several corporate finance variables.”
Foros, Ø., Kind, H. J., & Shaffer, G. (2011) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.03.001 · Cited by 42
Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the FirmPreprint
Azar, J. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2969755 · Cited by 40
Self-citationChapter 12 Corporate Law and Governance
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Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the FirmPreprint
Azar, J. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2811221 · Cited by 35
Self-citationAre Mutual Funds Active Voters?Preprint
Iliev, P., & Lowry, M. B. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2145398 · Cited by 34
The Effects of Common Ownership on Customer-Supplier Relationships
Freeman, K. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2873199 · Cited by 29
Diversification and corporate decisions
Rubin, A. (2006) · Corporate Ownership and Control · doi:10.22495/cocv3i3c1p6 · Cited by 27 · cited 2×
“We find that the anti-competitive incentives implied by common ownership concentration alone – which come on top of those implied by the traditional HHI measure of market concentration and are measured on the same scale – are more than 10 times larger than what the FTC/DOJ 2010 horizontal merger…”
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Dekel, E., & Wolinsky, A. (2011) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdr028 · Cited by 27
Agents with and Without PrincipalsPreprint
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.248613 · Cited by 24
The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor OutcomesPreprint
Brav, A. P., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2022904 · Cited by 23
The Granular Nature of Large Institutional InvestorsPreprint
Ben‐David, I., Franzoni, F. A., Moussawi, R., et al. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2620271 · Cited by 20
Kraus, A., & Rubin, A. (2009) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2009.05.001 · Cited by 20
Majority Choice and the Objective Function of the Firm under Uncertainty
Benninga, S., & Muller, E. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003358 · Cited by 19
Can a joint venture lessen competition more than a merger?
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The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market CompetitionPreprint
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Partnering with Competitors - An Empirical Analysis of Airline Alliances and Multimarket CompetitionPreprint
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Market Power and Joint Ownership: Evidence from Nuclear Plants in Sweden
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Governing Multiple FirmsPreprint
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Bargaining with a Shared Interest: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Labor DisputesPreprint
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Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
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Product Market Competition in a World of Cross Ownership: Evidence from Institutional Blockholdings
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The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. S. (2019) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.101246 · Cited by 749
“55 In fact, a rapidly growing body of research finds that when a firm’s investors simultaneously own significant stakes in its competitors, managers are incentivized to reduce investment, increase disclosure and become less competitive (e.g., He and Huang, 2017; Azar et al., 2018; Park et al., 2019).”
BackgroundSocially responsible corporate customers
Dai, R., Liang, H., & Ng, L. (2020) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.01.003 · Cited by 690
The Big Three and corporate carbon emissions around the world
Azar, J., Duro, M., Kadach, I., & Ormazábal, G. (2021) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.007 · Cited by 667
Self-citationInternalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership
He, J., Huang, J.-K., & Zhao, S. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019 · Cited by 360
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Metadata
- Authors
- AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I.
- Affiliations
- University of Michigan (US)
- American Bar Association (US)
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2018-08
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1513-1565
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2887416572
- Cited by
- 980
- References
- 159
- Citations by year
- 2026: 124 · 2025: 183 · 2024: 145 · 2023: 109 · 2022: 90 · 2021: 98 · 2020: 91 · 2019: 72 · 2018: 43
- FWCI
- 222.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.iese.edu
- Licence
- Locations
- The Journal of Finance (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion, public-domain)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Keywords
- collective ownership, institutional investors, competition law, market concentration, airline industry, ticket prices, asset managers, diversification, corporate governance, product market competition
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