New directions in predictive processing
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Predictive processing (PP) is now a prominent theoretical framework in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This review focuses on PP research with a relatively philosophical focus, taking stock of the framework and discussing new directions. The review contains an introduction that describes the full PP toolbox; an exploration of areas where PP has advanced understanding of perceptual and cognitive phenomena; a discussion of PP's impact on foundational issues in cognitive science; and a consideration of the philosophy of science of PP. The overall picture is that PP is a fruitful framework, with exciting new directions awaiting exploration.
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Citations
Cites
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Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 2×
“It speaks in favour of this ambitious principle that all the elements of the PP-toolbox identified earlier fall out of mathematical reorganisations of FEP: perceptual inference, active inference, precision optimisation, complexity reduction, model selection etc. (Friston, 2010, Hohwy, 2015).”
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Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 7×
“Since key philosophical publications on PP by Clark (2013) and Hohwy (2013), there has been a dramatic increase in philosophically oriented publications on the topic.”
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“Pioneering work from Chris Eliasmith (2003) and Rick Grush (2004) did not appeal to Friston’s approach but independently provided influential philosophical frameworks congenial to PP.”
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“…is considerable debate and innovation in the debate about the significance of Markov blankets, which might be considered a mark of the mental and which have been shown to emerge at every possible level of description of living systems (Ramstead et al., 2019b, Hohwy, 2016, Kirchhoff et al., 2018).”
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“If discrete, then it may be easier to map on to (propositional) thought but this will also change neuronal message passing into a different format than predictive coding (Friston et al., 2017).”
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Background
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Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170
Self-citationTheory Is All You Need: AI, Human Cognition, and Causal Reasoning
(2024) · doi:10.1287/stsc.2024.0189 · Cited by 151
The functional role of cardiac activity in perception and action
Skora, L. I., Livermore, J. J. A., & Roelofs, K. (2022) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104655 · Cited by 125
“…operate on the principles of Bayesian inference, where incoming sensory information from multiple modalities (understood as statistical likelihood) is combined with the prior predictions to arrive at a best guess (posterior prediction) of the causes of that information (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2020).”
Affective experience in the predictive mind: a review and new integrative account
Fernandez Velasco, P., & Loev, S. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02755-4 · Cited by 43
“In a unifying vision, PP can be seen as the result of the free-energy principle, which states that self-organising systems must minimize (variational) free-energy (Friston 2010; for a discussion of pluralistic and unifying versions of PP, see the recent review in Hohwy 2020).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hohwy, J.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2020-03-02
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 209-223
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W3010115675
- Cited by
- 247
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 14.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Funders
- Australian Research Council (DP160102770, DP190101805)
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