The DOI matches its Crossref record; 94 of the 94 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies
Abstract
April 01 1999 Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies Stephen M. Walt Stephen M. Walt Stephen M. Walt is Professor of Political Science and Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division at the University of Chicago. He will join the faculty of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in July 1999. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Stephen M. Walt Stephen M. Walt is Professor of Political Science and Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division at the University of Chicago. He will join the faculty of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in July 1999. Online Issn: 1531-4804 Print Issn: 0162-2889 © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.1999 International Security (1999) 23 (4): 5–48. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.4.5 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Stephen M. Walt; Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies. International Security 1999; 23 (4): 5–48. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.23.4.5 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsInternational Security Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.1999 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Banfield, E. C., & Downs, A. (1958) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2109186 · Cited by 18,594
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 11,810
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,518
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994) · Princeton University Press · doi:10.1515/9781400821211 · Cited by 7,225
Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1994) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400820740 · Cited by 7,106
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
Diebold, W., & Keohane, R. O. (1984) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20042201 · Cited by 3,944
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Fearon, J. D. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944796 · Cited by 2,360
Cooperation under the security dilemma
Jervis, R. (1978) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009958 · Cited by 2,305
Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science
Hull, D. L. (1988) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226360492.001.0001 · Cited by 2,061
Riker, W. H., Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2108773 · Cited by 2,059
Mccloskey, D. N. (2008) · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_1435 · Cited by 1,816
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science.
Baird, D., & Hacking, I. (1988) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2215864 · Cited by 1,584
Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma
(2015) · Conflict After the Cold War · doi:10.4324/9781315664484-51 · Cited by 1,555
Journal of Conflict Resolution
(n.d.) · Max Planck Digital Library · Cited by 1,544
The moral dimension: toward a new economics
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-3358 · Cited by 1,531
Shove, G. F., & Hicks, J. R. (1933) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2224288 · Cited by 1,381
Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science
Van Evera, S. (2016) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9780801454455 · Cited by 1,374
Mueller, D. C. (1989) · Cited by 1,284
Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior
Richards, R. J. (1987) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226149516.001.0001 · Cited by 1,274
Education and democratic citizenship in America
(1997) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-4140 · Cited by 1,253
Oye, K. A. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691186702 · Cited by 1,131
Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work
Pape, R. A. (1997) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.22.2.90 · Cited by 1,104
Game Theory and Economic Modelling
Kreps, D. M. (1990) · doi:10.1093/0198283814.001.0001 · Cited by 1,023
Progress and its problems towards a theory of scientific growth
Laudan, L., & Carroll, P. T. (1977) · Cited by 981
Selten, R. (1988) · Theory and Decision Library C · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_2 · Cited by 917
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy
(1990) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571657 · Cited by 899
Bayes Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic
Grether, D. M. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885092 · Cited by 820
Game Theory for Political Scientists
Morrow, J. D. (1995) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691213200 · Cited by 786
Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World
Russett, B. (1994) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400821020 · Cited by 762
Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics
McCloskey, D. N. (1994) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511599347 · Cited by 722
The Logic of Images in International Relations.
Angell, R. C., & Jervis, R. (1972) · Social Forces · doi:10.2307/2576152 · Cited by 704
Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change
Fukuyama, F., Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R. O. (1994) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20045927 · Cited by 667
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War
Cohen, E. A., & Pape, R. A. (1996) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20047600 · Cited by 656
Sorensen, R. C., Lerner, D., & Lasswell, H. D. (1953) · The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science · doi:10.2307/1139766 · Cited by 629
Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict
Mack, A. (1975) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009880 · Cited by 620
Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace
Layne, C. (1994) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539195 · Cited by 600
Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments
(2002) · International Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9780203518588-31 · Cited by 586
Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory
Powell, R. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963947 · Cited by 565
Neorealism and neoliberalism : the contemporary debate
Baldwin, D. A. (1993) · Cited by 509
Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies
Achen, C. H., & Snidal, D. (1989) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010405 · Cited by 500
"Any More Bright Ideas?" The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy
Blyth, M. M., Goldstein, J., Keohane, R., & Sikkink, K. (1997) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.2307/422082 · Cited by 494
de Mesquita, B. B., & Lalman, D. (1992) · Cited by 484
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Smith, A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585485 · Cited by 458
Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems
Smith, A. (1996) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600934 · Cited by 457
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model
Fearon, J. D. (1994) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002794038002004 · Cited by 403
War and reason: domestic and international imperatives
(1992) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-2354 · Cited by 393
Military Organization and Society.
Lindstrom, F. B., & Andreski, S. (1970) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2093892 · Cited by 393
The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.
Williams, C. W., Dunn, F. S., Brodie, B., Wolfers, A., Corbett, P. E., & Fox, W. T. R. (1946) · Military Affairs · doi:10.2307/1982355 · Cited by 377
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining
Morrow, J. D. (1989) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111116 · Cited by 358
Smith, A. M. (1995) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600800 · Cited by 343
Cook, K. S., & Levi, M. (1990) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226742410.001.0001 · Cited by 328
Reputation And International Politics
Mercer, J. (2010) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9781501724473 · Cited by 314
Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology
Hynes, J. A., Hogarth, R. M., & Rader, M. W. (1988) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/135276 · Cited by 306
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining.
Cross, J. G., & Roth, A. E. (1987) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2523873 · Cited by 287
Nuclear deterrence theory the search for credibility
Powell, R. (1990) · Cited by 285
Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?
Schweller, R. L. (1992) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010448 · Cited by 268
Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs
Morrow, J. D. (1994) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002794038002005 · Cited by 264
Trachtenberg, M. (1991) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691217987 · Cited by 262
Powell, R. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938960 · Cited by 261
Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science
Almond, G. A. (1988) · PS Political Science & Politics · doi:10.1017/s1049096500034223 · Cited by 223
Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen
Reiter, D. (1995) · International Security · doi:10.2307/2539227 · Cited by 200
Truth versus Precision in Economics
Neuberg, L. G., & Mayer, T. (1994) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060161 · Cited by 194
Game theory and national security
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-3485 · Cited by 181
Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in Honor of Warren E. Miller
(1994) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.23326 · Cited by 171
Should Strategic Studies Survive?
Betts, R. K. (1997) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100014702 · Cited by 161
Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?
Bates, R. H. (1997) · PS Political Science & Politics · doi:10.2307/420485 · Cited by 154
Game Theory and the Spiral Model
Kydd, A. H. (1997) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1997.0012 · Cited by 150
Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View
de Mesquita, B. B. (1985) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600500 · Cited by 136
Stability and the Distribution of Power
Powell, R. (1996) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1996.0006 · Cited by 123
Udéhn, L. (2002) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203007907 · Cited by 121
Binmore, K., Kirman, A. P., & Tani, P. (1993) · Cited by 114
Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World
Nalebuff, B. (1991) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010397 · Cited by 102
Human Understanding. Vol 1, The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts
Datelle, H. (1975) · Physical Therapy · doi:10.1093/ptj/55.3.325 · Cited by 82
The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War
Cohen, E. A., & Herrmann, D. G. (1996) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20047678 · Cited by 73
On the Scientific Status of Rational Models
Moe, T. M. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110782 · Cited by 70
Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation
Nalebuff, B. (1986) · Conflict Management and Peace Science · doi:10.1177/073889428600900202 · Cited by 67
Theory and Progress in Social Science
Rule, J. B. (1999) · The Social Science Journal · doi:10.1016/s0362-3319(99)00030-0 · Cited by 67
A Spatial Model of International Conflict
Morrow, J. D. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540018503x · Cited by 66
Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World
Nalebuff, B. (1994) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-2790-9_9 · Cited by 64
Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970
Shimshoni, J. (1988) · Cited by 52
Kaufmann, C. D. (1994) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2600865 · Cited by 50
Newsom, D. D. (1995) · Foreign Policy · doi:10.2307/1149406 · Cited by 43
Engineering or science: What is the study of politics?
Ordeshook, P. C. (1995) · Critical Review · doi:10.1080/08913819508443378 · Cited by 40
Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control
Downs, G. W., & Rocke, D. M. (1987) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2010222 · Cited by 38
Wagner, R. H. (1982) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002782026002007 · Cited by 34
Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability
Langlois, J.-P. P. (1991) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111495 · Cited by 34
How democracies differ: Public opinion, state structure, and the lessons of the Fashoda crisis
Peterson, S. (1995) · Security Studies · doi:10.1080/09636419508429251 · Cited by 32
Bar‐Hillel, M. (1974) · Organizational Behavior and Human Performance · doi:10.1016/0030-5073(74)90020-8 · Cited by 27
Deterrence Theory Discussion: II
O’Neill, B. (1992) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951692892004004006 · Cited by 7
Cited by
The Evolution of International Security Studies
Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817762 · Cited by 1,238
Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
Tomz, M. (2007) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818307070282 · Cited by 699
The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships
Crawford, N. C. (2000) · International Security · doi:10.1162/016228800560327 · Cited by 673
Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
Reiter, D. (2003) · Perspective on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592703000033 · Cited by 467
Mercer, J. (2010) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309990221 · Cited by 403
Metadata
- Authors
- Walt, S. M.
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 5-48
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2131108751
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 94
- FWCI
- 84.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.