The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality
Abstract
Dual-system approaches to psychology explain the fundamental properties of human judgment, decision making, and behavior across diverse domains. Yet, the appropriate characterization of each system is a source of debate. For instance, a large body of research on moral psychology makes use of the contrast between “emotional” and “rational/cognitive” processes, yet even the chief proponents of this division recognize its shortcomings. Largely independently, research in the computational neurosciences has identified a broad division between two algorithms for learning and choice derived from formal models of reinforcement learning. One assigns value to actions intrinsically based on past experience, while another derives representations of value from an internally represented causal model of the world. This division between action- and outcome-based value representation provides an ideal framework for a dual-system theory in the moral domain.
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Cites
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BackgroundThe Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
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Cited by
Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.
Everett, J. A. C., Pizarro, D. A., & Crockett, M. J. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000165 · Cited by 317
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Self-citationThe logic of universalization guides moral judgment
Levine, S., Kleiman-Weiner, M., Schulz, L., Tenenbaum, J., & Cushman, F. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2014505117 · Cited by 88
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cushman, F.
- Venue
- Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-07-16
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 273-292
- ISSN
- 1088-8683 (ISSN-L)
- 1532-7957
- OpenAlex
- W2119998956
- Cited by
- 473
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 14.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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