The DOI matches its Crossref record; 216 of the 221 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems
Open accessAbstract
This excerpt describes the intellectual journey that I have taken the last half-century from when I began graduate studies in the late 1950s. The early efforts to understand the polycentric water industry in California were formative for me. In addition to working with Vincent Ostrom and Charles Tiebout as they formulated the concept of polycentric systems for governing metropolitan areas, I studied the efforts of a large group of private and public water producers facing the problem of an overdrafted groundwater basin on the coast and watching saltwater intrusion threaten the possibility of long-term use. Then, in the 1970s, I participated with colleagues in the study of polycentric police industries serving U.S. metropolitan areas to find that the dominant theory underlying massive reform proposals was incorrect. Metropolitan areas served by a combination of large and small producers could achieve economies of scale in the production of some police services and avoid diseconomies of scale in the production of others.
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“Ostrom shared the 2009 Nobel in economics for showing that groups of people are capable of managing their common resources on their own, but only when certain conditions are met.”
From Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional change (2014) · cites this paper as Ostrom 2010
In the citing paper
“In this paper, we draw on CPR theory (11–13) to argue that indigenous territories will only be effective at curbing deforestation when they are granted full property rights.”
From Collective property rights reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (2020) · cites this paper as [12]
In the citing paper
“Thus, homologation enables indigenous territories to fulfill three of the CPR management requisites: “clearly defined boundaries,” “collective management,” and “recognition of rights to organize” (11–13, 30).”
From Collective property rights reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon (2020) · cites this paper as [12]
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Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective
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McGinnis, M. D. (2011) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2010.00401.x · Cited by 760
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Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods
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“…simple, repeated public goods experiments, subjects initially tended to contribute at a higher level than predicted by the Nash equilibrium (R. Mark Isaac et al. 1984, 1985, 1994; Isaac and Walker 1988; Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames 1979) and outcomes slowly approach the predicted Nash…”
BackgroundEcological Degradation in Protected Areas: The Case of Wolong Nature Reserve for Giant Pandas
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COMMUNICATION and FREE‐RIDING BEHAVIOR: THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM
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Trade-offs and synergies between carbon storage and livelihood benefits from forest commons
Chhatre, A., & Agrawal, A. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0905308106 · Cited by 679 · cited 1×
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Institutional Incentives And Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies In Perspective
Elinor Ostrom, B., Schroeder, L., & Wynne, S. (1993) · Cited by 678
Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill
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Eviction for Conservation: A Global Overview
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Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
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BackgroundCoping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work
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“Developing game theoretical models of common-pool resource situations (Weissing and E. Ostrom 1993; E. Ostrom and Gardner 1993) has been one strategy we have used to assess the theoretical outcomes of a set of variables we have observed in the field.”
Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review
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Local Enforcement and Better Forests
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“…are sustainable over long periods of time, and how larger institutional arrangements enhance or detract from the capabilities of individuals at smaller scales to solve problems efficiently and sustainably (see, for example, Agrawal and Gibson 2001; Gibson et al. 2005; Schlager and Blomquist 2008).”
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
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Explaining discussion-induced cooperation.
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People and forests : communities, institutions, and governance
Gibson, C. C., McKean, M. A., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (2000) · Cited by 577
(1999) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-1545 · Cited by 560
Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out
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Insights on linking forests, trees, and people from the air, on the ground, and in the laboratory
Ostrom, E., & Nagendra, H. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0607962103 · Cited by 551 · cited 1×
“Other focused studies also stress the relationship between local monitoring and better forest conditions (Rucha Ghate and Harini Nagendra 2005; E. Ostrom and Nagendra 2006; Abwoli Y. Banana and William Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000; Edward Webb and Shivakoti 2008).”
Beyond panaceas in water institutions
Meinzen-Dick, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0702296104 · Cited by 549 · cited 2×
“Further, simple policy prescriptions to turn over resources to a government, to privatize, or more recently to decentralize, may also fail (Berkes 2007; William A. Brock and Stephen R. Carpenter 2007; Meinzen-Dick 2007).”
"Common Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy * 1
Ciriacy-Wantrup, S. V. (2019) · Natural Resource Economics: Selected Papers · doi:10.4324/9780429035210-4 · Cited by 513
The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, by Vincent Ostrom
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Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India
Bardhan, P. (2000) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/452480 · Cited by 445 · cited 1×
“Scholars have carefully documented effective farmer designed and operated systems in many countries including Japan (Masahiko Aoki 2001), India (Ruth Meinzen-Dick 2007; Pranab K. Bardhan 2000), and Sri Lanka (Norman T. Uphoff 1991).”
Rational Choice and Social Theory
Satz, D., Ferejohn, J., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (1994) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2940928 · Cited by 440
Institutions and collective action : self-governance in irrigation
Tang, S. (1992) · ICS Press eBooks · Cited by 424
Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics
Wilson, W. (1885) · Cited by 387
(1999) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.16061 · Cited by 384 · cited 4×
“Forests are a particularly important form of common-pool resource given their role in climate change–related emissions and carbon sequestration (Josep G. Canadell and Michael R. Raupach 2008), the biodiversity they contain, and their contribution to rural livelihoods in developing countries.”
InfluentialNetworks of Adjacent Action Situations in Polycentric Governance
McGinnis, M. D. (2011) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2010.00396.x · Cited by 368
Adaptive governance and managing resilience to natural hazards
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Forest commons and local enforcement
Chhatre, A., & Agrawal, A. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0803399105 · Cited by 358
Hayes, T. M. (2006) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.03.002 · Cited by 353 · cited 2×
“…by colleagues in Colombia to assess whether experienced villagers who are dependent on resources make decisions about the “time 7 See Joseph Henrich et al. (2006) in which field experiments were conducted in multiple countries testing whether a much broader set of participants would also…”
Background(1998) · The HKU Scholars Hub (University of Hong Kong) · Cited by 346
Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change
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Economic behavior and institutions
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The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid
Gibson, C. C., Andersson, K. P., Shivakumar, S. J., & Shivakumar, S. (2005) · OUP Catalogue · Cited by 329
The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid
Gibson, C. C., Andersson, K., Ostrom, E., & Shivakumar, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199278857.001.0001 · Cited by 322 · cited 1×
“…are sustainable over long periods of time, and how larger institutional arrangements enhance or detract from the capabilities of individuals at smaller scales to solve problems efficiently and sustainably (see, for example, Agrawal and Gibson 2001; Gibson et al. 2005; Schlager and Blomquist 2008).”
Nesting, Subsidiarity, and Community-based environmental Governance beyond the Local Scale
Marshall, G. (2007) · International Journal of the Commons · doi:10.18352/bmgn-lchr.50 · Cited by 316
(1999) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.16052 · Cited by 311
Institutional ecological economics
Paavola, J., & Adger, W. N. (2005) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.09.017 · Cited by 304
Choosing justice: an experimental approach to ethical theory
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-2607 · Cited by 301
Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?
Baland, J.-M., & Platteau, J.-P. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198290616.001.0001 · Cited by 277
Gardiner, P., & Popper, K. R. (1959) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2216437 · Cited by 272
American industry: Structure, conduct, performance
(1982) · Journal of Macroeconomics · doi:10.1016/0164-0704(82)90069-6 · Cited by 270
The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100 Years
Stavins, R. N. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.1.81 · Cited by 265
Allport, F. H. (1962) · The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0043563 · Cited by 247 · cited 1×
“The IAD builds on earlier work on transactions (John R. Commons [1924] 1968), logic of the situation (Karl R. Popper 1961), collective structures (Floyd H. Allport 1962), frames (Irving Goffman 1974), and scripts (Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson 1977).”
ON THE NATURE OF RECIPROCAL MOTIVES
COX, J. C., & DECK, C. A. (2005) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1093/ei/cbi043 · Cited by 244
Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality
(1992) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1992.tb02303.x · Cited by 232
The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications
Williamson, O. E. (1984) · Cited by 231
Strategies and Games: Theory and PracticePreprint
Dutta, P. K. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 229
Chaos, complexity and community management of fisheries
Wilson, J. A., Acheson, J. M., Metcalfe, M., & Kleban, P. (1994) · Marine Policy · doi:10.1016/0308-597x(94)90044-2 · Cited by 228
Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution
Casari, M., & Plott, C. R. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00098-7 · Cited by 225
The relative price of fairness: gender differences in a punishment game
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1996) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(96)00854-2 · Cited by 222
Anderson, T. L., & Hill, P. J. (1990) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467203 · Cited by 209
Communities and the environment : ethnicity, gender, and the state in community-based conservation
Agrawal, A., & Gibson, C. C. (2001) · Cited by 207
Towards understanding governance for sustainable urban water management
van de Meene, S. J., Brown, R. R., & Farrelly, M. A. (2011) · Global Environmental Change · doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.04.003 · Cited by 204
Whom Can We Trust?: How Groups, Networks, and Institutions Make Trust Possible
Cook, K. S., Levi, M., & Hardin, R. (2009) · Cited by 201
Schlager, E., & BLOMQUIST, W. (2008) · University of Colorado Press eBooks · doi:10.1353/book.2688 · Cited by 199
Reflections on Vincent Ostrom, Public Administration, and Polycentricity
McGinnis, M. D., & Ostrom, E. (2012) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02488.x · Cited by 197
ECONOMICS AND THE MODELING OF WATER RESOURCES AND POLICIES
Booker, J. F., Howitt, R. E., Michelsen, A. M., & Young, R. A. (2011) · Natural Resource Modeling · doi:10.1111/j.1939-7445.2011.00105.x · Cited by 196
Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons
Copeland, B. R., & Taylor, M. S. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.725 · Cited by 195
Testing Hypotheses for the Success of Different Conservation Strategies
BROOKS, J. S., FRANZEN, M. A., HOLMES, C. M., GROTE, M. N., & MULDER, M. B. (2006) · Conservation Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2006.00506.x · Cited by 190 · cited 2×
“Brooks et al. (2006) reviewed data generated by 124 conservation projects and found that allowing local users to harvest and sell some products and involving communities in the design and administration of a project were all important factors for successful outcomes.”
The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries: Economic Models and Human Behavior
Clark, C. (2006) · Cited by 190
Patterns of metropolitan policing
Elinor Ostrom, B., Parks, R. B., & Whitaker, G. P. (1978) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 186
(2000) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.10728 · Cited by 185
Theory and experiment: What are the questions?
Smith, V. L. S. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.008 · Cited by 181 · cited 1×
“While it is not possible yet to point to a single theory of human behavior that has been successfully formulated and tested in a variety of settings, scholars are currently positing and testing assumptions that are likely to be at the core of future developments (Smith 2003, 2010).”
Beyond the tragedy of the Commons
Basurto, X., & Ostrom, E. (2009) · ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT · doi:10.3280/efe2009-001004 · Cited by 180
REWARDS, EXPERIENCE AND DECISION COSTS IN FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS
SMITH, V. L., & WALKER, J. M. (1993) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1993.tb00880.x · Cited by 176 · cited 1×
“Predictions derived from the rational choice model are empirically supported in open markets for private goods and other competitive environments (Charles A. Holt 2007; Vernon L. Smith and Walker 1993; Debra Satz and John Ferejohn 1994).”
Successfully Governing the Commons: Principles of Social Organization in an Andean Irrigation System
Trawick, P. B. (2001) · Human Ecology · doi:10.1023/a:1007199304395 · Cited by 174 · cited 1×
“Conceiving of property rights bundles is now widely accepted by scholars who have studied diverse property rights systems around the world (David J. Brunckhorst 2000; P. Degnbol and McCay 2007; Jouni Paavola and W. Neil Adger 2005; Paul B. Trawick 2001; James A. Wilson et al. 1994).”
Meta-analyses of case studies: A method for studying regional and global environmental change
Rudel, T. K. (2008) · Global Environmental Change · doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.06.001 · Cited by 174 · cited 1×
“Thomas K. Rudel (2008) reported that he had screened nearly 1,200 studies for a meta-analysis of 268 cases of tropical forest cover change.”
Ones, U., & Putterman, L. (2007) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.018 · Cited by 174
Bray, D. B., Ellis, E. A., Armijo-Canto, N., & Beck, C. T. (2004) · Land Use Policy · doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2003.11.001 · Cited by 172
Andersson, K. P., Gibson, C. C., & Lehoucq, F. (2006) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.08.009 · Cited by 172
Governance of the Commons: A Role for the State?
Grafton, R. Q. (2000) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146949 · Cited by 163 · cited 2×
“In light of a comparative study of private, community, and state governed common-pool resources, R. Quentin Grafton (2000) found each to be successful when well matched to local settings and involving the active participation of local users.”
How Do Groups Solve Local Commons Dilemmas? Lessons from Experimental Economics in the Field
Cárdenas, J.-C. (2000) · Environment Development and Sustainability · doi:10.1023/a:1011422313042 · Cited by 155
Of Men and Meadows: Strategies of Alpine Land Use
Netting, R. M. (1972) · Anthropological Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3316527 · Cited by 153 · cited 2×
“A. scholars from Diverse Disciplines Examine Whether Resource users are Always Trapped Dramatic incidents of overharvested resources had captured widespread attention, while studies by anthropologists, economic historians, engineers, historians, philosophers, and political scientists of local governance of smaller to…”
Improving Irrigation Governance and Management in Nepal
Shivakoti, G. P., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (2003) · Asia-Pacific Journal of Rural Development · doi:10.1177/1018529120030208 · Cited by 148
Panaceas and diversification of environmental policy
Brock, W., & Carpenter, S. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · doi:10.1073/pnas.0702096104 · Cited by 143
Publius: The Journal of Federalism
(2010) · Publius The Journal of Federalism · doi:10.1093/publius/pjq031 · Cited by 133
In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action
Poteete, A. R., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (2004) · Agricultural Systems · doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2004.07.002 · Cited by 131
Toonen, T. A. J. (2010) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02147.x · Cited by 127 · cited 1×
“We need to ask how diverse polycentric institutions help or hinder the innovativeness, learning, adapting, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales (Theo Toonen 2010).”
Institutions, motivations and public goods: An experimental test of motivational crowding
Reeson, A. F., & Tisdell, J. G. (2008) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.04.002 · Cited by 126
Reflections on “Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation”
Elinor Ostrom, B. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.1.49 · Cited by 126
Multi-stakeholder platforms for linking small farmers to value chains: evidence from the Andes
Thiele, G., Devaux, A., Reinoso, I., Pico, H., Montesdeoca, F., Pumisacho, M., Andrade-Piedra, J. L., Velasco, C., Flores, P., Esprella, R., et al. (2011) · International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability · doi:10.1080/14735903.2011.589206 · Cited by 124
Wheare, K. C. (1948) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819100006203 · Cited by 122
Institutional factors affecting biophysical outcomes in forest management
Coleman, E. A. (2008) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.1002/pam.20405 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“Recent studies by Eric Coleman (2009) and Coleman and Brian Steed (2009) also find that a major variable affecting forest conditions is the investment by local users in monitoring.”
Changes in Public Commons as a Consequence of Urbanization: The Agara Lake in Bangalore, India
D’Souza, R., & Nagendra, H. (2011) · Environmental Management · doi:10.1007/s00267-011-9658-8 · Cited by 120
Monitoring and sanctioning in the commons: An application to forestry
Coleman, E. A., & Steed, B. C. (2009) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.02.006 · Cited by 109
A Behavioral Approach to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations
Ostrom, V., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (1965) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/000271626535900115 · Cited by 105
Bioregional Planning: Resource Management Beyond the New Millennium
Brunckhorst, D. J. (2000) · Cited by 103
The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries
Clark, C. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511617966 · Cited by 101 · cited 1×
“chhatre, ashwini and arun agrawal (2009), “tradeoffs and synergies between carbon storage and livelihood Benefits from forest commons,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(42), 17667–17670.”
Ison, R. L., Collins, K., Colvin, J., Jiggins, J., Roggero, P. P., Seddaiu, G., Steyaert, P., Toderi, M., & Zanolla, C. (2011) · Water Resources Management · doi:10.1007/s11269-011-9880-4 · Cited by 100
Polycentric Governance and Development
McGinnis, M. D. (1999) · Cited by 100
Settlement Design, Forest Fragmentation, and Landscape Change in Rondônia, Amazônia
Batistella, M., Robeson, S. M., & Moran, E. F. (2003) · Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing · doi:10.14358/pers.69.7.805 · Cited by 99
Bell, F. W. (1972) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259867 · Cited by 96 · cited 1×
“The Bundles of Property Rights Related to Common-Pool Resources Resource economists have used the term “common property resource” to refer to fisheries and water resources (H. Scott Gordon 1954; Anthony D. Scott 1955; Frederick W. Bell 1972).”
Unintended and perverse consequences of ignoring linkages in fisheries systems
Degnbol, P., & McCay, B. J. (2007) · ICES Journal of Marine Science · doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsm040 · Cited by 94 · cited 2×
“ostrom, elinor and harini nagendra (2006), “insights on linking forests, trees, and People from the air, on the Ground, and in the laboratory,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(51): 19224–19231.”
Banana, A. Y., & Gombya-Ssembajjwe, W. (2000) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5286.003.0010 · Cited by 94
Joshi, N. N., Elinor Ostrom, B., Shivakoti, G. P., & Lam, W. F. (2000) · Asia-Pacific Journal of Rural Development · doi:10.1177/1018529120000205 · Cited by 93 · cited 1×
“The earlier findings regarding the higher level of performance of farmer managed systems was again confirmed using the expanded database containing 229 irrigation systems (Neeraj N. Joshi et al. 2000; Shivakoti and E. Ostrom 2002).”
Janssen, M. A. (2006) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2006.02.004 · Cited by 91 · cited 1×
“…simplified but interesting combinations of theoretical variables and derive testable conclusions from them (see James M. Acheson and Roy Gardner 2005; Gardner et al. 2000; Franz Weissing and E. Ostrom 1993) as well as agent-based models (ABMs) (Wander Jager and Marco A. Janssen 2002; Janssen 2008).”
Wilson, J. A. (1990) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146679 · Cited by 88 · cited 1×
“Fishers end up “fishing for knowledge” (J. Wilson 1990) where using heuristics over time enables them to recognize diverse clues of environmental processes that they need to take into account when making their own decisions.”
Developing a method for analyzing institutional change
Elinor Ostrom, B. (2008) · Economics of legal relationships · doi:10.4324/9780203894439.ch3 · Cited by 84
Fourteen years of monitoring community-managed forests: learning from IFRI's experience
Wollenberg, E. K., Merino, L. F. G., Agrawal, A., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (2007) · The International Forestry Review · doi:10.1505/ifor.9.2.670 · Cited by 81 · cited 3×
“Ostrom 2004; Eva Wollenberg et al. 2007). IFRI is unique among efforts to study forests as it is the only interdisciplinary long term monitoring and research program studying forests in multiple countries owned by governments, private organizations, and communities. Forests are a particularly important form of common-…”
InfluentialImplications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior
Cox, J. C., Sadiraj, K., & Sadiraj, V. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9156-7 · Cited by 78
Tucker, C. M. (2008) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6977-2 · Cited by 76
Role of Monitoring in Institutional Performance: Forest Management in Maharashtra, India
Ghate, R., & Nagendra, H. (2005) · Digital Library Of The Commons Repository (Indiana University) · Cited by 73
Hybrid Forms of Business: The Logic of Gift in the Commercial World
Grassl, W. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1182-5 · Cited by 69
Yandle, T. (2007) · Ecology and Society · doi:10.5751/es-02181-120227 · Cited by 65 · cited 2×
“…the broad theoretical concept of an ITQ system into an operational system in a particular location involves multiple years of hard work by the fishers involved as well as the government officials (see Clark 2006; Tracy Yandle 2007; Yandle and Christopher Dewees 2003; Thráinn Eggertsson 1990).”
Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science
Alt, J. Ε., Levi, M., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (1999) · Russell Sage Foundation eBooks · Cited by 65
The Coordination Value of Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence
Camera, G., & Casari, M. (2014) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.6.1.290 · Cited by 64
Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules
Faysse, N. (2005) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00246.x · Cited by 61 · cited 1×
“We now know that the earlier theories of rational, but helpless, individuals who are trapped in social dilemmas are not supported by a large number of studies using diverse methods (Nicolas Faysse 2005; Poteete, Janssen, and E. Ostrom 2010).”
Banana, A. Y., Vogt, N. D., Bahati, J., & Gombya-Ssembajjwe, W. (2007) · Digital Library Of The Commons Repository (Indiana University) · doi:10.5897/sre.9000317 · Cited by 59
Decentralization, forests and rural communities : policy outcomes in South and Southeast Asia
Webb, E. L., & Shivakoti, G. P. (2008) · Cited by 54
Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment
Camera, G., Casari, M., & Bigoni, M. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.009 · Cited by 51
Cooperativeness and Impatience in the Tragedy of the CommonsPreprint
Fehr, E., & Leibbrandt, A. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1214914 · Cited by 48
Size and Performance in a Federal System
Elinor Ostrom, B. (1976) · Publius The Journal of Federalism · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a038392 · Cited by 45 · cited 1×
“…in Indianapolis (E. Ostrom et al. 1973), Chicago (E. Ostrom and Gordon P. Whitaker 1974), and St. Louis (E. Ostrom and Roger B. Parks 1973; E. Ostrom 1976) and then replicated in Grand Rapids, Michigan (Samir IsHak 1972) and Nashville, Tennessee (Bruce D. Rogers and C. McCurdy Lipsey 1974).”
Schlager, E. C., & Blomquist, W. A. (2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-4130 · Cited by 37
de Oliveira, A. C. M., Croson, R. T. A., & Eckel, C. C. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1883767 · Cited by 34
Economic Behavior and Institutions
Samuels, W. J., & Eggertsson, Þ. (1991) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060066 · Cited by 34 · cited 2×
“…the broad theoretical concept of an ITQ system into an operational system in a particular location involves multiple years of hard work by the fishers involved as well as the government officials (see Clark 2006; Tracy Yandle 2007; Yandle and Christopher Dewees 2003; Thráinn Eggertsson 1990).”
Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry
Acheson, J., & Gardner, R. (2005) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463105051634 · Cited by 32 · cited 10×
“Basurto, xavier and elinor ostrom (2009), “Beyond the tragedy of the commons,” Economia delle fonti di energia e dell’ambiente, 52(1), 35–60.”
InfluentialCollective management of residential housing in Russia: The importance of being social
Borisova, E., Polishchuk, L., & Peresetsky, A. A. (2014) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2014.04.007 · Cited by 30
The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources
Gardner, R., Herr, A., Elinor Ostrom, B., & Walker, J. M. (2000) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(00)00095-x · Cited by 28 · cited 1×
“…simplified but interesting combinations of theoretical variables and derive testable conclusions from them (see James M. Acheson and Roy Gardner 2005; Gardner et al. 2000; Franz Weissing and E. Ostrom 1993) as well as agent-based models (ABMs) (Wander Jager and Marco A. Janssen 2002; Janssen 2008).”
BackgroundMetropolitan Reform: Citizen Evaluations of Performances in Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee
Rogers, B. D., & Lipsey, C. M. (1974) · Publius The Journal of Federalism · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a038337 · Cited by 27
Managing Irrigation: Analyzing and Improving the Performance of Bureaucracies
Uphoff, N., Ramanurthy, P., & Steiner, R. A. (1991) · Cited by 26
The Metropolis and the Maze of Local Government
Friesema, H. P. (1966) · Urban Affairs Quarterly · doi:10.1177/107808746600200205 · Cited by 26 · cited 2×
“…for example, was strongly recommended to reduce the “chaotic” structure of metropolitan governance, increase efficiency, limit conflict among governmental units, and best serve a homogeneous view of the public (William Anderson and Edward W. Weidner 1950; Luther Gulick 1957; H. Paul Friesema 1966).”
Cooperation when N is large: Evidence from the mining camps of the American West
Stewart, J. (2008) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.001 · Cited by 24 · cited 1×
“11 See James I. Stewart (2009) for an important study that links size of group, acceptance of norms of cooperation, and support of property rights in 25 mining camps in the American Southwest. source: Adapted from E. Ostrom 2007: 15182.”
Research works printed but not linked: 19
- Brockington Daniel, 2006, Conservation and society, 4, 424
- Bromley Daniel W, 1986, Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, 591
- Ciriacy-Wantrup S. V., 1975, natural Resources Journal, 15, 713
- de Oliveira Angela C. M., 2009, CBEES Working Paper, 2008
- Frey Bruno S, 1997, American Economic Review, 87, 746
- Ghate Rucha, 2005, Conservation and society, 3, 509
- Kiser Larry L, 1982, strategies of Political Inquiry, ed. Elinor Ostrom, 179
- Oakerson Ronald J, 1986, In Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, 13
- Ostrom Elinor, 1973, The urbanization of the suburbs, ed. Louis H. Masotti and Jeffrey K. Hadden, 367
- Ostrom Elinor, 1991, Laboratory Research in Political Economy, ed. Thomas R. Palfrey, 287
- Ostrom Elinor, 1974, Improving the Quality of urban Management, ed. Willis Hawley and David Rogers, 303
- Ostrom Vincent, 1962, American Economic Review, 52, 450
- Ostrom Vincent, 1977, Alternatives for Delivering Public services: Toward Improved Performance, ed. Emanuel S. Savas, 7
- Schlager Edella, 1994, In Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, ed. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, 247
- Selten Reinhard, 1990, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146, 649
- Sen Amartya K, 1977, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6, 317
- Simon Herbert A, 1995, The Mind, the Brain, and Complex Adaptive systems, ed. Harold J. Morowitz and Jerome L. Singer, 25
- Tang Shui Yan, 1994, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources, ed. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, and James Walker, 225
- Williamson Oliver E, 1986, Economics as a Process: Essays in the new Institutional Economics, ed. Richard N. Langlois, 171
Cited by
Whitmee, S., Haines, A., Beyrer, C., Boltz, F., Capon, A. G., de Souza Dias, B. F., Ezeh, A., Frumkin, H., Gong, P., Head, P., et al. (2015) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(15)60901-1 · Cited by 2,998
Six Transformations to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals
Sachs, J. D., Schmidt-Traub, G., Mazzucato, M., Messner, D., Nakicenovic, N., & Rockström, J. (2019) · Nature Sustainability · doi:10.1038/s41893-019-0352-9 · Cited by 2,325
Social-ecological system framework: initial changes and continuing challenges
McGinnis, M. D., & Ostrom, E. (2014) · Ecology and Society · doi:10.5751/es-06387-190230 · Cited by 1,509
“2, Table 1) incorporates the following changes from versions of the SES framework initially presented by Ostrom (2007, 2009, 2010).”
BackgroundMethodBackground on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
Ostrom, E. (2011) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2010.00394.x · Cited by 1,719
Entrepreneurial ecosystem elements
Stam, E., & van de Ven, A. (2021) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-019-00270-6 · Cited by 1,276
“Is the province the best unit of analysis, or should entrepreneurial ecosystems perhaps be analysed in a more nested or polycentr ic (Ostrom 2010) way, fur ther problematizing the territorial view ‘borrowed’ from the ecological analogy? If we take the openness of the system seriously, this also opens ‘explanatory powe…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Ostrom, E.
- Affiliations
- Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408; Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-06-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 641-672
- ISSN
- 1918-6444 (ISSN-L)
- 0002-8282
- OpenAlex
- W1968869144
- Cited by
- 4,529
- References
- 221
- Citations by year
- 2026: 611 · 2025: 406 · 2024: 340 · 2023: 343 · 2022: 327 · 2021: 339 · 2020: 333 · 2019: 359 · 2018: 323 · 2017: 236 · 2016: 198 · 2015: 202 · 2014: 201 · 2013: 139 · 2012: 95
- FWCI
- 603.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- Locations
- Transnational Corporation Review (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Water Governance and Infrastructure
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- polycentric governance, complex economic systems, groundwater overexploitation, saltwater intrusion, urban water supply, police services, economies of scale, diseconomies of scale, Vincent Ostrom, metropolitan governance
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.