Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Teacher contracts that condition pay and retention on demonstrated performance can improve selection into and out of teaching. I study alternative contracts in a simulated teacher labor market that incorporates dynamic self-selection and Bayesian learning. Bonus policies create only modest incentives and thus have small effects on selection. Reductions in tenure rates can have larger effects, but must be accompanied by substantial salary increases; elimination of tenure confers little additional benefit unless firing rates are extremely high. Benefits of both bonus and tenure policies exceed costs, though optimal policies are sensitive to labor market parameters about which little is known. (JEL I21, J22, J23, J24, J31, J41, J45)
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Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
Can You Recognize an Effective Teacher When You Recruit One?
Rockoff, J. E., Jacob, B. A., Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. O. (2011) · Education Finance and Policy · doi:10.1162/edfp_a_00022 · Cited by 390
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Value-added modeling: A review
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Teacher Effects and Teacher-Related Policies
Jackson, C. K., Rockoff, J. E., & Staiger, D. O. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-040845 · Cited by 300
Teacher applicant hiring and teacher performance: Evidence from DC public schools
Jacob, B. A., Rockoff, J. E., Taylor, E. S., Lindy, B., & Rosen, R. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.08.011 · Cited by 109
Metadata
- Authors
- Rothstein, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2015-01-01
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 100-130
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2164864294
- Cited by
- 141
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 84.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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