The DOI matches its Crossref record; 73 of the 73 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 31 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Open accessAbstract
Casual evidence as well as daily experience suggest that many people have a strong aversion against being the 'sucker' in social dilemma situations. As a consequence, those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding, even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities. A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that there is indeed a widespread willingness of the cooperators to punish the free-riders. Our results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. In addition, we provide evidence that free-riders are punished the more heavily the more they deviate from the cooperation levels of the cooperators. Potential free-riders, therefore, can avoid or at least reduce punishment by increasing their cooperation levels. This, in turn, suggests that in the presence of punishment opportunities there will be less free riding. Testing this conjecture is the other major aim of our paper.
Overview
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Fehr and Gächter show experimentally that costly punishment of free riders is widespread and that the mere opportunity to punish dramatically raises cooperation in public goods games. The pattern of punishment and emotional responses supports the hypothesis that negative emotions make punishment threats credible.
Key findings
- In the no-punishment condition, contributions collapse: in the final period, 75% of subjects in the Stranger-treatment and 53% in the Partner-treatment free ride completely. With punishment opportunities, average contributions are maintained at 50–95% of the endowment, and in the Partner-treatment final period 82.5% of subjects contribute the whole endowment.
- Punishment targets free riding: the more a subject’s contribution falls below the others’ average, the more punishment points they receive. OLS regressions show absolute negative deviation is positive and highly significant (Stranger: 0.2428*; Partner: 0.4168*), while positive deviation has no significant effect.
- Sanctions change behavior: in the Partner-treatment, 89% of punished below-endowment contributors increased their contribution next period by an average of 4.6 tokens; in the Stranger-treatment, 78% increased by an average of 3.8 tokens.
- Payoff consequences: free riders’ overall payoff falls by 24% in the Stranger-treatment and 16% in the Partner-treatment relative to no punishment. By the final period, the punishment condition yields a relative payoff gain of roughly 20% in the Partner-treatment and 10% in the Stranger-treatment.
Methods
- Computerized laboratory public goods experiment with 112 subjects across five sessions in January–February 1996; subjects were students from many fields except economics. Groups of n = 4, endowment y = 20 tokens, marginal public-good payoff a = 0.4, ten periods, N = 24 per session.
- Four treatment conditions: Stranger vs. Partner group composition, each with and without punishment opportunities. In punishment conditions, subjects could assign up to 10 punishment points to each other after seeing individual contributions; each point reduced the target’s first-stage payoff by 10%, up to 100%, and imposed increasing costs on the punisher.
- Analysis used nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon matched pairs, Mann-Whitney) and OLS/Tobit regressions of received punishment points on others’ average contribution, absolute negative deviation, positive deviation, and period/session/group controls. A separate emotion questionnaire (N = 33, non-experiment participants) measured negative feelings toward free riders on a 7-point scale.
Limitations
- The paper does not include a dedicated limitations section. It states that the Stranger-treatment’s probability of future rematching is very low but not exactly zero, and addresses this with a Perfect Stranger robustness treatment where rematching probability is zero; results are similar.
- The text makes evident that the experiment uses student subjects, neutral framing, specific parameters, and a finite ten-period horizon, so external validity to real-world settings is not directly established. The paper itself notes that real-world free riding is often described in value-laden terms, suggesting emotion-based punishment may be even more important outside the lab.
- One Partner-session had only 16 subjects instead of 24, yielding 4 groups rather than the planned 6. The emotion questionnaire used a separate sample of 33 subjects who did not participate in the main experiment.
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Claims the paper makes
1 of 31 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged
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In the paper
“Bilateral trust-or gift exchange games (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Fehr and Falk 1999) indicate that many subjects are conditionally cooperative, i.e., they are willing to cooperate to some extent if others cooperate, too.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > III. Predictions
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995 source
- Supportedcites Fehr and Falk 1999 source
In “Why Do Firms Refuse to Hire Underbidders?” (p. 19), the paper reports that a majority of workers made reciprocal effort choices: 29 of 44 workers (66%) increased effort as wages rose. This supports the claim that many subjects cooperated more when the other party acted cooperatively. (LLM, conf=0.93)
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A nonparametric Wilcoxon matched pairs test shows that this difference in contributions is significant at all conventional significance levels (p < 0.0001).”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a large rise in the average contribution level in the Stranger-treatment.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher.”
- Also stated in: § I. Introduction · hedged
“Our results indicate that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher.”
- Also stated in: § I. Introduction · plain
“Instead, when they have the opportunity to punish free riders, they do so even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Also stated in: § I. Introduction · hedged
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The table reveals that in the punishment condition subjects contribute between two and four times more than in the no-punishment condition.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a large rise in the average contribution level in the Stranger-treatment.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators.”
- Also stated in: § I. Introduction · boosted
“A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that the above episode is not just a single event but that free riding generally causes very strong negative emotions among cooperators and that there is a widespread willingness to punish the free riders.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Also stated in: § I. Introduction · boosted
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the punishment condition, however, average contribution rates between 50 and 95 percent of the endowment can be maintained.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesThe paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all.”
- Also stated in: § I. Introduction · plain
“In the punishment condition, however, average contribution rates between 50 and 95 percent of the endowment can be maintained.”
- Also stated in: § I. Introduction · plain
“If subjects in the punishment condition have the opportunity to implicitly coordinate on a common group standard their contributions converge to almost full cooperation: In the final period of this treatment 82.5 percent of the subjects contribute the whole endowment although the standard economic model predicts no cooperation at all.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- Also stated in: § I. Introduction · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a large rise in the average contribution level in the Stranger-treatment.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a large rise in the average contribution level in the Stranger-treatment.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the final period of this treatment 82.5 percent of the subjects contribute the whole endowment although the standard economic model predicts no cooperation at all.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes
- It may state two separate claims as one. 37
- Probably not a substantial claim. 29
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the no-punishment condition contributions converge to very low levels, i.e., between 53 and 75 percent of the subjects free ride completely in the final period while the remaining subjects contribute only little.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“55 percent of all choices are at g i = 0.The next frequent choices are g i = 10 (6.9 percent) and g i = 5 (5.2 percent).”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > The change
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“After the introduction of punishment opportunities in Session 3 (see Figure 1b) and Session 5 (see Figure 3b) there is an immediate increase in contributions.Moreover, after the removal of punishment opportunities in Sessions 1 and 2 (see Figure 1a) and Session 4 (see Figure 3a) contributions immediately drop to considerably lower levels.”
- Also stated in: § C. Why Do Punishment Opportunities Raise Contributions? · plain
“Figures 1 and 3 show that this is indeed the case.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > C. Why Do Punishment Opportunities Raise Contributions?
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § C. Why Do Punishment Opportunities Raise Contributions? · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although average contributions seem to be slightly lower in the Perfect Stranger treatment the null hypothesis of equal contribution levels cannot be rejected on the basis of Mann-Whitney tests.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > E. Partners, Strangers and Perfect Strangers
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedn = 24Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Note that 57 percent of all the individual contributions in the Partner-treatment are in the interval [-2,+2] while only 26 percent are in this interval in the Stranger-treatment.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 7:
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is interesting that in the Partner-treatment it is only the negative deviation that affects punishment levels systematically while the level of the others’ average contribution has no significant impact.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 7:
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“20 percent of subjects in the Partner-and 53 percent in the Stranger-treatment obey this definition of a free rider.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > D. Payoff Consequences of Punishment
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The introduction (elimination) of the punishment opportunity leads to an immediate rise (fall) in contributions (see Figures 1 and 3).”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Both the median intensity of the own negative emotion and the anticipated median intensity of others if oneself is the free rider are 4 on the 7-point scale.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The rational anticipation of punishment for below-average contributions and the importance of the second stage for the contribution behavior has also been confirmed by a postexperimental questionnaire.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The results of Table 6 show that free riding causes strong negative emotions and that such emotions are anticipated by most people.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In Session 4 and in Session 5 average contributions in period 11 are significantly different from contributions in period 10 (Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, p = 0.05 (Session 4) and p = 0.027 (Session 5)).”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 5: In the no-punishment condition of the Partner-treatment average contributions converge towards full free riding whereas in the punishment condition they increase and converge towards full cooperation.
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Whereas average contributions in the no-punishment condition converge again towards 2 tokens they immediately jump upward in period 11 and continue to rise until they reach 13 tokens in period ten.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a large rise in the average contribution level in the Stranger-treatment.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In 89 percent of these cases the punished subject increased g i immediately in the next period with an average increase of 4.6 tokens.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 7:
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“RESULT 5: In the no-punishment condition of the Partner-treatment average contributions converge towards full free riding whereas in the punishment condition they increase and converge towards full cooperation.”
- Also stated in: § RESULT 5: In the no-punishment condition of the Partner-treatment average contributions converge towards full free riding whereas in the punishment condition they increase and converge towards full cooperation. · plain
“In sharp contrast, the average contribution is above 18 tokens in the punishment condition.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 5: In the no-punishment condition of the Partner-treatment average contributions converge towards full free riding whereas in the punishment condition they increase and converge towards full cooperation.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § RESULT 5: In the no-punishment condition of the Partner-treatment average contributions converge towards full free riding whereas in the punishment condition they increase and converge towards full cooperation. · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the (anticipated) intensity of negative emotions towards a free rider in case that others contribute relatively little (Scenario 1' and 2') is smaller but still considerable”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Very high or even full cooperation can be achieved and maintained in the punishment condition whereas the same subjects converge towards full defection in the no-punishment condition.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > VI. Concluding Remarks
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“in the punishment condition the difference between”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > E. Partners, Strangers and Perfect Strangers
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This, in turn, suggests that in the presence of punishment opportunities there will be less free riding.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Tests✗ Asserted: fails✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true.
In the paper
“Since the same group of subjects interacts for an ex ante unknown number of periods and since individual reputation formation was possible in these experiments there were material incentives for cooperation and for punishment.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Note that in the Partner-treatment the probability of being rematched with the same three people in the next period is 100 percent while in the Stranger-treatment it is less than 0.05 percent.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > A. Basic Design
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“To rule out such material incentives we eliminated all possibilities for individual reputation formation and implemented treatment conditions with an ex ante known finite horizon.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Our work is also related to the interesting study of Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) who show that, if there are opportunities for ostracizing non-cooperators, rational egoists can maintain cooperation for T-1 periods in a T-period Prisoner's Dilemma.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The very existence and frequent use of such value laden terms suggests that emotions are involved and can be elicited by these terms.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In view of the fact that free riding is described by such expressions emotion-based punishment may even be more important in reality than in our experiments.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In addition, we also had treatments in which the group composition changed randomly from period to period so that the probability of meeting the same subject in future periods was very low.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Nor do we know of evidence that relates this willingness to punish to the underlying negative emotions.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Moreover, even if a subject is rematched in the next period with one of the previous group members, our anonymity conditions ensure that the subject does not know this.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > A. Basic Design
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“However, in the final period 73 percent of all individuals (N = 1042) chose g i = 0 and many of the remaining players chose g i close to zero.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > III. Predictions
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Fehr and Schmidt (forthcoming)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In this treatment we ensure that each subject meets any of the other N-1 subjects exactly once, i.e., the probability of future interactions with the same subject is zero.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > A. Basic Design
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“We conjecture that, in addition to purely selfish subjects, there is a nonnegligible number of subjects who are (i) conditionally cooperative and (ii) willing to engage in the costly punishment of free riders.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > III. Predictions
What the sources say
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“There is evidence that additional information about the whole contribution vector in the nopunishment condition slightly decreases cooperation levels (Croson 1995, Andreoni 1995) or leaves them unaffected (Weimann 1994).”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > III. Predictions
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Croson 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Andreoni 1995
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Weimann 1994
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“With this procedure we wanted to maximize the chances that subjects do not know each other.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > IV. Experimental Results
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“They also show that even a minority of fair-minded (i.e., punishing) subjects can enforce an equilibrium with full cooperation in the punishment condition.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > III. Predictions
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Fehr and Schmidt (forthcoming)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This procedure has the advantage that the first treatment condition in a session is definitely unaffected by the subsequent treatment.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > III. Predictions
Load-bearingStrength:boosted· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the treatment without punishment opportunities complete free riding is a dominant strategy.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Note that in our experiments the description of the public good and the option to punish is framed in completely neutral terms.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This has the advantage that, in addition to across-subject comparisons, we can make within-subject comparisons of cooperation levels which have much more statistical power.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > A. Basic Design
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In addition, by comparing the behavior in a condition that is played first in a session with the behavior in the same condition when it is played second in a session we can explicitly study spillover effects.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > III. Predictions
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The treatments without punishment opportunities serve as a control for the treatment with punishment opportunities.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > A. Basic Design
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Therefore, purely selfish subjects will never punish in a one-shot context.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“In this model ostracizing noncooperators is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium and, hence, rational for selfish group members.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > I. Introduction
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) source
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, it could be that in the no-punishment condition the selfish types induce the other types to defect also, while in the punishment condition the disciplining of the selfish types by the punishing types induces all subjects to cooperate.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > III. Predictions
Tests✗ Asserted: fails✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We do not know of many instances in which a variation in the behavioral environment that should -according to the standard economic approach -have no effect, causes such a large behavioral difference.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > VI. Concluding Remarks
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If the presence of punishing types is anticipated it is, however, quite rational for the selfish types to raise their contributions when they move into the punishment condition and to lower their contributions when they move into the no-punishment condition.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the other subjects (the “non-free riders”) also contribute more in the punishment condition.This limits the payoff reduction for the free riders.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > D. Payoff Consequences of Punishment
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“punishment opportunities render eight of ten groups capable of achieving almost full cooperation althoughaccording to the standard approachfull defection is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 5: In the no-punishment condition of the Partner-treatment average contributions converge towards full free riding whereas in the punishment condition they increase and converge towards full cooperation.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: According to the standard approach, full defection is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the Partner-treatment without punishment.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Subjects seemed to have had a clear understanding of why they were punished and how they should respond to the punishment.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 7:
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This payoff reduction is driven by two sources.First, free riders are punished more heavily and second, they contribute more to the project in the punishment condition.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > D. Payoff Consequences of Punishment
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“it seems difficult to provide alternative explanations of the observed behavioral regularities”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
In the paper
“Heckathorn (1996) also examines a public good model with punishment opportunities.His simulations, which allow for different strategies (types), indicate the importance of punishing types for cooperation.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > The change
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Heckathorn (1996) source
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the large behavioral difference between”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > E. Partners, Strangers and Perfect Strangers
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The quote only partly states this claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“we believe, however, that emotions play a key role”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“starting with Andreoni (1988), there has been an intensive discussion in the literature whether contributions are higher in the Partner-treatment or not”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > E. Partners, Strangers and Perfect Strangers
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Andreoni (1988)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Figure 5 also provides further support for the emergence of a common behavioral standard for individual contributions in the Partner-but not in the Stranger-treatment.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > RESULT 7:
Load-bearingStrength:boosted· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: A frequent or modal individual contribution in the final period indicates the behavioral standard or focal action for that condition.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“This highlights the importance of experience and learning for subjects' actual behavior.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > E. Partners, Strangers and Perfect Strangers
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Erev and Roth (1998)
- Not matchedcites Schotter and Sopher (1998)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Unfortunately, in one Partner-session only 16 subjects showed up so that we had only 4 groups of size n = 4.”
- Also stated in: § The change · plain
“An exception is Session 4 where only N = 16 subjects showed up.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > The change
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § The change · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The enormous impact of the punishment opportunities on contributions in our experiment suggests that a neglect of the widespread willingness to punish free riders faces the serious risk of making wrong predictions and, hence, giving wrong normative advice.”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > VI. Concluding Remarks
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“free riding causes strong negative emotions among the cooperators and that these emotions, in turn, trigger the willingness to punish free riders”
§ Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments * > V. Interpretation -Negative Emotions and Punishment
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Hirshleifer (1987)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Frank (1988)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
The authors state this as an assumption.
All subjects are rational money maximizers, and this is common knowledge.
“If all subjects are rational money maximizers, and if this is common knowledge, the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction with”
The paper relies on this without support.
Subjects strongly dislike being the 'sucker' (cooperating while other group members free ride).
“We believe, in particular, that subjects strongly dislike being the 'sucker', i.e., being those who cooperate while other group members free ride.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
There is a mix of selfish, conditionally cooperative and punishing subjects in our experiments.
“In view of the evidence mentioned above it is reasonable to assume that there is a mix of selfish, conditionally cooperative and punishing subjects in our experiments.”
The paper relies on this without support.
According to the standard approach, full defection is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the Partner-treatment without punishment.
“full defection is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A frequent or modal individual contribution in the final period indicates the behavioral standard or focal action for that condition.
“Thus, full free riding clearly emerges as the behavioral regularity in this condition.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Negative emotions are more intense the more a free rider deviates from the others' average contribution.
“because negative emotions are the more intense the more the free rider deviates from the others' average contribution.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [14]
In the citing paper
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [14]
In the citing paper
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [14]
In the citing paper
“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [44]
In the citing paper
“This occurs despite opposing forces such as aversion to free riding (Fehr and G ¨ achter, 2000), altruistic and adaptive preferences, reputa tional effects, preferences for relational goods (Bruni and Smerilli, 2010; Tomassini and Antonioni, 2020).”
From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as Fehr and G ¨ achter, 2000
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Perfect Stranger subjects could not meet every other subject in six periods
MinorWith 24 subjects in groups of 4, each subject meets only 3 others per period. Six periods therefore allow meetings with at most 18 distinct people, not every one of the other 23 subjects as claimed.
“In each session we ensured that every subject in a given condition met every other subject exactly once in this condition, i.e., the probability of being rematched was zero.”
“Note also that with N = 24 and n = 4 six periods is the maximum number of periods compatible with a zero rematching probability.”
Partner-treatment regression reports too many observations
MinorThe Partner-treatment has 10 groups of 4 subjects observed for 10 periods, giving 400 subject-period observations, not the reported 440. The regression's residual degrees of freedom, 378, also match 400 observations with 21 regressors and an intercept.
Reported 440 · recomputed 400
“| | N = 720 | N = 440 | | | F[14, 705] = 39.0*** adj. R 2 = 0.43 | F[21, 378] = 41.3*** adj. R 2 = 0.68 |”
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“Note that these regularities are rather in line with the findings reported in Fehr and Gächter (2000) that subjects in public goods games were more heavily punished the more their contribution fell below the average contribution of other groups members and that contributions above the average were punished much less a…”
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“In behavioral experiments with humans, punishment has been shown to stabilize cooperation in multi-player social dilemmas (Yamagishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and G ¨ achter, 2000, 2002), leading to higher payoffs after an initial learning period (G ¨ achter et al., 2008; Rand et al., 2009b).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2000-09-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 980-994
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122867100
- Semantic Scholar
- 475819d6223c13c466d20a80ddced737da5bf347
- Cited by
- 4,547
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 195 · 2025: 235 · 2024: 225 · 2023: 204 · 2022: 176 · 2021: 217 · 2020: 240 · 2019: 228 · 2018: 202 · 2017: 203 · 2016: 190 · 2015: 215 · 2014: 223 · 2013: 224 · 2012: 217
- FWCI
- 145.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- costly punishment, free-riding, public goods, cooperation, credible threats, emotions, negative emotions, group norms
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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