Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling
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Abstract
The theory of market signaling and screening is a cornerstone of the new economics of information. The last two and a half decades have not only witnessed a series of remarkable theoretical developments but also a wide range of applications. This essay examines the key theoretical issues and explores their use in three major fields: industrial organization, labor, and finance. Considerable emphasis is placed on attempts to test the theory in each of these fields.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Riley, J. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-06-01
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 432-478
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2119362097
- Cited by
- 704
- References
- 99
- FWCI
- 28.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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