Cited by 896Misinformation and Its ImpactsDigitalization, Law, and RegulationEthics and Social Impacts of AI

Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security

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Chesney, Robert, Citron, Danielle Keats·2018·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Crossref · 10.2139/ssrn.3213954

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  • Mirsky and Lee focused on reenactment approaches and replacement approaches.

    “Mirsky and Lee [19] focused on reen- actment approaches (i.e., to change a target's expres- sion, mouth, pose, gaze or body), and replacement approaches (i.e., to replace a target's face by swap or transfer methods).”

    From Deep learning for deepfakes creation and detection: A survey (2022) · cites this paper as [19]

  • Deepfakes threaten digital content authenticity, facilitating misinformation and manipulation.

    “The rise of deepfakes-synthetic media generated using artificial intelligence-threatens digital content authenticity, facilitating misinformation and manipulation.”
  • Deepfakes have been used to create fake news, commit fraud, and even produce explicit content without consent.

    “Deepfakes have been used to create fake news, commit fraud, and even produce explicit content without consent (Chesney & Citron, 2019).”
  • Synthetic media can be used to intimidate, threaten or harass political figures to influence their actions and statements, or deter political participation.

    “Beyond disinformation campaigns aimed directly at undermining the credibility of candidates or influencing voter sentiments on specific issues, synthetic media can also be used to intimidate, threaten or otherwise harass political figures to influence their actions and statements, or to deter political participation altogether (Chesney & Citron, 2018).”
  • Moderation and takedown mechanisms tend to lag behind the speed at which such content spreads, allowing politically motivated synthetic media to reach wide audiences before factcheckers can intervene.

    “Consequently, moderation and takedown mechanisms tend to lag behind the speed at which such content spreads, allowing politically motivated synthetic media to reach wide audiences before factcheckers can intervene (Chesney & Citron, 2018).”

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Research works printed but not linked: 45

  1. Id. at 1148. 62. Id. at 1149. 63. Id. at 1146. 64. Id. 65. Id. at 1149. 66. Id. at 1146
  2. Meyer, supra note 59 (quoting political scientist Dave Karpf)
  3. Nicholas Confessore, 2017, In November, Facebook disclosed to investors that it had at least twice as many fake users as it previously estimated, indicating that up to 60 million automated accounts may roam the world's largest social media platform."); see also Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to Find Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 117th Cong
  4. M J David, 2018, The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a Multidisciplinary Effort, SCIENCE, 359
  5. E G See, 2007, Negative Emotion Enhances Memory Accuracy: Behavioral and Neuroimaging Evidence, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS, PSYCHOL. SCI, 213
  6. Citron See, at 122 (exploring limits of civil law in redressing injuries resulting from cyber stalking)
  7. 2005, Since When Is It Illegal to Just Mention a Trademark Online?, Mike Masnick coined the phrase "the Streisand Effect" in Techdirt in 2005. Mike Masnick
  8. Hate Citron, 2018, at 122 (explaining that someone can sue for copyright of their own image only if they took the photos themselves); see also Megan Farokhmanesh, Is It Legal to Swap Someone's Face Into Porn Without Consent?, VERGE
  9. Compare David Greene, 2018, KEG4-73L3] (noting that copyright claims may address deep fakes subject to fair use objections) with Jesse Lempel, Combatting Deep Fakes Through the Right of Publicity, We Don't Need New Laws for Faked Videos, We Already Have Them, EFF BLOG
  10. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 46, 405
  11. S Rep See, 1995, Key provisions criminalized the transmission of indecent material to minors
  12. Selyukh, supra note 198 (quoting Cox); see CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, 170
  13. See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 46, 121
  14. Citron & Wittes, 1997, In the landmark Reno v. ACLU decision, the Supreme Court struck down the CDA's blanket restrictions on Internet indecency under the First Amendment, 46
  15. Online expression was too important to be limited to what government officials think is fit for children. Id. at 875. Section 230's immunity provision, however, was left intact
  16. & Citron, 2003, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 40, at 171. For some of the most insightful work on the significance of Section 230's immunity provision, see the work of Daphne Keller
  17. Daphne Keller, Toward a Clearer Conversation about Platform Liability, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND
  18. Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 46
  19. Jones V, 2014, Dirty World Enter. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir
  20. S C, 2012, Dirty World, LLC
  21. 2007, Selyukh, supra note 198. In his view, sites that solicit unlawful materials or have a connection to unlawful activity should not enjoy Section 230 immunity. See id. 214. See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 46, at 118; Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, Cox recently said as much: "I'm afraid
  22. See Danielle Citron & Quinta, 2008, 236. YouTube, for example, barred incitement in 2008. See Peter Whoriskey, YouTube Bans Videos That Incite Violence, The New Anti-Sex-Trafficking Legislation May Not End the Internet, 12
  23. 2019, Multiple states prescribe criminal penalties for those who engage in similar conduct, CAL. PENAL CODE �, 404
  24. Va, 2012, For an excellent overview of crimes of incitement in the digital age and the associated issues, see Margot E. Kaminski, 18, 2
  25. 2013, T]o survive constitutional review, any false campaign speech law would have to be narrow, targeted only at false speech made with actual malice, 53
  26. E G See, Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016) (striking down an Ohio election-lies law as a content-based restriction of "core political speech" that lacked sufficient tailoring); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d, 774
  27. 2016, For the crucial role that the FTC has played in the development of privacy policy, see CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY
  28. J Daniel, 2014, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM, L. REV, 583
  29. E G See, 2016, California Unfair Business Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE �
  30. 1987, allowing civil penalty of $50,000 per unlawful act); see also Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or Deceptive Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L, J, 125
  31. Louise Matsakis, 2018, The FTC is Officially Investigating Facebook's Data Practices, WIRED
  32. 2012, Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. � 45(a, 252
  33. Callum See, 2017, How the Federal Trade Commission Could (Maybe) Crack Down on Fake News
  34. Tim See, 2010, THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
  35. 2015, See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,737 (F.C.C
  36. 2015, Consumer Watchdog Petition for Rulemaking to Require Edge Providers to Honor 'Do Not Track' Requests, 15
  37. 2018, Google in 2006 obtained an exemption from disclosure obligations based on the practical argument that its online ad spaces were too small to accommodate the words. In the spring of 2018 the FEC began the process of changing this approach. See Alex Thompson, The FEC Took a Tiny Step to Regulate Online Political Ads, But Not in Time for 2018 Elections, VICE NEWS
  38. 2018, Attorney Announces Extradition Of Alleged Russian Hacker Responsible For Massive Network Intrusions At U.S. Financial Institutions, Brokerage Firms, A Major News Publication, And Other Companies, 264. For example, foreign nationals at times have been extradited to the United States to face criminal charges relating to hacking
  39. 2017, B9BW-PSAR]; see also Catherine Padhi, Emergencies Without End: A Primer on Federal States of Emergency, LAWFARE
  40. Exec, 2015, Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg, 18
  41. 2016, See Issuance of Amended Executive Order 13694; Cyber-Related Sanctions Designation
  42. We anticipate that regulations to be promulgated will define 'cyber-enabled' activities to include any act that is primarily accomplished through or facilitated by computers or other electronic devices. For purposes of E.O. 13694, malicious cyber-enabled activities include deliberate activities accomplished through unauthorized access to a computer system, including by remote access; circumventing one or more protection measures, including by bypassing a firewall; or compromising the security of hardware or software in the supply chain. These activities are often the means through which the specific harms enumerated in the E.O. are achieved, including compromise to critical infrastructure, denial of service attacks, or massive loss of sensitive information, The Treasury Department has indicated that it will promulgate regulations defining "cyberenabled activities
  43. 2018, For an insightful discussion of the Carpenter decision, see Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV, J. L. & TECH, 357
  44. The Carpenter decision follows logically from the opinions articulated in United States v
  45. 2012, Though the third-party doctrine was not actually modified in United States v. Jones, five justices in that case expressed doubt about the wisdom of simply applying the third-party doctrine unaltered to circumstances involving novel, 62, 89

Cited by

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Authors
Chesney, R., & Citron, D. K.
Affiliations
  • The University of Texas at Austin (US)
  • University of Virginia (US)
Corresponding author
Chesney, Robert
Venue
SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2018
ISSN
1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2883289607
Cited by
880
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 159 · 2025: 168 · 2024: 139 · 2023: 140 · 2022: 95 · 2021: 73 · 2020: 62 · 2019: 44
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
  • eYLS (Yale Law School) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Keywords
deepfakes, synthetic media, privacy, democracy, national security, disinformation, truth decay, cognitive biases, civil liability, criminal sanctions, regulation, authentication, economic sanctions, covert operations, law and policy

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