The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Open accessOverview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-6637 · Cited by 16,594
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Self-citationImpure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Self-citationPassions within reason: the strategic role of the emotions
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-4535 · Cited by 2,967
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964229 · Cited by 2,063
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
Fehr, E. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.106228 · Cited by 1,629
Self-citationDoes Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118338 · Cited by 1,506
Self-citationExperience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
Camerer, C., & Hua Ho, T. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00054 · Cited by 1,487
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
Fehr, E., Gachter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171941 · Cited by 1,169
Self-citationElster, J. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,166
Andreoni, J. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6 · Cited by 1,118
The Handbook of Experimental Economics
(2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5 · Cited by 1,105
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion?
Andreoni, J. (2002) · Market Failure or Success · doi:10.4337/1843760258.00027 · Cited by 912
Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203330 · Cited by 643
Roethlisberger, F. J. (1939) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 624
The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use
Sethi, R., & Somanathan, E. (1996) · American Economic Review · Cited by 552
Roth, A. E. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-006 · Cited by 430
Anomalous behavior in public goods experiments: How much
Palfrey, T. R., & Prisbrey, J. E. (1997) · American Economic Review · Cited by 398
Güth, W., & Tietz, R. (1990) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-z · Cited by 396
Halteman, J. (1996) · Cited by 347
Frank, R. H. (1991) · Cited by 328
Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250052 · Cited by 325
Self-citationMotivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms
Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.230010 · Cited by 290
An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives
G�th, W. (1995) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01243036 · Cited by 268
The Dynamics and Dilemmas of Collective Action
Heckathorn, D. D. (1996) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2096334 · Cited by 254
Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism
Hirshleifer, D., & Rasmusen, E. (1989) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(89)90078-4 · Cited by 249
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?
Fehr, E., & G�chter, S. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.229047 · Cited by 244
Self-citationOn the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and PromisesPreprint
Hirshleifer, J. (1984) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 218
Happiness, Economy and Institutions
Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203211 · Cited by 216
Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?Preprint
Palfrey, T. R., & Prisbrey, J. E. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 213
WHY FREE RIDE? STRATEGIES AND LEARNING IN PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTSPreprint
Andereoni, J. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 180
Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance
Winter‐Ebmer, R., & Zweimüller, J. (1999) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/1467-6435.00102 · Cited by 158
Do immigrants displace young native workers: The Austrian experience
Winter‐Ebmer, R., & Zweimüller, J. (1999) · Journal of Population Economics · doi:10.1007/s001480050102 · Cited by 152
Whyte, W. F. (1977) · Cited by 131
Social Comparisons, Inequality, and GrowthPreprint
Knell, M. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203114 · Cited by 131
Environmental tax reform: efficiency and political feasibility
Felder, S., & Schleiniger, R. (2002) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/s0921-8009(02)00109-x · Cited by 119
Was Bewirkt die Volkswirtschaftslehre?
Frey, B. S. (2000) · Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik · doi:10.1111/1468-2516.00003 · Cited by 107
Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments
James Andreoni, A. (1988) · Cited by 93
Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent ExperimentPreprint
Anderhub, V., Gächter, S., & Königstein, M. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203290 · Cited by 78
Self-citationInequality, Redistribution, and Economic GrowthPreprint
̧ller, J. Z. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.230011 · Cited by 62
Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and comparison of experimental resultsPreprint
Güth, W., & Tietz, R. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 51
9. The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400838837.148 · Cited by 51
Managerial Power and CompensationPreprint
Frey, B. S., & Kucher, M. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203331 · Cited by 48
The Law, Oral Tradition and the Mining Community
Francis, H. (1985) · Journal of Law and Society · doi:10.2307/1410120 · Cited by 44
Ecological Tax Reform with Exemptions for the Export Sector in a Two Sector Two Factor ModelPreprint
Schleiniger, R. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203332 · Cited by 44
Business Cycle Phenomena in Overlapping Generations Economies with Stochastic ProductionPreprint
Peter, J.-U., & Schenk–Hoppé, K. R. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.230012 · Cited by 44
Is There a Golden Rule for the Stochastic Solow Growth Model?Preprint
Schenk–Hoppé, K. R. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.230018 · Cited by 43
Outcome, process & power in direct democracyPreprint
Frey, B. S., Kucher, M., & Stutzer, A. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-004372992 · Cited by 33
Tyran, J. (1999) · Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-46883-4_10 · Cited by 28
Financial Innovation, Communication and the Theory of the FirmPreprint
Bettzüge, M. O., & Hens, T. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.230015 · Cited by 20
Measuring Treatment — Effects in Experimental Cross — Sectional Time Series
Königstein, M. (2000) · Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-45782-1_3 · Cited by 8
(1998) · American Economic Review
Cited by
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Self-citationConducting behavioral research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
Mason, W., & Suri, S. (2012) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-011-0124-6 · Cited by 3,172
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
Self-citationFairness Expectations and Altruistic Sharing in 15-Month-Old Human Infants
Schmidt, M. F. H., & Sommerville, J. A. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023223 · Cited by 579
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1999
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2070368086
- Cited by
- 784
- References
- 57
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
