The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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Citations
Cites
Groves, T. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914085 · Cited by 3,284
Multipart pricing of public goods
Clarke, E. H. (1971) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01726210 · Cited by 3,246
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Gibbard, A. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914083 · Cited by 3,202
Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2 · Cited by 2,821
Groves, T., & Loeb, M. (1975) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(75)90001-8 · Cited by 325
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Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Nisan, N., & Ronen, A. (2001) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0790 · Cited by 1,331
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
BARON, D. P. (1982) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03591.x · Cited by 929
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E. (1979) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297045 · Cited by 809
Incentives and incomplete information
d'Aspremont, C., & Gérard-Varet, L.-A. (1979) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(79)90043-4 · Cited by 795
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
Nisan, N., & Ronen, A. (1999) · Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing · doi:10.1145/301250.301287 · Cited by 476
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Li, S. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160425 · Cited by 439
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Börgers, T., Krähmer, D., & Strausz, R. (2015) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001 · Cited by 379
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Rogerson, W. P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297997 · Cited by 356
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
Satterthwaite, M. A., & Sonnenschein, H. (1981) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297198 · Cited by 303
Incentives and Political Economy
Laffont, J.-J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199248680.001.0001 · Cited by 299
Self-citationThe Economics of Multidimensional Screening
Rochet, J.-C., & Stole, L. A. (2010) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610240.006 · Cited by 289
Designing incentive compatible contracts for effective demand management
Fahrioglu, M., & Alvarado, F. L. (2000) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/59.898098 · Cited by 285
Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good Decisions
(1991) · Papers in Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.027 · Cited by 278
Avery, C., Resnick, P., & Zeckhauser, R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.3.564 · Cited by 267
Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93
Metadata
- Authors
- Green, J., & Laffont, J.-J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1977-03
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 427
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2135954328
- Cited by
- 803
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 55.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.