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The Evolution of Cooperation.
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Cited by
Items 201–228 of 228
Transaction costs, collective action and adaptation in managing complex social–ecological systems
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Group morality and intergroup relations: Cross-cultural and experimental evidence
Cohen, T. R., Montoya, R. M., & Insko, C. A. (2006) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167206291673 · Cited by 163
Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.10.040 · Cited by 162
Lorenzen, M. (2007) · Urban Studies · doi:10.1080/00420980601184752 · Cited by 152
Marshall, G. R. (2009) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.10.008 · Cited by 147
Patience is a virtue: cooperative people have lower discount rates
Curry, O. S., Price, M. E., & Price, J. G. (2008) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.09.023 · Cited by 146
Mohtashemi, M., & Mui, L. (2003) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00143-7 · Cited by 115
Complex Dynamical Systems in Social and Personality Psychology: Theory, Modeling, and Analysis
Richardson, M. J., Dale, R., & Marsh, K. L. (2014) · Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511996481.015 · Cited by 104
Trust and partner selection in social networks: An experimentally grounded model
Bravo, G., Squazzoni, F., & Boero, R. (2012) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2012.03.001 · Cited by 85
“ls and presents the results. Finally, Section 6 discusses our findings. 2 2 Research background Most studies on cooperation assumed that individuals have no choice over which opponents they play (e.g. Axelrod 1984, 1997). This implied that, especially in large populations, cheaters may escape punishment by roving from…”
BackgroundResultMarch, C. (2021) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2021.102426 · Cited by 72
Partner choice versus punishment in human Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Barclay, P., & Raihani, N. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.004 · Cited by 67
Inside the Mental Voting Booth: An Impression-Driven Process Model of Candidate Evaluation
Lodge, M., & Stroh, P. (1993) · Explorations in Political Psychology · doi:10.1215/9780822396697-011 · Cited by 66
Learning a commonsense moral theory
Kleiman-Weiner, M., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.005 · Cited by 53
Cozzolino, P. J., Sheldon, K. M., Schachtman, T. R., & Meyers, L. S. (2009) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.01.008 · Cited by 47
Subtle social cues, explicit incentives, and cooperation in social dilemmas
Boone, C., Declerck, C. H., & Suetens, S. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.005 · Cited by 43
Pietraszewski, D. (2022) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21000583 · Cited by 45
Evolution and Normative Scepticism
Schafer, K. (2010) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400903114219 · Cited by 44
Heterogeneity Stabilizes Reciprocal Altruism Interactions
FISHMAN, M. A., LOTEM, A., & STONE, L. (2001) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.2248 · Cited by 36
Ziegler, R. (2008) · Social Networks · doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2007.10.001 · Cited by 35
Implications of an Emerging Integration of Universal and Culturally Specific Psychologies
Smith, G. T., Spillane, N. S., & Annus, A. M. (2006) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00013.x · Cited by 35
The impact of a third-party assurance seal in customer purchasing intention
Lee, S. M., Choi, J., & Lee, S.-G. (2004) · Journal of Internet Commerce · doi:10.1300/j179v03n02_03 · Cited by 29
A dear enemy relationship in a territorial cichlid: evidence for the threat-level hypothesis
Sogawa, S., Ota, K., & Kohda, M. (2016) · Behaviour · doi:10.1163/1568539x-00003351 · Cited by 20
Social media ills and evolutionary mismatches: a conceptual framework
Lim, A. J., & Tan, E. (2024) · Evolutionary Psychological Science · doi:10.1007/s40806-024-00398-z · Cited by 18
“When opportunity arises, personal interest sometimes precedes collective interest (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Ferriere et al., 2002).”
Tit for Tat in the Dear Enemy Relationship Between Territorial Females of a Cichlid Fish
Sogawa, S., & Kohda, M. (2018) · Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution · doi:10.3389/fevo.2018.00044 · Cited by 16
Dasgupta, N., & Musolesi, M. (2025) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-025-09698-5 · Cited by 8
Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents
Piatti, G., Jin, Z., Kleiman-Weiner, M., Schölkopf, B., Sachan, M., & Mihalcea, R. (2024) · Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 37 · doi:10.52202/079017-3548 · Cited by 14
“Inspired by game-theoretic research on the evolution of cooperation [5] and “The Tragedy of the Commons,” we build G OV S IM to simulate realistic multi-party social dilemmas such as those faced by groups managing shared resources [27, 62].”
Chen, Q., Ilami, S., Lore, N., & Heydari, B. (2026) · Journal of Mechanical Design · doi:10.1115/1.4070755 · Cited by 3
Chen, Y. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2606.14923 · Cited by 2
“Trust games show people extend and reciprocate trust at personal cost [4] and pay to punish defectors to sustain cooperation [7, 2]; trust is asymmetric, with bad impressions weighing more than good [3, 16] and violations far easier to inflict than to repair [15, 9].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Connolly, T., & Axelrod, R.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1984-12
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 661
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2331296304
- Cited by
- 3,890
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 211.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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