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Intentionalism Defended

Byrne, Alex · 2001 · The Philosophical Review
Cited by 212

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about ” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice versa. Recently a number of philosophers have argued that this picture of perception is incorrect. According to them, the sensational component of a perceptual experience cannot vary independently of its intentional component: the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is entirely determined by the experience’s propositional content—that is, by what it represents. Usually this is supposed to hold also of “bodily sensations”: experiences of pain, twinges, tickles, and the like. The phenomenal character of such experiences, it is claimed, is likewise entirely determined by their propositional contents. This view comes in a number of variants, and also goes under a number of names:

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Metadata

Authors
Byrne, A.
Venue
The Philosophical Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
2001-04
Volume
110
Issue
2
Pages
199
ISSN
0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4249018138
Cited by
212
References
8
FWCI
1.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Intentionalism Defended. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2693675
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Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2693675

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