The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
Abstract
We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system (cf. Duverger's Law). The candidates' positions are less differentiated under a runoff system. There exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition
Shepsle, K. (2012) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203714966 · Cited by 197
Cited by
Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India
Chattopadhyay, R., & Duflo, E. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x · Cited by 2,284
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555136 · Cited by 1,649
IVERSEN, T., & SOSKICE, D. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062083 · Cited by 1,175
Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00141-x · Cited by 1,101
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives
Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.1.225 · Cited by 821
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
Treisman, D. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619151 · Cited by 800
Pande, R. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803769206232 · Cited by 658
Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government
Przeworski, A. (2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511778490 · Cited by 638
Besley, T., Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal‐Querol, M. (2011) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02448.x · Cited by 606
Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States
Besley, T. (2002) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0213 · Cited by 577
Declining inequality in Latin America: a decade of progress?
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.48-5195 · Cited by 553
Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden
Besley, T., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160080 · Cited by 480
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2013) · Handbook of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00002-9 · Cited by 480
Why dominant parties lose: Mexico's democratization in comparative perspective
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-6403 · Cited by 479
A Political Theory of Populism *
Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs077 · Cited by 475
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Diermeier, D., Keane, M., & Merlo, A. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828464 · Cited by 452
Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603770383424 · Cited by 445
Clots-Figueras, I. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.017 · Cited by 436
Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement*
Madestam, A., Shoag, D., Veuger, S., & Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt021 · Cited by 431
Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
Besley, T., & Case, A. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.41.1.7 · Cited by 401
Caselli, F., & Morelli, M. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00023-9 · Cited by 386
Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil
Fujiwara, T. (2015) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11520 · Cited by 378
Besley, T. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357761 · Cited by 371
GALASSO, V., & NANNICINI, T. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000535 · Cited by 367
Health and the Political Agency of Women
Bhalotra, S., & Clots-Figueras, I. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.2.164 · Cited by 347
Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx016 · Cited by 336
MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics
EGGERS, A. C., & HAINMUELLER, J. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990190 · Cited by 318
Cai, H., & Treisman, D. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201314 · Cited by 311
Are Female Leaders Good for Education? Evidence from India
Clots-Figueras, I. (2012) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.1.212 · Cited by 311
Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment
Butler, D. M., & Nickerson, D. W. (2011) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00011019 · Cited by 310
Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile
Baland, J.-M., & Robinson, J. A. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.1737 · Cited by 307
Why do local governments privatise public services? A survey of empirical studies
Bel, G., & Fageda, X. (2007) · Local Government Studies · doi:10.1080/03003930701417528 · Cited by 306
Female political representation and substantive effects on policies: A literature review
Hessami, Z., & da Fonseca, M. L. (2020) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101896 · Cited by 306
Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?
BESLEY, T., & REYNAL-QUEROL, M. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000281 · Cited by 303
Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence
Besley, T. (2004) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247604323067925 · Cited by 290
Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2009) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14906 · Cited by 290
Political Economics and Public Finance
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7097 · Cited by 279
EMERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE OF INEFFICIENT STATES
Acemoglu, D., Ticchi, D., & Vindigni, A. (2011) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.01008.x · Cited by 277
Levy, G. (2004) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00254-0 · Cited by 276
“Plata o Plomo?”:Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence
DAL BÓ, E., DAL BÓ, P., & DI TELLA, R. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406061995 · Cited by 264
Signaling Character in Electoral Competition
Kartik, N., & McAfee, R. P. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.3.852 · Cited by 252
How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks: Evidence from Chinese Import Competition
Feigenbaum, J. J., & Hall, A. B. (2015) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/682151 · Cited by 178
EL COSTO DE COORDINAR: NÚMERO DE CANDIDATOS PRESIDENCIALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA 1993-2010
LUJÁN, D. (2017) · Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) · doi:10.4067/s0718-090x2017000100002 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Osborne, M. J., & Slivinski, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-02-01
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 65-96
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2159823353
- Cited by
- 1,246
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 8.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.