OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPROPRIATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUP-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN KOREA.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this study, a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea was used to examine simultaneous causality between ownership structure and performance. The results show that performance determine...
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“because the main problem there is that controlling shareholders usually already have had too much concentrated ownership and control rights, which allow some of them to potentially expropriate minority shareholders (Chang, 2003).”
From An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies (2008) · cites this paper as Chang, 2003
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“They found that group-focused transformational leadership positively influences team performance through teammember exchange (TMX), while individual-focused transformational leadership positively influences team member performance through LMX. In addition, TMX positively mediates the relationship between group-focused…”
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“It is also possible that the observed decline in the value of group affiliation could be explained by other negative business group attributes, such as executive entrenchment (Morck et al., 2005) or expropriation (Chang, 2003), which may have become more salient after 1999.”
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“More importantly, tunneling often shrinks a firm’s performance and equity value (Chang, 2003; Claessens et al., 2002; Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Marchica & Mura, 2005; Volpin, 2002).”
BackgroundThe Effects of Corporate Governance on the Relationship between Innovative Efforts and Performance1
Jermias, J. (2007) · European Accounting Review · doi:10.1080/09638180701707045 · Cited by 86
“For example, Chang (2003) argues that total sales and total equity are two plausible instruments for managerial share ownership since there is no a priori reason for these two variables to be endogenous to managerial share ownership or firm performance.”
BackgroundHow outside directors facilitate corporate R&D investment? Evidence from large Korean firms
Yoo, T., & Sung, T. (2014) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.005 · Cited by 90
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“The Shleifer and Vishny model has been used to explain the remarkable investment growth which took place in highly corrupt regimes, such as South Korea in the post-war period (Kang 2002, Chang 2003 ) and Indonesia during the Suharto years (MacIntyre 2001).”
MethodAuditing Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Audit Opinions and Restatements
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“The latter are exploited to divert private benefits to controlling shareholders by diverting resources to companies in which they own more cash‐flow rights (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000; Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Chang, 2003).”
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“Two possible explanations exist for this negative relationship: (1) an entrenchment effect by the dominant family business group ( Chang, 2003 ); and (2) the aim of business groups to maintain collective interests and maximize the group as a whole.”
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Lien, Y.-C., & Filatotchev, I. V. (2014) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2014.09.002 · Cited by 77
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State ownership and listed firm performance: a universally negative governance relationship?
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“ownership may respond to performance ( Chang 2003 ), and the relationship between ownership and performance may be spurious because of the existence of possible unmeasured variable(s).”
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“2002; Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Chang, 2003; Coff, 1999; Baek, Kang, & Lee, 2006), and especially family firms in the emerging economies (La Porta et al., 2000). Some economists, although noting the positive information effects, argue that ethnic networks can lead to dynamic inefficiencies. Greif (1994) argues that ther…”
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BackgroundFamily ownership and financial performance relations in emerging markets
Wang, K. T., & Shailer, G. (2017) · International Review of Economics & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.iref.2017.05.014 · Cited by 70
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“…with no great loss to their wealth.12 Controlling shareholders’ extraction or expropriation of small shareholders’ wealth to fund private benefits has received extensive attention in economics, finance, and IB (e.g., Johnson et al. 2000; Faccio et al. 2010; Chang, 2003; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007).”
BackgroundCorporate governance, globalization and firm productivity
Min, B. S., & Smyth, R. (2013) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2013.07.004 · Cited by 67
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“Many entrepreneurs pursue overall value maximization for the whole business group, sometimes at the expense of external investors who hold shares in the business group’s listed entity (Chang 2003).”
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MethodInfluentialHu, H. W., & Xu, D. (2021) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/01492063211015301 · Cited by 63
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“In Korea, the spotlight on family ownership is particularly pronounced, superseding the focus on CEO ownership (Baek et al., 2004; Chang, 2003).”
Corporate governance, ownership and sustainability
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“…in Singapore) as example, we are not completely in agreement with hypotesys that, in Asian countries in particular, managers tied to the founding families tend to adopt policies that benefit the families at the expense of other stakeholders (Claessen et al., 2000; Chang, 2003; Oh et al., 2011).”
BackgroundUnderpricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Literature Review
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“The study related to Korean-Chaebol exhibit greater degree of underpricing in the interest of maintaining the controlling stake for private benefit by the promoters (Chang [73]).”
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Group control motive as a determinant of ownership structure in business conglomerates
Kim, W., Lim, Y., & Sung, T. (2007) · Pacific-Basin Finance Journal · doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2006.05.003 · Cited by 56
“Chang (2003) investigates how inside ownership and family portion of this inside ownership interact with firm performance using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework.”
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“Concentrated holdings are more efficient in monitoring board’s decisions to reduce agency type I problem (Chang, 2003; Filip and Raffournier, 2014; Pound, 1988); however, the same can lead to entrenchment by the powerful owners, that is, type II problem (Morck et al., 1988).”
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“(2), (3), and (4) by replacing Affiliate with G_KFTC, which represents large business groups or Chaebols as identified by KFTC.25 We find significant and positive coefficients on G_KFTC in model (2), and on Public x G_KFTC in model (3), suggesting that Chaebols make more charitable contributions than non-Chaebols and…”
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“Our finding supplements the existing view that prevalent family control is the only remedy for inefficient corporate-governance institutions in the emerging markets (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2003; Chang, 2003; Peng & Jiang, 2010).”
BackgroundFacing global economic crisis: Foreign sales, ownership groups, and corporate value
Ma, X., Yiu, D. W., & Zhou, N. (2013) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2013.02.002 · Cited by 51
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“…groups” (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Chang & Hong, 2002; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), and their interfirm ties “group affiliations” (Chang, 2003). v During the period of this study, the Brazilian Ministry of Communications restricted foreign ownership in the first…”
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“Likewise, there is some support for the idea that dominant principals can extract value from other owners by controlling the firm’s governance mechanisms (Chang, 2003).”
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“, 1999) and multilayer holding corporate structures (Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Chang, 2003; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001).”
BackgroundThe performance and the effects of family control in North African IPOs
Hearn, B. A. (2011) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2011.02.006 · Cited by 47
“Finally the Sargan-Basmann test provides a measure of the adequacy and effectiveness of these instrumental variables to solve the problem (see Chang (2003) for full discussion of techniques).”
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“Chang (2003) also finds that controlling shareholders actually undermine the rights of minority shareholders, which contributes to the lower flexibility.”
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“Furthermore, firms in countries with a lower level of transparency have more incentives to seek personal gains than those of other stakeholders (Oh, Chang, and Martynov 2011).”
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“…for controlling shareholders to advise management on strategic opportunities (Cheffins and Armour, 2012), finance uncertain and risky projects (Chang, 2003), supply rare goods and services (Inoue, Lazzarini, and Musacchio, 2013), and pledge their personal reputation as an intangible…”
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“Similarly, in the case of stock ownership by managers, prior research shows that higher managerial equity stakes lead to risk-enhancing firm strategies (Chang, 2003; Kroll et al., 1997).”
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How Does CSR Activity Affect Sustainable Growth and Value of Corporations? Evidence from Korea
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“Several studies focusing on Korean listed corporations [36,43] discovered that leverage is positively associated with the Korean listed corporations’ value.”
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Chinese Business Groups: Their Origins and Development
Hahn, D., & Lee, K. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0009 · Cited by 35
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Emerging Markets: Evidence from India
Kapil, S., & Mishra, R. K. (2019) · Theoretical Economics Letters · doi:10.4236/tel.2019.96129 · Cited by 37
“[51]; Chung and Pruitt [52]; Chang [53]) says that with increased stake of insiders, the interest of insiders would converge with value creation for company.”
BackgroundDou, H., Liu, Y., Shi, Y., & Xu, H. (2022) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2022.102144 · Cited by 32
Corporate ownership and company performance: a study of Malaysian listed companies
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Metadata
- Authors
- Chang, S. J.
- Affiliations
- Korea University (KR)
- Corresponding author
- Chang, S. J.
- ORCID
- Chang, S. J.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2003-04-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 238-253
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1974345323
- Cited by
- 550
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 56.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Academy of Management Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Family Business Performance and Succession
- Keywords
- ownership structure, expropriation, firm performance, public companies, corporate governance, Korean firms
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.