OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPROPRIATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUP-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN KOREA.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this study, a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea was used to examine simultaneous causality between ownership structure and performance. The results show that performance determine...
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“because the main problem there is that controlling shareholders usually already have had too much concentrated ownership and control rights, which allow some of them to potentially expropriate minority shareholders (Chang, 2003).”
From An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies (2008) · cites this paper as Chang, 2003
Citations
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Cited by
An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies
Peng, M. W., Wang, D. Y. L., & Jiang, Y. (2008) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400377 · Cited by 3,286
“…, if implemented in emerging economies, is likely to be disastrous, because the main problem there is that controlling shareholders usually already have had too much concentrated ownership and control rights, which allow some of them to potentially expropriate minority shareholders (Chang, 2003).”
Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00752.x · Cited by 1,807
“It also makes it hard to identify and challenge unfair intra-group transactions ( Chang, 2003 ) since such networks provide significant opportunity for collusion or other unethical transactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Woodruff, 1999).”
BackgroundStrategy Research in Emerging Economies: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom*
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“Chang (2003) suggests that concentrated ownership may create an incentive for the family owners to expropriate wealth from the subsidiary businesses of a large diversified business group.”
Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Khanna, T., & Yafeh, Y. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.2.331 · Cited by 1,390
Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea
Black, B. S., Jang, H., & Kim, W. (2006) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewj018 · Cited by 1,062
Metadata
- Authors
- Chang, S. J.
- Affiliations
- Korea University (KR)
- Corresponding author
- Chang, S. J.
- ORCID
- Chang, S. J.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2003-04-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 238-253
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1974345323
- Cited by
- 550
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 56.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Academy of Management Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Family Business Performance and Succession
- Keywords
- ownership structure, expropriation, firm performance, public companies, corporate governance, Korean firms
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