OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPROPRIATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUP-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN KOREA.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this study, a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea was used to examine simultaneous causality between ownership structure and performance. The results show that performance determine...
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“because the main problem there is that controlling shareholders usually already have had too much concentrated ownership and control rights, which allow some of them to potentially expropriate minority shareholders (Chang, 2003).”
From An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies (2008) · cites this paper as Chang, 2003
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“It also makes it hard to identify and challenge unfair intra-group transactions ( Chang, 2003 ) since such networks provide significant opportunity for collusion or other unethical transactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Woodruff, 1999).”
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“Chang (2003) , in a study of 419 Chaebol affiliates firms during the period 1986‐1996, also found that larger shareholders who are also managers are able to expropriate value from other shareholders.”
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“Consistent with this criticism, Chang (2003) shows that firm performance causes ownership structure in Korea (but the reverse is not true) and that controlling shareholders use inside information to increase their direct and indirect ownership stakes in more profitable firms.”
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Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms
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“La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997; 1998; 1999; 2000), Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000), Glaeser, Johnson, Shleifer (2001), and Chang (2003) have found that controlling shareholders extract private benefits from minority shareholders through “tunneling.””
BackgroundFilatotchev, I., Strange, R., Piesse, J., & Lien, Y.-C. (2007) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400279 · Cited by 401
Exploring the Relationship Between Board Characteristics and CSR: Empirical Evidence from Korea
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“Second, Korea has a unique corporate governance system, the Chaebol, which can be characterized as having a strong affiliation between owners and top managers and family-controlled corporate structures (Chang 2003).”
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“Following Claessens et al. (2000) and Chang (2003) the membership of the controlling family is identified by linking corporate insiders including CEO, board chairman, honorary chairman and vice chairman of the company that share a common family name with the CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLICLY LISTED 269”
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The Dark Side of Board Political Capital: Enabling Blockholder Rent Appropriation
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“/ Resource-Based Theory and Corporate Diversification 1349 Wiersma and Bantel (1992) found that top managers’ cognitive perspectives are associated with the propensity to change in diversification level, and Calori, Johnson, and Sarnin (1994) showed that CEO cognitive complexity affects the breadth of the business por…”
BackgroundInfluentialCSR decoupling within business groups and the risk of perceived greenwashing
Bothello, J., Ioannou, I., Porumb, V., & Zengin‐Karaibrahimoglu, Y. (2023) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3532 · Cited by 220
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Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
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Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firm Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India
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Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant?
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“This problem may become especially severe as the number of “tiers” of the pyramid increases and controlling shareholders have lower cash-flow ownership levels (Chang, 2003; Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al., 2002).”
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Jeong, Y.-C., & Kim, T.-Y. (2019) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2016.0575 · Cited by 225
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“Prior research has identified that insider ownership positively affects firm performance by reducing the agency cost in terms of ownership by management (Cole & Mehran, 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; McConnell & Servaes, 1990), by family and affiliates (Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2000), and by employees (Kruse, 1993;…”
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“…transactions in earnings management, although quite a lot of anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem might be serious in transition economies like China.7 The exceptions include Chang (2002), which finds that Korean firms use related party purchases and sales to suppress or inflate earnings.”
BackgroundDimensions of CEO–Board Relations
Boyd, B. K., Haynes, K. T., & Zona, F. (2011) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00943.x · Cited by 206
“Some scholars have argued (e.g., Chang, 2003), that agency problems are more CEO – Board Relations / 21 acute in family firms than their more widely held counterparts.”
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“The latter, newer research stream, however, has mostly focused on aspects of ownership structure other than ownership concentration per se, such as insider ownership (Chang, 2003; Lins and Servaes, 2002) and the presence of large shareholders (Claessens et al.”
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Peng, M. W., & Delios, A. (2007) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-006-9021-4 · Cited by 215
“Chang (2003) , Chang and Hong (2000, 2002), Chang et al. (2006), Kim”
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“Some research has been done on shareholder agreements, but it has been largely limited to pyramidal company structures (see Chang, 2003, for an exception).”
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Cho, D., & Kim, J. (2007) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00557.x · Cited by 190
“The positive relationship between a large shareholder ownership rate and profitability found in this analysis is consistent with Chang (2003).”
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“I also included an indicator variable of whether the subsidiary was affiliated with a business group (0/1), as previous studies have revealed that business group affiliations can affect firm performance (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Chang, 2003; Khanna and Thomas, 2009).”
Diversified Business Groups and Corporate Refocusing in Emerging Economies
Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, R. A., Tihanyi, L., & White, R. E. (2005) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206305279895 · Cited by 188
“Accordingly, they are likely to actively provide suggestions to the management of the business group, which would help the group avoid wealth-destroying strategies, such as tunneling, found to be associated with broader family ownership ( Chang, 2003 ).”
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“6 Chang (2003) examines the simultaneous relationship between ownership and firm performance for chaebol affiliates.”
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Effect of ownership structure and board structure on firm value: evidence from India
Mishra, R. K., & Kapil, S. (2017) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-03-2016-0059 · Cited by 196
From diversification premium to diversification discount during institutional transitions
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“The government pushed many chaebols to list some of their member firms (Chang, 2003a ).”
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“For instance, one often-observed practice in business groups is tunneling: the family transfers resources from member firms in which the family holds relatively low cash-flow rights to affiliated firms in which the family owns high cash-flow rights (Bertrand et al. 2002, Chang 2003 ).”
BackgroundCEO Hubris and Firm Performance: Exploring the Moderating Roles of CEO Power and Board Vigilance
Park, J., Kim, C., Chang, Y. K., Lee, D.-H., & Sung, Y.-D. (2015) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2997-2 · Cited by 168
“This kind of behavior has been echoed in a number of corporate governance research in Korea (e.g., Chang 2003), and often described with a notion of principal–principal problem in the general management literature (e.g., La Porta et al. 1999; Morck and Yeung 2003).”
BackgroundFamily Business Performance from a Governance Perspective: A Review of Empirical Research
Pindado, J., & Requejo, I. (2014) · International Journal of Management Reviews · doi:10.1111/ijmr.12040 · Cited by 197
Is nepotism so bad for family firms? A socioemotional wealth approach
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Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view
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“ings suggest that ownership variables not only influence firm-level factors but that, in turn, these firm-level factors influence aspects of organizational ownership (Chang, 2003).”
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The role of corporate governance in FDI decisions: Evidence from Taiwan
Lien, Y.-C., Piesse, J., Strange, R. N., & Filatotchev, I. V. (2005) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2005.08.002 · Cited by 174
Business group affiliation and firm performance in a transition economy: A focus on ownership voids
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“Leverage Because capital structure is found to be significantly correlated with firm performance ( Chang, 2003 ) and more importantly, because the debt problem (e.g., triangular debt) is a significant issue in China (Peng & Luo, 2000), we introduced the leverage (i.e., the ratio of total debt to equity) as a proxy for…”
BackgroundFamily ownership and R&D investment: The role of growth opportunities and business group membership
Choi, Y. R., Zahra, S. A., Yoshikawa, T., & Han, B. H. (2014) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.10.007 · Cited by 167
“Affiliates' ownership was included in family ownership, as affiliates in the Korean context are owned and controlled by the business group's family and thus similar to divisions in diversified corporations (Chang, 2003; Chang & Choi, 1988).”
BackgroundMethodInternational strategy and business groups: A review and future research agenda
Holmes, R. M., Hoskisson, R. E., Kim, H., Wan, W. P., & Holcomb, T. R. (2016) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2016.11.003 · Cited by 153
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“Chang (2003) provides evidence that controlling shareholders of chaebols use inside information to increase their shares of more profitable firms and transfer profits to other affiliates through intra-group trading.”
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OWNERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DEAL: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND OVERLAPPING INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP.
Goranova, M., Dharwadkar, R., & Brandes, P. (2008) · Academy of Management Proceedings · doi:10.1002/smj.849 · Cited by 131
Related parties transactions and firm's market value: the French case
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“extend from the emerging economies, known for the weakness of their systems of governance (Chang, 2003; Jian and Wong, 2004), to countries in Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Johnson et al.”
BackgroundA New Perspective on Ownership Identities in China's Listed Companies
Delios, A., Wu, Z. J., & Zhou, N. (2006) · Management and Organization Review · doi:10.1111/j.1740-8784.2006.00048.x · Cited by 137
Product Diversification and International Expansion of Business Groups: Evidence from India
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National Culture and Corporate Innovation
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“…East Asia where significant corporate wealth is concentrated among a few families, and more than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Chang, 2003; Claessens et al., 1999; Filatotchev et al., 2005; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1999).”
BackgroundCorporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Firm Value: Evidence from Korea
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“In particular, Korea is characterized by weak protection for minority shareholders [48].”
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THE STATE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND A VISION OF THE FUTURE
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“Chang (2003) offered another interesting example.”
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“ownership variables remain unchanged. The subsample of firms with only positive institutional blockholdings reveals that foreign institutional blockholders are associated with income-increasing accruals, possibly due to their experience and incentives in speculative trading around earnings announcements. We then exami…”
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“…(Guillen 2000), economic performance (Chang and Hong 2000; Khanna 2000; Khanna and Palepu 2000), market valuation (Lins and Servaes 2002; Baek, Kang, and Park 2004) , and associated agency problems (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 2002; Chang 2003; Fisman and Wang 2010) of business groups.”
InfluentialEquity market liberalization and corporate governance
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“In addition, the findings show that firms not affiliated with chaebols (the independent firms) and firms with concentrated ownership (7)According to Chung and Yang (1992), the largest 30 chaebols produced 35.”
A capabilities‐based perspective on target selection in acquisitions
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“Impact of group control mechanisms on the performance of diversified affiliated companies There are three main control mechanisms that have been commonly used in business groups (Chang, 2003b; Keister, 1998).”
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Yaprak, A., & Karademir, B. (2010) · International Marketing Review · doi:10.1108/02651331011037548 · Cited by 103
Yildirim‐Öktem, Ö., & Üsdiken, B. (2009) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00663.x · Cited by 103
“…weak institutional environments that often characterize late-industrializing countries, the most important way available to external partners for monitoring firm management as well as the family controlling the business group could be to have seats on the board of the joint venture (Chang, 2003).”
BackgroundPurkayastha, S., Manolova, T. S., & Edelman, L. F. (2016) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2016.11.004 · Cited by 109
Corruption in Asia: Pervasiveness and arbitrariness
Lee, S., & Oh, K. (2007) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-006-9027-y · Cited by 101
Value relevance of disclosed related party transactions
Ge, W., Drury, D. H., Fortin, S., Feng, L., & Tsang, D. (2010) · Advances in Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.adiac.2010.02.004 · Cited by 101
Performance feedback, financial slack and the innovation behavior of firms
Lu, L.-H., & Wong, P.-K. (2019) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-018-9634-4 · Cited by 103
“…measures of firm performance: return on invested capital, calculated as the sum of net income before taxes plus interest payment divided by the total assets (Chang, 2003) and return on equity, computed as the income available for common equity divided by the total common equity (Henkel, 2009).”
MethodKuo, A., Kao, M.-S., Chang, Y.-C., & Chiu, C.-F. (2012) · European Management Journal · doi:10.1016/j.emj.2012.03.008 · Cited by 119
“Of course, family shareholders may try to undertake certain strategic moves, such as product diversification, to mitigate the risks (Chang, 2003), but such endeavors cannot reduce firm-specific financial risks associated with undiversified holdings (Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006; Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke,2001).”
BackgroundOwnership structure, horizontal agency costs and the performance of high-tech entrepreneurial firms
Colombo, M. G., Croce, A., & Murtinu, S. (2013) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-013-9483-y · Cited by 102
“In this situation, owner-managers have room to engage in actions that diverge from those aimed at maximising firm profits (Chang 2003) and provide them with private benefits to the detriment of non-manager individual shareholders.5 These latter, being ‘outsiders’, do not have resources and…”
Terlaak, A., Kim, S., & Roh, T. (2018) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-018-3911-5 · Cited by 98
Principal-Principal Conflicts and IPO Pricing in an Emerging Economy
Lin, C., & Chuang, C.-M. (2011) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00870.x · Cited by 104
Business groups in East Asia: Post-crisis restructuring and new growth
Chang, S. (2006) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-006-9013-4 · Cited by 89
Self-citationBusiness Groups and Corporate Governance: Review, Synthesis, and Extension
Colli, A., & Colpan, A. M. (2015) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12144 · Cited by 103
Rhee, L., Ocasio, W. C., & Kim, T.-H. (2019) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2018.1237 · Cited by 91
Does diversification add firm value in emerging economies? Effect of corporate governance
Lien, Y.-C., & Li, S. (2013) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.05.030 · Cited by 102
Chung, H., & Chan, S.-T. (2012) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-011-9281-5 · Cited by 94
“…by family members directly or indirectly in a pyramidal ownership structure, family leadership will impose authorized power in strategic decisions (Chang, 2003; Morck et al., 2005), and accordingly influence the performance in family businesses or family business groups in a positive manner…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Performance Effects of Business Groups in Russia
Estrin, S., Poukliakova, S., & Shapiro, D. (2009) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2008.00820.x · Cited by 86
“Previous studies relating some aspect of corporate ownership structure to performance have correctly stressed the issue of reverse causality (Black et al., 2004; Chang, 2003; Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko, 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialBusiness group affiliation, earnings management and audit quality: evidence from Bangladesh
Muttakin, M. B., Khan, A., & Mihret, D. G. (2017) · Managerial Auditing Journal · doi:10.1108/maj-01-2016-1310 · Cited by 99
Family, institutional investors ownerships and corporate performance: the case of Indonesia
Musallam, S. R. M., Fauzi, H., & Nagu, N. (2018) · Social Responsibility Journal · doi:10.1108/srj-08-2017-0155 · Cited by 85
Metadata
- Authors
- Chang, S. J.
- Affiliations
- Korea University (KR)
- Corresponding author
- Chang, S. J.
- ORCID
- Chang, S. J.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2003-04-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 238-253
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1974345323
- Cited by
- 550
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 56.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Academy of Management Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Family Business Performance and Succession
- Keywords
- ownership structure, expropriation, firm performance, public companies, corporate governance, Korean firms
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