OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPROPRIATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUP-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN KOREA.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this study, a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea was used to examine simultaneous causality between ownership structure and performance. The results show that performance determine...
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“because the main problem there is that controlling shareholders usually already have had too much concentrated ownership and control rights, which allow some of them to potentially expropriate minority shareholders (Chang, 2003).”
From An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies (2008) · cites this paper as Chang, 2003
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“Oluwatoyin et al. (2009) used OLS method unable to express the three relations (Chang, 2003; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Cho, 1998) used simultaneous equations and two-stage-least squares (2SLS), deal with and influence each other estimates of the ownership structure and corporate performance.”
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“This is in line with Chang (2003), Chang and Hong (2000) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) who argue that firms with insider ownership whereby the owner and manager are the same or own the business jointly can result in improved innovation performance of the business.”
BackgroundBUSINESS GROUP PERFORMANCE, CONTEXT, AND STRATEGY: A META-ANALYSIS.
Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E. R., Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., van Essen, M., & van Oosterhout, J. (2010) · Academy of Management Proceedings · doi:10.5465/ambpp.2010.54494717 · Cited by 3
Kim, J. (2019) · Chula Digiverse · doi:10.58837/chula.the.2019.228 · Cited by 3
Does Ethnicity Pay? Evidence from Overseas Chinese FDI in ChinaPreprint
Huang, Y., Jin, L., & Qian, Y. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1107616 · Cited by 3
The relation between firm value and corporate ownership : evidence from China’s listed companies
Yao, Y. (2008) · The University of Bath Online Publications Store (The University of Bath) · Cited by 3
Heo, Y., & Pak, A. (2025) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.4359 · Cited by 2
Miah, M. S., Ferdous, C. S., Shams, A., & Ahmed, M. (2025) · SN Business & Economics · doi:10.1007/s43546-025-00945-1 · Cited by 2
“Chang (2003) novel study on 3086 Korean firms between 1986 and 1996 reveals that business groups ( chaebol) families capitalize on inside information and posit severe agency conflict.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Chang, S. J.
- Affiliations
- Korea University (KR)
- Corresponding author
- Chang, S. J.
- ORCID
- Chang, S. J.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2003-04-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 238-253
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1974345323
- Cited by
- 550
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 56.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Academy of Management Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Family Business Performance and Succession
- Keywords
- ownership structure, expropriation, firm performance, public companies, corporate governance, Korean firms
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.