OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPROPRIATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUP-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN KOREA.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this study, a sample of group-affiliated public firms in Korea was used to examine simultaneous causality between ownership structure and performance. The results show that performance determine...
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“because the main problem there is that controlling shareholders usually already have had too much concentrated ownership and control rights, which allow some of them to potentially expropriate minority shareholders (Chang, 2003).”
From An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies (2008) · cites this paper as Chang, 2003
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“Accordingly, they can expropriate value from minority shareholders. ( Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;”
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“concentrated ownership have higher performance ( Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Short, 1994;”
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Capital Structure Choice and Firm Value: New Empirical Evidence from Asymmetric Causality Test
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“In studies of Nayyar (1993), Becker and Gerhart (1996), Wiggins and Ruefli (2002), Chang (2003), Cho and Pu cik (2005) and Short et al. (2007), M/B is used as a market measure reflecting firm value.”
BackgroundForeign Ownership, Agency Costs, and Long-Term Firm Growth: Evidence from Korea
Choi, Y. M., & Park, K. (2019) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su11061599 · Cited by 36
“Controlling shareholders have a close relationship or social ties with managers and thus possibly have the power to expropriate minority shareholders by pursuing their private interests [32].”
BackgroundPrincipal Costs in Initial Public Offerings
Dalziel, T., White, R. E., & Arthurs, J. D. (2011) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.01005.x · Cited by 34
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“In contrast, family firms, guided by SEW considerations, are more inclined to pursue exploratory innovation in response to stakeholder pressure (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2011; Morck & Yeung, 2003).”
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Yoo, T., & Rhee, M. (2013) · Asian Business & Management · doi:10.1057/abm.2013.2 · Cited by 32
“To measure Ownership Concentration, we used the percentage of shares held by the controlling shareholder, that is, the group of shareholders in control of the company, such as those owning a majority equity stake in the company, their family members, and affiliated entities (Chang, 2003).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCorporate fraud under pyramidal ownership structure: Evidence from a regulatory reform
Choi, D., Gam, Y. K., & Shin, H. (2020) · Emerging Markets Review · doi:10.1016/j.ememar.2020.100726 · Cited by 30
“Prior researchers document that a pyramidal ownership structure of business groups reinforces a conflict of interest between controlling and minority shareholders (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006a, b; Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan, 2002; Chang, 2003; Jian and Wong, 2010; Aharony et al., 2010; Jiang et al., 2010; Cheun…”
BackgroundThai Business Groups: Crisis and Restructuring
Polsiri, P., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0007 · Cited by 30
Kwon, S. H., Kim, J., & Yim, H. (2023) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.114090 · Cited by 29
How family control influences FDI entry mode choice
Kao, M.-S., Kuo, A., & Chang, Y.-C. (2013) · Journal of Management & Organization · doi:10.1017/jmo.2013.23 · Cited by 31
“Of course, family shareholders may try to mitigate the risks via strategic moves such as product diversification (Chang, 2003), but such moves cannot reduce firm-specific financial risks associated with concentrated shareholdings since the company’s failure may imply the loss of all returns (Yeh,…”
BackgroundBusiness Groups in Emerging Markets: A Survey and Analysis
Poczter, S. L. (2017) · Emerging Markets Finance and Trade · doi:10.1080/1540496x.2017.1286587 · Cited by 28
“…in South Korea and China both originated in government policies intended at least in part to support economic development by promoting the provision of public goods (Berglöf and Perotti 1994; Chang 2003; Ferris, Kim, and Kitsabunnarat 2003; Keister and Lu 2004; Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Maman 2002).”
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An, F., Gao, X., Guan, J., Li, H., & Liu, Q. (2015) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2015.12.050 · Cited by 27
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Zajac, E. J., & Goranova, M. (2024) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2022.0479 · Cited by 33
Cho, J. (2023) · Asian Business & Management · doi:10.1057/s41291-023-00250-5 · Cited by 26
“…family ownership , measured as the sum of the ratio of stocks held by all family members and by affiliates in the same family business group (Chang, 2003); family CEO presence , measured as a binary variable implying family CEO presence (1) or absence (0); founder CEO presence , measured…”
Malaysian Business Groups: The State and Capital Development in the Post-Currency Crisis Period
Gomez, E. T. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0006 · Cited by 32
The impact of corporate governance on firm performance in Egyptian listed companies
Mohamed, E. K. A., Basuony, M. A. K., & Badawi, A. (2013) · Corporate Ownership and Control · doi:10.22495/cocv11i1c7art6 · Cited by 26
“Chang (2003) reveals that the concentration of ownership, which enables owners to reduce managers’ discretion, and increased ownership by managers, which aligns managers’ interests with those of shareholders, improve firm performance.”
BackgroundCategorizing the Complexity: A Scoping Review of Structures Within Organizations
Watson, M. K., Winchester, C. C., Luciano, M. M., & Humphrey, S. E. (2024) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/01492063241271252 · Cited by 27
“Studies suggest that authority structures are determined by firm performance (e.g., ownership structure; Chang, 2003) and subsequently influence firm performance (e.g., co-CEO structure; Krause, Priem, & Love, 2015; ownership structure; Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & Wright, 2010; Gedajlovic &…”
Wright, P., Kroll, M. J., Mukherji, A., & Pettus, M. L. (2008) · Journal of Management & Governance · doi:10.1007/s10997-008-9063-8 · Cited by 25
“In the related literature it has been proposed that agency conflicts may be lowered as CEO ownership incentives rise (Kroll et al. 1997; Chang 2003; Fiss 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialUnveiling the role of multiple blockholders: Evidence from closely held firms
Russino, A., Picone, P. M., & Dagnino, G. B. (2019) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12299 · Cited by 27
Control-Enhancing Mechanisms and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan
Shaikh, R., Fei, G., Shaique, M., & Nazir, M. R. (2019) · Journal of risk and financial management · doi:10.3390/jrfm12030130 · Cited by 25
“Chang (2003) specified that families and ultimate shareholders hold more shares of firms with assuring returns and profits based on the inside information of intragroup transfer to affiliates.”
BackgroundVoluntarily Disclosing Prosocial Behaviors in Korean Firms
Griffin, J. J., & Youm, Y. N. (2018) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-018-3915-1 · Cited by 24
“Following previous literature (Choi et al. 2013; Lee and Gaur 2013; Chang 2003), we identified chaebol groups as those included in the list of “large-scale business groups” provided by the Korea Fair Trade Commission3 for each year.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe influence of ownership structure on the extent of CSR reporting: An emerging market study
Fadli, A. A., Sands, J., Jones, G., Beattie, C., & Pensiero, D. (2022) · Business and Society Review · doi:10.1111/basr.12286 · Cited by 27
Singh, K., & Rastogi, S. (2023) · Benchmarking An International Journal · doi:10.1108/bij-10-2022-0658 · Cited by 24
Ownership structure and corporate diversification strategies of Chinese business groups
Zhao, J. (2010) · Management Research Review · doi:10.1108/01409171011092167 · Cited by 24
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Kamardin, H., Latif, R. A., Mohd, K. N. T., & Adam, N. C. (2014) · Jurnal Pengurusan · doi:10.17576/pengurusan-2014-42-05 · Cited by 33
“However, Fauzias et al. (1999), Chang (2003) and Lin, Huang and Young (2008) find that performance is negatively and significantly related to board ownership.”
BackgroundAre better-governed firms more innovative? Evidence from Korea
Choi, P. M. S., Chung, C. Y., Vo, X. V., & Wang, K. (2020) · International Review of Economics & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.iref.2020.05.018 · Cited by 27
Choi, D., Choi, P. M. S., Choi, J. H., & Chung, C. Y. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12041680 · Cited by 25
“Therefore, the board of directors is usually made up of companions of the chaebol families and insiders, as a result, corporate decision‐making is not very transparent [44].”
BackgroundFamily Ownership and Control in Large Firms: The Good, the Bad, the Irrelevant - and WhyPreprint
Peng, M. W., & Jiang, Y. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.938173 · Cited by 23
“…(digging a tunnel to sneak out corporate resources – such theft is often illegal) (Bertrand et al., 2002), and (2) related transactions (selling firm assets to another company owned by controlling shareholders at below-market places – this is often legal) (Chang, 2003; Johnson et al., 2000).”
Trees in the Forest: How Do Family Owners Make CSR Decisions in Business Groups?
Oh, W., Ree, H., Chang, Y. K., & Postuła, I. (2022) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-022-05270-3 · Cited by 22
“As a result, due to their family-centered structure, business groups’ opportunistic rent-seeking behaviors (from the overall society in some cases) have come under criticism (Chang, 2003b; Cho & Kim, 2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialAguilera, R. V., Federo, R., Justo, R., Merida, A. L., & Pascual‐Fuster, B. (2024) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12603 · Cited by 23
Chakraborty, I. (2015) · Global Economic Review · doi:10.1080/1226508x.2015.1013486 · Cited by 22
“This criterion has been used earlier by Mishra and McConaughy (1999), Mishra et al. (2001) and Chang (2003), among others.”
MethodVallabhaneni, D. (2012) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119197973.ch10 · Cited by 22
WITHDRAWN: Board diversity and CSR
Feng, X., Groh, A. P., & Wang, Y. (2020) · Global Finance Journal · doi:10.1016/j.gfj.2020.100578 · Cited by 22
RetractedGroup-affiliated Firms and Corporate Social Responsibility Activities
Lee, W. (2018) · Journal of Asian Finance Economics and Business · doi:10.13106/jafeb.2018.vol5.no4.127 · Cited by 21
The effectiveness of governance mechanisms in emerging markets: A review
Refakar, M., & Ravaonorohanta, N. (2020) · Corporate Ownership and Control · doi:10.22495/cocv17i3art1 · Cited by 25
How cross‐shareholding influences financial reporting: Evidence from Japan
Muramiya, K., & Takada, T. (2020) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12333 · Cited by 20
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Hans, L. K., Chittoor, R., Vissa, B., & Chen, G. (2023) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/01492063231180130 · Cited by 20
“In a study that explores causation in a reverse direction (link 4-3(2)), Chang (2003) shows that performance determines ownership structure but not vice versa and provides evidence that controlling shareholders use insider information to take direct and indirect equity stakes in pro fi table or…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLv, D. D., Chen, W., & Lan, H. (2020) · BRQ Business Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/2340944420916097 · Cited by 20
“First, compared with other firms, managerial ownership links the personal interest of managers with the performance of firms (Chang, 2003).”
BackgroundYoo, T., & Koh, Y. (2014) · Asian Business & Management · doi:10.1057/abm.2014.11 · Cited by 20
“To measure the controlling shareholder variable, we used family control, given the Korean context where large firms are often run by family members or professional managers appointed by the family (Chang, 2003).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCorporate Governance and Company Performance: A Study with Reference to Manufacturing Firms in IndiaPreprint
Saravanan, P. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2063677 · Cited by 20
Ng, S. H., Shrives, P. J., & Yeoh, K. K. (2013) · Corporate Ownership and Control · doi:10.22495/cocv10i3art11 · Cited by 21
“…business groups makes it hard to determine where control resides, as well as identifying and challenging unfair intra-group transactions (Chang, 2003) in which “such networks provide significant opportunity for collusion or other unethical transactions” (Young et al., 2008, p.206).”
BackgroundInternal capital markets and employee wage: Evidence from China
Tan, W., Li, X. R., Zhao, J., Lin, C., & Wang, H. (2023) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102680 · Cited by 19
The impact of control structures on firm value
Besim, S. (2023) · Borsa Istanbul Review · doi:10.1016/j.bir.2023.05.001 · Cited by 19
Jung, B., Lee, D., Rhee, S. G., & Shin, I. (2019) · Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies · doi:10.1111/ajfs.12245 · Cited by 19
Business group affiliation, performance, context, and strategy: a meta-analysis
Carney, M. (2012) · Strategic Direction · doi:10.1108/sd.2012.05628baa.010 · Cited by 19
“On the other hand, we find no benefits associated with scope, such as those suggested by Khanna and Palepu (1997), Chang and Hong (2000), and others.”
BackgroundCho, S. J., Chung, C. Y., & Liu, C. (2018) · International Review of Finance · doi:10.1111/irfi.12219 · Cited by 19
Ok, C., & Ahn, H. S. (2019) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su11195178 · Cited by 22
“The KIS database has been adopted in previous studies that utilize Korean firms as a sample [60,61].”
MethodLin, C., & Chuang, C.-M. (2016) · International Marketing Review · doi:10.1108/imr-09-2015-0203 · Cited by 18
Taiwanese Business Groups: Steady Growth in Institutional Transition
Chung, C., & Mahmood, I. P. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0004 · Cited by 22
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Cho, H. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12187738 · Cited by 17
“Such an approach provides advantages by reducing omitted variable and endogeneity issue, and it also decreases the risk of including the outlier observation [33].”
BackgroundHow do Business Groups Function and Evolve in Emerging Markets? The Case of Turkish Business Groups
Yaprak, A., Karademir, B., & Osborn, R. N. (2006) · Advances in international marketing · doi:10.1016/s1474-7979(06)17010-6 · Cited by 17
Chen, X. (2019) · The North American Journal of Economics and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.najef.2019.101076 · Cited by 17
Ownership Structure and Governance Implementation: Evidence from Indonesia
Siagian, F. T. (2011) · Cited by 17
Jun, I., Sheldon, P. M., & Rhee, J. (2010) · Asian Business & Management · doi:10.1057/abm.2010.26 · Cited by 17
Nekhili, M., & Cherif, M. (2009) · Comptabilité - Contrôle - Audit · doi:10.3917/cca.153.0055 · Cited by 17
Female senior managers and the gender equality environment: Evidence from south Korean firms
Song, J. M. (2022) · Pacific-Basin Finance Journal · doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2022.101838 · Cited by 16
Byun, H. S., Lee, J. H., & Park, K. S. (2017) · Emerging Markets Finance and Trade · doi:10.1080/1540496x.2016.1240675 · Cited by 16
“Chang (2003) analyzes the relation between the direct ownership of controlling shareholders and firm performance and finds that controlling shareholders increase the direct ownership of profitable member firms.”
BackgroundMa, X., & Lu, J. W. (2017) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-017-9517-0 · Cited by 16
“On the other hand, this description points to the possibility of the spill-over of grouprelated problems to affiliated firms, which is prevalent in emerging economies (Chang, 2003; Chang & Hong, 2000; Khanna & Rivikin, 2001).”
BackgroundInfluentialWang, X. A., Wan, W. P., & Yiu, D. W. (2018) · Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal · doi:10.1002/sej.1297 · Cited by 16
The Relation between Cash Holdings and R&D Expenditures According to Ownership Structure
Kim, H., & Park, S. (2012) · Eurasian economic review : · doi:10.14208/bf03353811 · Cited by 16
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Oetzel, J. M., & Oh, C. H. (2019) · Journal of International Business Policy · doi:10.1057/s42214-018-00016-3 · Cited by 17
“may be able to increase its level of ownership when its subsidiary is expected to show better performance (Chang, 2003).”
BackgroundMethodInnocents Abroad: The Hazards of International Joint Ventures with Pyramidal Group Firms
Perkins, S., Mørck, R., & Yeung, B. Y. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13914 · Cited by 16
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Wright, P., Kroll, M. J., Mukherji, A., & Pettus, M. L. (2008) · Journal of Management & Governance · doi:10.1007/s10997-008-9073-6 · Cited by 15
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Gress, D. R., & Poon, J. (2007) · Growth and Change · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2257.2007.00376.x · Cited by 15
Avoiding inheritance taxes in family firms
Shin, H. (2020) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12308 · Cited by 15
“…literature documents tunneling in business groups under a pyramidal ownership structure by highlighting conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006a, 2006b; Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002; Chang, 2003).”
BackgroundChung, C. Y., Kim, D., & Lee, J. (2020) · Global Economic Review · doi:10.1080/1226508x.2020.1798268 · Cited by 16
Indonesian Business Groups: The Crisis in Progress
Hanani, A. D. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0008 · Cited by 17
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Kohli, M., & Gill, S. (2019) · Journal of Family Business Management · doi:10.1108/jfbm-09-2019-0060 · Cited by 14
Political connection and CSR : Evidence from Korea
Park, S.-H. (2022) · Business Ethics the Environment & Responsibility · doi:10.1111/beer.12452 · Cited by 15
Hussain, M. A., & Hadi, A. R. A. (2018) · International Journal of Business and Management · doi:10.5539/ijbm.v13n2p14 · Cited by 14
“The recommended changes it brought to the board structure together with the procedures to make a company more accountable to the shareholders, suggested ideas that led to the increase in the number of independent directors on the board, separation of the chairmanship role from that of the CEO and the introduction of b…”
BackgroundInfluentialMalawat, F. F., Sutrisno, S., & Subekti, I. (2018) · Jurnal Ekonomi MODERNISASI · doi:10.21067/jem.v14i1.2377 · Cited by 14
“Kajian empiris penelitian sebelumnya menemukan bahwa pemegang saham pengendali melakukan ekspropriasi dengan tunneling activities, (Chang, 2003; Cheung et al., 2006; Glaeser et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2000).”
BackgroundEarnings quality of Taiwanese group firms
Yang, Y.-J., Kweh, Q. L., & Lin, R.-C. (2014) · Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics · doi:10.1080/16081625.2013.871771 · Cited by 14
“Consistently, Chang (2003) shows that controlling shareholders of group firms use inside information to expropriate profits.”
BackgroundKorean Business Groups: The Financial Crisis and the Restructuring of Chaebols
(2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0003 · Cited by 19
Labor investment efficiency: a review of the international literature
Habib, A., Ranasinghe, D., & Liu, Y. (2024) · Journal of Accounting Literature · doi:10.1108/jal-10-2024-0277 · Cited by 21
The Mixed Gamble of Competitive Dynamics in Family‐Controlled Firms
Cho, J., Massis, A. D., & Kotlar, J. (2025) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.13218 · Cited by 13
Hussain, M., & Hadi, A. R. A. (2019) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-03-2018-0107 · Cited by 15
What Constitutes “Too Big to Jail?” Evidence from South Korea's Family Business Groups
Choi, H., Kang, H., & Lee, C. (2018) · Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies · doi:10.1111/ajfs.12241 · Cited by 13
Galang, R. M. N., Lavado, R., White, G. O., & Francisco, J. P. (2020) · Journal of Asia Business Studies · doi:10.1108/jabs-05-2019-0135 · Cited by 14
Kim, J., Kim, S., & Lee, H. (2011) · Asian Journal of Technology Innovation · doi:10.1080/19761597.2011.578430 · Cited by 13
“In association with the case of Korean firms, studies of Choi (2008) and Chang (2003) address that the leverage has a positive relation with the Tobin's Q.”
Background'Private Benefits of Control' and Debt Financing
Filatotchev, I. V., & Mickiewicz, T. M. (2006) · Aston Publications Explorer (Aston University) · Cited by 14
Ngui, K. S., Voon, M. L., & Ling, E. L. A. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1095138 · Cited by 13
Auditor selection within a business group: evidence from Taiwan
Yang, Y.-J., Kang, J., Lin, R.-C., & Ronen, J. (2014) · Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting · doi:10.1007/s11156-014-0467-z · Cited by 12
Katper, N. K., Shaikh, S. S., Anand, V., & Ali, N. I. (2018) · International Business Research · doi:10.5539/ibr.v11n11p55 · Cited by 12
Kim, Y., Shin, T., & Park, S. (2019) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-019-09671-3 · Cited by 13
“Following Chang and Hong (2000) and Chang (2003), we measured ROIC as the sum of net income before tax plus interest payments deflated by total assets, which provides a returnmetric that is comparable across firms.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCorruption and business cycle volatility: a corporate governance perspective
Lin, C., Huang, C., & Chuang, C.-M. (2017) · Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics · doi:10.1080/16081625.2017.1378114 · Cited by 12
“For instance, Chang (2003) has found that controlling families of Korean chaebols (i.e. Korean business groups) systematically engage in insider trading that expropriates minority shareholders.”
BackgroundSaravanan, P. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1360534 · Cited by 12
Chung, C. Y., Jo, H., & Lee, J. (2025) · Financial Innovation · doi:10.1186/s40854-025-00784-x · Cited by 11
“Chang (2003) reported that the boards of these companies are associated with chaebol families, eroding the transparency of their decision-making.”
Speed of FDI expansions and the survival of Korean SMEs: the moderating role of ownership structure
Cho, J., & Lee, J. (2018) · Asian Business & Management · doi:10.1057/s41291-018-0045-7 · Cited by 12
“2002; Chang 2003; Kim et al.”
BackgroundInfluentialNew Venture Governance: An Integrative, Multidisciplinary Review
Deb, P., Sreekumar, V., Sen, P., Duru, A. I., & Brannon, D. L. (2024) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2022.0167 · Cited by 13
Singaporean Business Groups: The Role of the State and Capital in Singapore Inc.
Tsui‐Auch, L. S. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287345.003.0005 · Cited by 14
Does Sustainable Corporate Governance Enhance Accounting Practice? Evidence from the Korean Market
Choi, D., Choi, P. M. S., Choi, J. H., & Chung, C. Y. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12072585 · Cited by 11
“Chang [22] states that these companies’ boards are mainly made up of close associates of the chaebol families, eroding the transparency of their decision-making.”
BackgroundRelated party transactions, benefits of control and earnings quality
Tong, Y., & Wang, H. (2008) · Frontiers of Business Research in China · doi:10.1007/s11782-008-0011-x · Cited by 14
Top manager ownership levels and incentive alignment in inventively active firms
Levitas, E., Barker, V. L., & Ahsan, M. (2011) · Journal of strategy and management · doi:10.1108/17554251111128600 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Chang, S. J.
- Affiliations
- Korea University (KR)
- Corresponding author
- Chang, S. J.
- ORCID
- Chang, S. J.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2003-04-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 238-253
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W1974345323
- Cited by
- 550
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 37 · 2017: 32 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 56.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Academy of Management Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Family Business Performance and Succession
- Keywords
- ownership structure, expropriation, firm performance, public companies, corporate governance, Korean firms
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.