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Cited by 129Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesDisability Rights and RepresentationEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

From “She Would Say That, Wouldn't She?” to “Does She Take Sugar?” Epistemic Injustice and Disability

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Scully, Jackie Leach·2018·International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics
DOI 10.3138/ijfab.11.1.106
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Abstract

Epistemic injustice is the idea that social power ensures that the knowledge of some groups is excluded from the collective epistemic resources. In this paper, I argue that there are distinctive features of disabled life that, because they shape the processes through which knowledge is gathered, evaluated, judged, and disseminated, also influence the ways in which epistemic injustice is experienced by disabled people. These features include the ascription of a global epistemic incapacity to people affected by impairment. Against a background of contemporary political shifts and biotechnology innovation, the implications of epistemic injustice for disabled people are serious.

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  • Infrastructural barriers compound into epistemic violence, the systematic dismissal of disabled researchers' knowledge claims.

    “These infrastructural barriers then compound into epistemic violence , the systematic dismissal of disabled researchers' knowledge claims [21, 64].”

    From "I Don't Trust Any Professional Research Tool": A Re-Imagination of Knowledge Production Workflows by, with, and for Blind and Low-Vision Researchers (2026) · cites this paper as [64]

    Section 4 (Effects; page unavailable) describes disabled people's knowledge claims being rejected or dismissed, and the section on systemic exclusion in health and social care identifies institutional conditions that make such dismissal more likely. The paper does not specifically say that infrastructural barriers compound into this harm for disabled researchers; it discusses disabled people more broadly and does not frame the process as “epistemic violence.” (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • When evaluation systems conflate medium with quality, they create hermeneutical injustice: BLV researchers' contributions are undervalued because evaluative frameworks embody ableist assumptions about what recognizing excellence looks like.

    “When evaluation systems conflate medium with quality, they create what Scully describes as hermeneutical injustice [64]: BLV researchers' contributions are undervalued because evaluative frameworks embody ableist assumptions about what recognizing excellence looks like.”

    From "I Don't Trust Any Professional Research Tool": A Re-Imagination of Knowledge Production Workflows by, with, and for Blind and Low-Vision Researchers (2026) · cites this paper as [64]

    In “4. Effects,” Scully describes hermeneutic injustice as excluding stigmatized groups’ knowledge from collective epistemic resources; the same section discusses dominant groups judging disabled people’s claims through their own frameworks. This supports the conceptual connection, but the cited paper does not address evaluation systems conflating medium with quality or the undervaluation of BLV researchers’ work. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. David Wasserman, Jerome Bickerbach, and Robert Wachbroit, 172-216. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  2. Carel, Havi, and Ian James Kidd. 2014. "Epistemic Justice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis." Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4): 529- 40. Consortium for Research into Deaf Education. 2011. "CRIDE Report on 2011 Survey on Education Provision for Deaf Children in England." http://www.batod.org.uk/content/resources/survey/cride-2011/CRIDE2011.pdf

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Authors
Scully, J. L.
Corresponding author
Scully, Jackie Leach
ORCID
Scully, Jackie Leach
Venue
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics
Publisher
University of Toronto Press Inc. (UTPress)
Published
2018-02
Volume
11
Issue
1
Pages
106-124
ISSN
  • 1937-4577 (ISSN-L)
  • 1937-4585
DOI
10.3138/ijfab.11.1.106
OpenAlex
W2793317418
Cited by
128
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 34 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 1
FWCI
15.93
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (publishedVersion)
  • UNSWorks (University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Newcastle University ePrints (Newcastle Univesity)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Disability Rights and Representation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
epistemic injustice, disability, people with disabilities, social power, knowledge production, epistemic exclusion, biotechnology

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