Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Game Theory and Evolution The Replicator Dynamics Evolutionary Games in Finite Populations From Finite to Infinite Populations (and Back Again) Applications Concluding Remarks References
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C.
- Venue
- Reviews of Nonlinear Dynamics and Complexity
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-04-22
- Pages
- 25-61
- OpenAlex
- W1517235484
- Cited by
- 220
- References
- 21
- Type
- other
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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