The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reputation is valuable within and outside one?s own social group
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Citations
Cites
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges.
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.284.5412.278 · Cited by 2,798
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780 · cited 1×
“Nevertheless, in experiments, humans usually begin with cooperation at a high level which declines towards zero when the game is played repeatedly (e.g. (Fischbacher et al. 2001).”
BackgroundEvolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700 · cited 2×
“Indirect reciprocity requires the donor’s costs of giving help to be lower than the value of the help to the receiver (see Nowak and Sigmund 1998a, 1998b).”
BackgroundDawes, R. M. (1980) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125 · Cited by 2,022
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415424a · Cited by 1,371
Self-citationEvolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673 · cited 1×
“In contrast to public goods situations, stable cooperation can evolve through indirect reciprocity as theoretical work has shown (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a, 1998b; Lotem et al. 1999; Leimar and Hammerstein 2001; Fishman 2003; Mohtashemi and Mui 2003).”
Background
Cited by
Going green to be seen: status, reputation, and conspicuous conservation
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., & Van den Bergh, B. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0017346 · Cited by 2,174
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Rand, D. G. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.004 · Cited by 683
Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem
Willer, R. (2009) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240907400102 · Cited by 670
Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment
Gächter, S., & Herrmann, B. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0275 · Cited by 481
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0912515107 · Cited by 412
Self-citationTrudel, R. (2019) · Consumer Psychology Review · doi:10.1002/arcp.1045 · Cited by 412
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity
Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Semmann, D., & Milinski, M. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0704598104 · Cited by 381
Self-citationPowering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment
Yoeli, E., Hoffman, M., Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1301210110 · Cited by 269
Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional change
Wilson, D. S., Hayes, S. C., Biglan, A., & Embry, D. D. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13001593 · Cited by 255
The cultural evolution of emergent group-level traits
Smaldino, P. E. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13001544 · Cited by 211
Multiple gossip statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness
Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2008) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0762 · Cited by 158
Self-citationDoes Observability Affect Prosociality?
Bradley, A., Lawrence, C., & Ferguson, E. (2018) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2018.0116 · Cited by 122
Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., Röhl, T., & Milinski, M. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1315273111 · Cited by 90
Self-citationCosts for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour
Bednarik, P., Fehl, K., & Semmann, D. (2014) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.1661 · Cited by 49
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M.
- Venue
- Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology
- Published
- 2005-01-12
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 611-616
- ISSN
- 0340-5443 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-0762
- OpenAlex
- W2068979131
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 12.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.