Evolution of commitment and level of participation in public goods games
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Before engaging in a group venture agents may require commitments from other members in the group, and based on the level of acceptance (participation) they can then decide whether it is worthwhile joining the group effort. Here, we show in the context of public goods games and using stochastic evolutionary game theory modelling, which implies imitation and mutation dynamics, that arranging prior commitments while imposing a minimal participation when interacting in groups induces agents to behave cooperatively. Our analytical and numerical results show that if the cost of arranging the commitment is sufficiently small compared to the cost of cooperation, commitment arranging behavior is frequent, leading to a high level of cooperation in the population. Moreover, an optimal participation level emerges depending both on the dilemma at stake and on the cost of arranging the commitment. Namely, the harsher the common good dilemma is, and the costlier it becomes to arrange the commitment, the more participants should explicitly commit to the agreement to ensure the success of the joint venture. Furthermore, considering that commitment deals may last for more than one encounter, we show that commitment proposers can be lenient in case of short-term agreements, yet should be strict in case of long-term interactions.
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Citations
Cites
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Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502 · cited 5×
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“In the current setting, an agent’s payoff represents its fitness or social success, and the evolutionary dynamics are driven by social learning (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Sigmund, 2010, Rendell et al., 2010), whereby the more successful agents tend to be imitated more often by the others.”
BackgroundSocial learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature09203 · Cited by 580 · cited 2×
“…to study this problem, as it captures the tension between the benefit of mutual cooperation and the temptation to exploit the efforts of others in a joint venture (Ostrom, 1990, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Santos et al., 2008, Hauert et al., 2007, Sigmund et al., 2010, Van Segbroeck et al., 2012).”
BackgroundSigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570
Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection
Imhof, L. A., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2005) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0502589102 · Cited by 381
Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas
Han, T. A., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., & Pereira, L. M. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep09312 · Cited by 54 · cited 8×
“In the two-player setting (namely, the Prisoner’s Dilemma) the behavior of proposing prior commitments has been shown to promote the evolution of cooperation if the cost of arranging commitment is sufficiently small compared to the cost of cooperation [19,23,25].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationEmergence of Social Punishment and Cooperation through Prior Commitments
Han, T. A. (2016) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10120 · Cited by 33 · cited 13×
“In turn, as these AI and MAS works focus more on the formalization of more complex decision making aspects, such as in arranging an agreement, they provide us with more sophisticated extensions to our current commitment-organising mechanisms.”
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“Last but not least, there is a large literature on commitments inAI andMAS [6,7,28,51,72, 74].”
BackgroundInfluential
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“Han et al. [11] considers the idea of commitments, without transfers, in evolutionary game theory.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., & Lenaerts, T.
- Venue
- Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
- Published
- 2016-06-14
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 561-583
- ISSN
- 1387-2532 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7454
- OpenAlex
- W2416397817
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 29.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Funders
- FWO Belgium
- Fonds De La Recherche Scientifique - FNRS
- URF Teesside University (11200174)
- FCT Portugal (UID/CEC/ 04516/2013)
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