Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Clark has recently suggested that predictive processing advances a theory of neural function with the resources to put an ecumenical end to the "representation wars" of recent cognitive science. In this paper I defend and develop this suggestion. First, I broaden the representation wars to include three foundational challenges to representational cognitive science. Second, I articulate three features of predictive processing's account of internal representation that distinguish it from more orthodox representationalist frameworks. Specifically, I argue that it posits a resemblance-based representational architecture with organism-relative contents that functions in the service of pragmatic success, not veridical representation. Finally, I argue that internal representation so understood is either impervious to the three anti-representationalist challenges I outline or can actively embrace them.
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Citations
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Cited by
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From symbols to icons: the return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution
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Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Williams, D.
- Venue
- Minds and Machines
- Published
- 2017-06-26
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 141-172
- ISSN
- 0924-6495 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8641
- OpenAlex
- W2682853549
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 7.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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