The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment
Open accessAbstract
In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person's life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent's intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively "direct" or "personal". Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent's muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people's real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Six views of embodied cognition
Wilson, M. (2002) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196322 · Cited by 4,782
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620
Self-citationA unifying view of the basis of social cognition
GALLESE, V, KEYSERS, C., & RIZZOLATTI, G. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.002 · Cited by 2,236
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05631 · Cited by 1,545
Self-citationA Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
HAUSER, M., CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., KANG‐XING JIN, R., & MIKHAIL, J. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00297.x · Cited by 666
Self-citationSelective deficit in personal moral judgment following damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex
Ciaramelli, E., Muccioli, M., Làdavas, E., & di Pellegrino, G. (2007) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsm001 · Cited by 436
Cited by
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0021847 · Cited by 2,666
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231
Self-citationDeontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: A process dissociation approach
Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0031021 · Cited by 696
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
Serotonin selectively influences moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion
Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M. D., & Robbins, T. W. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1009396107 · Cited by 526
Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.
Everett, J. A. C., Pizarro, D. A., & Crockett, M. J. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000165 · Cited by 317
Greene, J. D. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.003 · Cited by 277
Self-citationUniversals and variations in moral decisions made in 42 countries by 70,000 participants
Awad, E., Dsouza, S., Shariff, A., Rahwan, I., & Bonnefon, J.-F. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1911517117 · Cited by 261
Doris, J. M., & The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 · Cited by 227
Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations
Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x · Cited by 179
Self-citationAway from Trolley Problems and Toward Risk Management
Goodall, N. J. (2016) · Applied Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1080/08839514.2016.1229922 · Cited by 124
The neuroscience of moral cognition: from dual processes to dynamic systems
Van Bavel, J. J., FeldmanHall, O., & Mende-Siedlecki, P. (2015) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.08.009 · Cited by 95
Bergmann, L. T., Schlicht, L., Meixner, C., König, P., Pipa, G., Boshammer, S., & Stephan, A. (2018) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2018.00031 · Cited by 96
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Deontological guilt and obsessive compulsive disorder
Mancini, F., & Gangemi, A. (2015) · Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2015.05.003 · Cited by 70
Greene, J. D. (2016) · A Companion to Experimental Philosophy · doi:10.1002/9781118661666.ch11 · Cited by 48
Self-citationCausal Responsibility and Robust Causation
Grinfeld, G., Lagnado, D., Gerstenberg, T., Woodward, J. F., & Usher, M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069 · Cited by 41
Moral judgement in early bilinguals: Language dominance influences responses to moral dilemmas
Wong, G., & Ng, B. C. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01070 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-06
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 364-371
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2096877169
- Cited by
- 633
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 14.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
