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Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers
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Cited by
The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance
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Metadata
- Authors
- Traxler, C.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 89-103
- ISSN
- 0176-2680 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2117175457
- Cited by
- 281
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 26.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.