The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience☆
Abstract
This study investigates a particularly brazen form of corporate abuse, in which controlling shareholders use intercorporate loans to siphon billions of RMB from hundreds of Chinese listed companies during the 1996-2006 period. We document the nature and extent of these transactions, evaluate their economic consequences, examine factors that affect their cross-sectional severity, and report on the mitigating roles of auditors, institutional investors, and regulators. Collectively, our findings shed light on the severity of the minority shareholder expropriation problem in China, as well as the relative efficacy of various legal and extra-legal governance mechanisms in that country.
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Citations
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Cited by
Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective
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Metadata
- Authors
- Jiang, G., Lee, C. M. C., & Yue, H.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-10
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-20
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2113942631
- Cited by
- 1,593
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 140.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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