Cited by 999COVID-19 epidemiological studiesCommunication and COVID-19 ImpactElectoral Systems and Political Participation

Polarization and public health: Partisan differences in social distancing during the coronavirus pandemic

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Allcott, Hunt, Boxell, Levi, Conway, Jacob, Gentzkow, Matthew, Thaler, Michael, Yang, David·2020·Journal of Public Economics

Abstract

We study partisan differences in Americans' response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Political leaders and media outlets on the right and left have sent divergent messages about the severity of the crisis, which could impact the extent to which Republicans and Democrats engage in social distancing and other efforts to reduce disease transmission. We develop a simple model of a pandemic response with heterogeneous agents that clarifies the causes and consequences of heterogeneous responses. We use location data from a large sample of smartphones to show that areas with more Republicans engaged in less social distancing, controlling for other factors including public policies, population density, and local COVID cases and deaths. We then present new survey evidence of significant gaps at the individual level between Republicans and Democrats in self-reported social distancing, beliefs about personal COVID risk, and beliefs about the future severity of the pandemic.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104254

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  • In the US, the polarization was further fueled by the upcoming presidential election at the time of data collection.

    “This polarization was further fueled by the US presidential election, which was upcoming at the time of data collection for this study (e.g., It's time to vote the Liberal party out!) (see also Allcott et al., 2020).”

    From Understanding user responses to the COVID-19 pandemic on Twitter from a terror management theory perspective: Cultural differences among the US, UK and India (2022) · cites this paper as Allcott et al., 2020

    The Introduction (page not provided) describes partisan differences in US pandemic messaging and behavior, and the Data > Survey section dates the paper’s survey to April 4–7, 2020. But the paper does not say that the upcoming presidential election further fueled the polarization; searches for election-related terms found no such explanation. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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  • Contemporary media, most notably partisan media and social media, often generate polarized societies due to one-sided information flows.

    “contemporary media, most notably partisan media and social media, often receive condemnation for generating polarized societies due to one-sided information flows”

    From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Allcott et al., 2020

    The Introduction (page not provided) describes divergent COVID-19 messaging in partisan media. The Conclusion (page not provided) says divergent messaging is consistent with differences in beliefs and behavior, but cautions that the paper cannot pin down their ultimate causes. It does not establish that social media or one-sided information flows generally generate polarized societies, or discuss condemnation of media for doing so. (LLM, conf=0.87)

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  • Other work on Facebook offers a more ambiguous portrait: some evidence suggests it contributes to issue polarization, while other shows it has no effect on ideological extremity, affective polarization, or belief in false claims.

    “That said, other work, specifically on Facebook, offers a more ambiguous portrait.While some evidence suggests it contributes to issue polarization (Allcott et al., 2020;Settle, 2018), other shows it has no effect on ideological extremity, affective polarization, or belief in false claims (Nyhan et al., 2023; also see Guess et al., 2023aGuess et al., , 2023b).”

    From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Allcott et al., 2020

    The Introduction and Conclusion discuss partisan differences in COVID-19 beliefs and social distancing, and suggest divergent media messaging as a possible explanation. Our copy does not address whether Facebook contributes to issue polarization (searched: Facebook, issue polarization, social media). The claims about no effect are attached to other citations, not this source. (LLM, conf=0.77)

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  • In one study, a randomly assigned group of Facebook users deactivated Facebook for four weeks prior to the 2018 USA midterm election; compared to a matched control group, deactivation reduced issue polarization, and to a lesser extent, affective polarization.

    “In one study, a randomly assigned group of Facebook users deactivated Facebook for four weeks prior to the 2018 USA midterm election. When compared to a matched control group, deactivation reduced issue polarization, and to a lesser extent, affective polarization271.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [271]

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Authors
Allcott, H., Boxell, L., Conway, J., Gentzkow, M., Thaler, M., & Yang, D.
Affiliations
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
  • Stanford University (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Boxell, Levi
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2020-11
Volume
191
Pages
104254
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3015740662
Cited by
999
References
54
Citations by year
2026: 34 · 2025: 89 · 2024: 107 · 2023: 179 · 2022: 220 · 2021: 232 · 2020: 136 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1
FWCI
30.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Public Economics (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • John S. and James L. Knight Foundation
  • Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University
  • Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
  • Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
  • National Science Foundation
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Modeling and Simulation › COVID-19 epidemiological studies
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Communication and COVID-19 Impact
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing, partisan differences, political polarization, public health behavior, pandemic response, heterogeneous agent model, smartphone location data, perceived personal risk, political communication

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