Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
Abstract
Punishment is widely recognized as a potential promoter in sustaining or even enhancing public cooperation, but it meanwhile induces the problem of second-order free-riders. Particularly, recent evidence shows that costly punishment can be maintained if punishers may engage in corruption. However, how to reduce or eliminate incidents of corruption has been the enduring conundrum in human society. As power asymmetries are associated with hierarchies, we investigate how costly punishment affects the evolution of cooperation in the cases without and with corruption control. In the absence of corruption control, altruistic punishers are incapable of punishing corrupt punishers. Corrupt punishment maintains civilian cooperation but undermines the evolution of altruistic punishment. Otherwise, altruistic punishers can enforce symmetrical or asymmetrical punishment on both corrupt punishers and civilian defectors. In this case, both civilian cooperation and altruistic punishment can be promoted. And as an instrument of corruption control, the policy of asymmetrical punishment is more effective in fostering public cooperation and improving social welfare than symmetrical punishment. Moreover, no matter whether corruption control is considered or not, spiteful corruption that non-cooperative punishers penalize defectors is a more effective form for enhancing cooperation compared with bribery. Our work may thus offer an insight into the effects of corruption on public cooperation and the policy of anti-corruption.
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- Authors
- Huang, F., Chen, X., & Wang, L.
- Affiliations
- Peking University (CN)
- University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (CN)
- Corresponding author
- Wang, Long
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-07
- Volume
- 449
- Pages
- 60-72
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2796832372
- Semantic Scholar
- 227ebdb0785c28cbb2d3ed1b533864ef69039420
- Cited by
- 28
- References
- 78
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 5.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Theoretical Biology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (61503062, 61751301, 61533001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, corruption control, costly punishment, altruistic punishment, bribery, anti-corruption policy, power imbalance, hierarchical society, social welfare (welfare economics)
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Theoretical, Societies
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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