Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational
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The only two studies that included data on both ACS and moralized rationality found no support for the prediction that ACS is associated with moralized rationality.
“However, the only two studies that included data on both ACS and moralized rationality found no support for that prediction [65].”
From The amoral atheist? A cross-national examination of cultural, motivational, and cognitive antecedents of disbelief, and their implications for morality (2021) · cites this paper as [65]
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“…strongly value epistemic rationality, by contrast, analytic thinking skills should have little effect on the rationality of their beliefs, because these skills are likely to either remain disengaged, or employed in pursuit of preferred conclusions rather than the truth (e.g., Kahan et al., 2017).”
BackgroundAnalytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories
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“…are driven by the extent to which people view epistemic rationality as important for them personally. unfounded beliefs did not control for CA (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2011; Swami et al., 2014; for an exception, see Pennycook et al., 2012).”
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“…beliefs are promoted by various epistemic and existential motives, such as the need for control (Van Prooijen&Acker, 2015; Whitson&Galinsky, 2008), uncertainty management (Van Prooijen& Jostmann, 2013), terror management (Newheiser et al., 2011), and ideology protection (Van Prooijen et al., 2015).”
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“…beliefs are promoted by various epistemic and existential motives, such as the need for control (Van Prooijen&Acker, 2015; Whitson&Galinsky, 2008), uncertainty management (Van Prooijen& Jostmann, 2013), terror management (Newheiser et al., 2011), and ideology protection (Van Prooijen et al., 2015).”
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Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511 · see citing works
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief
Van Bavel, J. J., & Pereira, A. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.004 · Cited by 743 · see citing works
Conspiracy theories and the conspiracy mindset: implications for political ideology
Sutton, R. M., & Douglas, K. M. (2020) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.02.015 · Cited by 264 · see citing works
Ståhl, T. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0246593 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
“Lastly, unlike what has been found in American M-Turk and Crowdflower samples [64, 65], disbelief was only very weakly related to moralization of epistemic rationality in both countries.”
BackgroundResultSelf-citation
- Authors
- Ståhl, T., & van Prooijen, J.-W.
- Affiliations
- University of Illinois Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Ståhl, Tomas
- ORCID
- Ståhl, Tomas
- Venue
- Personality and Individual Differences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-02
- Volume
- 122
- Pages
- 155-163
- ISSN
- 0191-8869 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2765520092
- Cited by
- 245
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 45
- FWCI
- 30.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Personality and Individual Differences (publishedVersion)
- VU Research Portal (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- epistemic rationality, skepticism, supernatural beliefs, conspiracy theories, analytical thinking, general intelligence, individual differences
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