The DOI matches its Crossref record; 308 of the 308 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Abstract
What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
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“While it might be theoretically desirable to impose a rapid turnover of the incumbent elite on coming to power, this strategy is rarely feasible. Any large-scale coordinated attack on the elite would likely provoke immediate resistance”
From Post-Populism: Transitions from Populist to Personalist Authoritarian Rule (2023) · cites this paper as Svolik, 2012
In the citing paper
“Although not considered by Earl’s typology (19), a large literature on authoritarian politics shows the centrality of information control and propaganda for authoritarian rule (106–111).”
From Physical and virtual repertoires of contention (2022) · cites this paper as [108]
Citations
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Rød, E. G., & Weidmann, N. B. (2015) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343314555782 · Cited by 290
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Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?
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The Pathology of Hard Propaganda
Huang, H. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/696863 · Cited by 233
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Somer, M., McCoy, J. L., & Luke, R. E. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1865316 · Cited by 220
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Dimitrov, M. K. (2015) · Studies in Comparative International Development · doi:10.1007/s12116-014-9170-2 · Cited by 120
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Hyde, S. D. (2020) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.abb2434 · Cited by 108
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Olar, R.-G. (2019) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343318822718 · Cited by 50
Multiple Measurements, Elusive Agreement, and Unstable Outcomes in the Study of Regime Change
Lueders, H., & Lust, E. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3042470 · Cited by 48
The Long Arm and the Iron Fist: Authoritarian Crackdowns and Transnational Repression
Dukalskis, A., Furstenberg, S., Hellmeier, S., & Scales, R. (2024) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/00220027231188896 · Cited by 31
Inclusionary regimes, party institutionalization and redistribution under authoritarianism
Pelke, L. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1786683 · Cited by 19
Genocidal Consolidation: Final Solutions to Elite Rivalry
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Income inequality in authoritarian regimes: the role of political institutions and state capacity
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Post-Populism: Transitions from Populist to Personalist Authoritarian Rule
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Metadata
- Authors
- Svolik, M. W.
- Affiliations
- University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
- Corresponding author
- Svolik, Milan W.
- ORCID
- Svolik, Milan W.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2012-09-17
- OpenAlex
- W296931085
- Cited by
- 2,611
- References
- 308
- Citations by year
- 2026: 184 · 2025: 266 · 2024: 195 · 2023: 233 · 2022: 264 · 2021: 184 · 2020: 324 · 2019: 259 · 2018: 226 · 2017: 140 · 2016: 123 · 2015: 99 · 2014: 68 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 71.77
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Keywords
- authoritarian regimes, dictatorship, authoritarian control, regime change, military dictatorship, democratic transition, Arab Spring, ruling coalition, political institutions, elite politics
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