Pernicious polarization, autocratization and opposition strategies
Abstract
“Pernicious polarization” – the division of society into mutually distrustful Us versus Them camps in which political identity becomes a social identity – fosters autocratization by incentivizing citizens and political actors alike to endorse non-democratic action. An exploratory analysis of new V-Dem data on polarization indeed shows the negative relationship between the level of political polarization and liberal democracy ratings. How can pernicious polarization be avoided or reversed once present? By drawing on an endogenous explanation of polarization, where the decisions and actions of both opposition actors and incumbents contribute to its evolution, we focus on the question of what democratic opposition actors can do to stop or reverse pernicious polarization. Based on insights from examples across the world and deductive theory-building, along with illustrative cases, we offer a typology of potential opposition goals, strategies and tools, and then analyse how these may affect polarization and in turn democratic quality at early and late stages. We identify goals as either generative or preservative, and we argue that “active-depolarizing” and “transformative-repolarizing” strategies are more promising than “passive-depolarizing” and “reciprocal polarizing” strategies to improve a country's resilience to autocratizing pressures. The specific tools employed to pursue these goals and strategies are also crucial, though the effectiveness of available institutional accountability and mobilizational tools will change as the process of polarization advances. The emerging literatıres on opposition strategies to democratize electoral autocracies and to improve the resilience of democracies should incorporate their impact on polarization as a critical intervening variable.
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TL;DR
The paper argues that pernicious polarization fosters autocratization and uses V-Dem data to show polarization is negatively associated with liberal democracy, especially at sustained severe levels. It offers a typology of opposition goals and strategies, arguing that proactive transformative-repolarizing and active-depolarizing strategies are more promising than reactive reciprocal-polarizing or passive-depolarizing strategies.
Key findings
- In linear regressions with state and year fixed effects for 1900–2019, political polarization is negatively and statistically significantly associated with V-Dem liberal democracy at the analysis year and at one-, two-, and five-year lags: coefficients −0.420, −0.415, −0.391, and −0.305, respectively (p<0.01; N=6,192 for analysis year; 119 states).
- Periods of rapid polarization were not significantly more damaging to democratic quality than other periods of increased polarization. Sustained severe polarization was more damaging: difference coefficients were −0.640 at the analysis year and −0.654 at one-year lag (p<0.05), while elevated and heightened polarization showed no observable difference from all other cases.
- The paper’s typology links preservative goals to reactive reciprocal polarization or passive depolarization, and generative goals to proactive transformative repolarization or active depolarization. It expects reciprocal polarization to deepen pernicious polarization, passive depolarization to suspend elite polarization, and proactive strategies to reduce/contain polarization and slow or reverse autocratization if successful.
- Illustrative cases include South Korea’s 2014–2016 polarization spike and later democratic recovery, Turkey’s 2019 CHP active-depolarizing local campaigns, Hungary’s 2019 Budapest opposition win, and Venezuela’s 2015 opposition overreach after a super-majority win.
Methods
- Exploratory linear regression analyses with state and year fixed effects on 1900–2019, using V-Dem political polarization normalized to 0–1 and V-Dem liberal democracy scored 0–1; closed autocracies and states with fewer than 30 observation years were excluded, and polarization was lagged at 1, 2, and 5 years.
- Tests H1–H3: H1 increased polarization decreases liberal democracy; H2 increased rate of polarization disproportionately decreases it; H3 level of polarization disproportionately decreases it. Rapid polarization was coded as an increase of at least 10% (0.1 units) in 5 or fewer years, with two or more years of increase and no declines greater than 0.01. Elevated, Heightened, and Severe thresholds were 0.456, 0.566, and 0.722, each sustained at least five years with no declines greater than 0.01.
- The opposition-strategy framework is built deductively and illustrated with heuristic examples from across the world; the authors state this is not a systematic comparative case analysis.
Limitations
- The paper states the quantitative analysis is exploratory and the case examples are heuristic, selected to illustrate strategies and propositions rather than to offer systematic comparative case analysis. It also states it does not explain how and why oppositions choose one strategy over another, and that future research will examine different periods, specifically post-1975 and post-1994.
- The paper states the V-Dem polarization measure is imperfect and suffers weaknesses like other expert-opinion-survey measures, though it is described as the most appropriate available. It also states assumptions that the effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time, and it excludes closed autocracies and states with fewer than 30 observation years.
- Evident from the text: the quantitative findings are associational, not causal; the strategy typology and expected outcomes are not systematically tested; and the illustrative cases are selected, so they cannot establish the general effectiveness of the proposed opposition strategies.
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Claims the paper makes
2 of 24 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Findingcitation§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 16
Successful cooptation may simply strengthen the hegemonic leader, as happened multiple times in Kenya and Zimbabwe.
“Instead, such a successful cooptation strategy may simply strengthen the hegemonic leader, as happened for example multiple times in Kenya and Zimbabwe.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [34] source
The Incumbent strategies section (continuing on p. 253) describes Zimbabwe’s two episodes as a strategy of defanging the opposition through cooptation or power-sharing. The Institutional antecedents section says a power-sharing agreement left ZANU-PF dominant. Our copy does not substantiate the claimed repeated examples in Kenya, or explicitly say that cooptation strengthened the Zimbabwean leader. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Findingown data§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 8
Increased polarization decreases the quality of liberal democracy in a state.
“The observed effect of polarization on liberal democracy is negative and statistically significant for each of the periods examined.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Findingown data§ [Table 1 about here] · p. 8
The difference between the effect of polarization on democratic quality during periods of rapid polarization and all other cases was not statistically significant.
“The effect on democratic quality remained negative and statistically significant for both groups, but the difference between the two was not statistically significant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Findingown data§ [Table 1 about here] · p. 9
For periods of elevated and heightened polarization, there is no observable difference between the effect of polarization within these periods and all other cases.
“For periods of both elevated and heightened polarization, there is no observable difference between the effect of polarization within these periods, and all other cases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Findingown data§ [Table 1 about here] · p. 9
The effect of polarization on democratic quality is more damaging under periods of severe polarization, for the analysis year and single year lag, than all other periods.
“In line with our expectations, the effect of polarization on democratic quality is shown to be more damaging under periods of severe polarization, for the analysis year and single year lag, than all other periods.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Findingown data§ [Table 1 about here] · p. 9
There is no statistically significant difference between polarizing periods lagged 2 or 5 years on democratic quality.
“In none of these periods is there a statistically significant difference between polarizing periods lagged 2 or 5 years on democratic quality, so these results are excluded for ease of presentation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Findingown data§ [Table 1 about here] · p. 8
The effect of polarization on democratic quality remained negative and statistically significant for both periods of rapid polarization and all other cases.
“The effect on democratic quality remained negative and statistically significant for both groups”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Findingown data§ Abstract · p. 1
An exploratory analysis of new V-Dem data shows a negative relationship between political polarization level and liberal democracy ratings.
“An exploratory analysis of new V-Dem data on polarization indeed shows the negative relationship between the political polarization level of and liberal democracy ratings.”
- Also stated in: § Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 8 · plain
“The observed effect of polarization on liberal democracy is negative and statistically significant for each of the periods examined.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Also stated in: § Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 8 · plain
- Findingown data§ Conclusions · p. 26
Polarization is associated with deterioration in democratic quality, including democratic elements of electoral authoritarian regimes.
“In this article, we present exploratory empirical analysis using new V-Dem data that supports our general proposition that polarization is associated with deterioration in democratic quality, including democratic elements of electoral authoritarian regimes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 15
The Venezuelan opposition's attempts to remove Hugo Chavez early in his tenure-coup attempt, general strike, military sit-in, massive protests, legislative election boycott, and recall referendum-all failed to unseat him.
“A coup attempt, a general strike, a military sit-in, massive protests, and a legislative election boycott, along with the legal instrument of a recall referendum, all failed to unseat President Hugo Chavez early in his tenure.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [33] McCoy Jennifer, 2019, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Findingown data§ Conclusions · p. 26
Sustained severe levels of polarization have the most deleterious effects.
“and that sustained severe levels of polarization have the most deleterious effects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 12
Comparative case examples indicate two versions of reactive counter-polarization: reciprocal polarization and passive avoidance depolarization.
“Comparative case examples indicate two versions: reciprocal polarization that engages in the same divisive discourse and tactics as the incumbent, and passive avoidance depolarization that seeks to defuse the conflict and mitigate abusive behavior from within the system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20
Successful examples of active depolarization include the 2019 opposition victories of Istanbul and Budapest mayorships in Turkey and Hungary.
“Successful examples include the 2019 opposition victories of crucial Istanbul and Budapest mayorships in Turkey and Hungary.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 18
Between 2012 and 2017, the Russian opposition learned to transform reactive electoral mobilizations into proactive ones, as a source of candidate recruitment and synergy to win elections.
“Between 2012 and 2017, for instance, the Russian opposition is argued to have learned how to transform 'reactive electoral mobilizations' (protesting the corruption of elections) to 'proactive' ones, as a source of candidate recruitment and synergy to win elections.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [39] source
- Interpretationreasoning§ The Endogenous Nature of Polarization and Negative Consequences for Democracy · p. 4
Democratic oppositions often contribute to pernicious polarization through their own actions and reactions, often unintentionally.
“Often unintentionally, 'democratic' oppositions also contribute to pernicious polarization through their own actions and reactions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 11
If incumbents have managed to gain influence over accountability mechanisms by populating them with loyalists, oppositions will not accept them as legitimate.
“Alternatively, if incumbents have managed to gain influence over accountability mechanisms by populating them with loyalists, oppositions will not accept them as legitimate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 10
The severity of polarization and the length of time it has been sustained at high levels will shape the opportunity structures of opposition groups and the effectiveness of their choice of instruments and strategies.
“The severity of the polarization and the length of time it has been sustained at high levels will shape the opportunity structures of opposition groups and the effectiveness of their choice of instruments and strategies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 11
No matter whether the opposition is motivated by principle or self-interest, polarization undermines its ability to constrain the incumbent's actions by appealing to the normal democratic accountability mechanisms.
“In other words, no matter whether the opposition is motivated by principle or self-interest, polarization undermines its ability to constrain the incumbent's actions by appealing to the normal democratic accountability mechanisms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ The Endogenous Nature of Polarization and Negative Consequences for Democracy · p. 4
The strategies chosen by political and social actors to initiate or respond to polarizing politics will determine its outcomes.
“Precisely because we provide an endogenous explanation of polarization, agency comes into play and the strategies chosen by political and social actors to initiate or respond to polarizing politics will determine its outcomes.”
- Also stated in: § Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 9 · plain
“Our endogenous explanation of polarization posits that agency is critical to the development of polarization, and the long-term ideological-programmatic goals as well as the strategies chosen by political and social actors to initiate or respond to polarizing politics will determine its outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 9 · plain
- Interpretationnone given§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 10
The timing of each strategy and the practical instruments with which it is implemented affect the outcomes.
“We also argue that the timing of each strategy and the practical instruments with which it is implemented affect the outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data§ Introduction · p. 3
The severity, i.e. level of polarization, is mostly responsible for the negative consequences for democracy.
“A large-N exploratory analysis supports our argument that the severity, i.e. level of polarization, is mostly responsible for the negative consequences for democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Interpretationown data§ [Table 1 about here] · p. 9
Periods of sustained severe polarization pose a distinct threat to democratic quality in democracies and electoral autocracies above the baseline threat of polarization.
“These results provide suggestive evidence that the periods of sustained severe polarization, our primary focus, pose a distinct threat to democratic quality in democracies and electoral autocracies above the baseline threat of polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 10
At early stages, before polarization has progressed significantly, oppositions often retain significant institutional leverage in the form of horizontal accountability mechanisms-judiciaries, legislatures, bureaucracies-as well as vertical and societal mobilizational capacity from organized political and civil societies.
“At early stages, before polarization has progressed significantly, oppositions often retain significant institutional leverage in the form of horizontal accountability mechanisms -judiciaries, legislatures, bureaucracies, as well as vertical and societal mobilizational capacity from organized political and civil societies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites McCoy and Somer, 'Pernicious Polarization';
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Gamboa , 'Opposition at the Margins.'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Abstract · p. 1
Pernicious polarization fosters autocratization by incentivizing citizens and political actors to endorse non-democratic action.
“Pernicious polarization' - the division of society into mutually distrustful Us versus Them camps in which political identity becomes a social identity -- fosters autocratization by incentivizing citizens and political actors alike to endorse non-democratic action.”
- Also stated in: § Introduction · p. 2 · plain
“Severe polarization fosters 'autocratization,' 1 by which we mean the gradual erosion of democratic quality in democracies and the democratic elements of electoral authoritarian regimes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Svolik, 'Polarization versus Democracy;'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die ;
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites McCoy and Somer, 'Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization.'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Also stated in: § Introduction · p. 2 · plain
- Premisecitation§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 10
Democratic oppositions aiming to prevent or reverse autocratization have two basic sets of instruments to hold accountable a democracy-eroding incumbent: legal-institutional forms of vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability, and extra- or unconstitutional mechanisms.
“Democratic oppositions aiming to prevent or reverse autocratization have two basic sets of instruments to hold accountable a democracyeroding incumbent: legal-institutional forms of vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability, and extra- or unconstitutional mechanisms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Laebens and Luhrmann, 'What Stops Democratic Erosion?';
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Gamboa, 'Opposition at the Margins;'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Slater, 'Democratic Careening.'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 11
At later stages of polarization, the toolkit is smaller as the institutions themselves become politicized and organizational capacity reduced.
“At later stages of polarization, however, the toolkit is smaller as the institutions themselves become politicized and organizational capacity reduced.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 11
Vertical and diagonal accountability mechanisms become divided and weakened based on partisanship under severe polarization.
“Simultaneoıusly, the vertical and 'diagonal' 26 accountability mechanisms become divided and weakened based on partisanship.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 11
In contexts of severe, sustained polarization, incumbents are motivated to ignore horizontal-institutional accountability mechanisms seen as disloyal to them, discrediting them as politically biased, elitist or antagonistic in the eyes of their constituencies.
“In contexts of severe, sustained polarization, incumbents are motivated to ignore horizontal-institutional accountability mechanisms seen as disloyal to them, discrediting them as politically biased, elitist or antagonistic in the eyes of their constituencies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data§ [Table 1 about here] · p. 8
Periods of rapid polarization are not any more damaging to democratic quality than other periods of increased polarization.
“Thus, we cannot conclude that periods of rapid polarization are any more damaging to democratic quality than other periods of increased polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
- Interpretationnone given§ The Endogenous Nature of Polarization and Negative Consequences for Democracy · p. 4
Polarization by its very nature advantages the most extreme or radical voices within each camp over potential bridge-builders or de-polarizing centrists.
“Second, polarization by its very nature advantages the most extreme or radical voices within each camp -- extreme in their willingness to antagonize rivals and ignore democratic decorum -over potential bridge-builders or de-polarizing centrists.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Introduction · p. 3
The process of deepening polarization is primarily driven by political actors deliberately employing polarizing politics to achieve their aims.
“We argue that the process of deepening polarization is primarily driven by political actors deliberately employing polarizing politics to achieve their aims.”
- Also stated in: § The Endogenous Nature of Polarization and Negative Consequences for Democracy · p. 4 · plain
“polarization episodes are initiated by political entrepreneurs who choose polarizing strategies to further their political aims.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McCoy and Somer, 'Special Issue on Polarized Polities.'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Also stated in: § The Endogenous Nature of Polarization and Negative Consequences for Democracy · p. 4 · plain
- Interpretationreasoning§ The Endogenous Nature of Polarization and Negative Consequences for Democracy · p. 4
Increasing polarization incentivizes autocratization regardless of initial actor aims.
“Rather we maintain that increasing polarization incentivizes autocratization regardless of initial actor aims.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 6
Polarization is more likely to turn pernicious when it permeates society, creating mutually distrustful societal camps who increasingly view one another through a Manichaean lens.
“Accordingly, we argue that polarization is more likely to turn pernicious when it permeates society, creating mutually distrustful societal camps who increasingly view one another through a Manichaean lens.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites McCoy, Rahman, and Somer. 'Global Crisis of Democracy;'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites McCoy and Somer, 'Pernicious Polarization.'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 6
As the level of polarization rises, it is expected to damage democratic quality to a greater degree.
“Hence, we can expect it to damage democratic quality to a greater degree.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 12
At later stages with sustained, severe polarization, public perceptions of legal-constitutional accountability institutions become polarized: opposition groups view them as necessary oversight, while pro-incumbent supporters view them as political attacks.
“In contrast, at later stages with sustained, severe levels of polarization, public perceptions of those same legal-constitutional accountability institutions become polarized -opposition groups view them as necessary mechanisms of oversight and accountability, while pro-incumbent supporters view them as sinister political attacks on the incumbent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 15
More advanced stages of democratic erosion present special dilemmas for oppositions because autocratizing incumbents may have politicized accountability institutions by placing loyalists in key institutions.
“More advanced stages of democratic erosion or autocratization present special dilemmas for oppositions. In this context, an autocratizing incumbent may have been able to politicize accountability institutions by placing their own loyalists in key institutions, from electoral to judicial to security agencies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 17
Denigration and demonization of the incumbent and their supporters inhibits the ability of a democratic opposition to attract allies from disaffected incumbent supporters.
“Denigration and demonization of the incumbent and their supporters also inhibits the ability of a democratic opposition to attract allies from among disaffected incumbent supporters if needed to protest growing violations of democratic norms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 18
Proactive strategies can be either polarizing or depolarizing.
“Like the reactive strategies, proactive strategies can either be polarizing or depolarizing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 12
In a polarized context, parties are often tempted to engage in a self-defeating tit-for-tat strategy.
“In a polarized context, parties are often tempted to engage in an ultimately selfdefeating tit-for-tat strategy out of indignation or pressured by their angered bases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 16
Elite depolarization can be achieved when opposition forces join power-sharing agreements with autocratic incumbents, whether for personal gain or to change the system from within.
“First, elite depolarization can be achieved when opposition forces join in powersharing agreements with autocratic incumbents, whether for personal gain or with the aim of changing the system 'from within'.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 16
A pacted transition to democracy can produce an apparent elite consensus without addressing underlying grievances fueling polarization.
“A second variant of passive avoidance depolarization is a pacted transition to democracy that produces an apparent elite consensus without addressing the underlying grievances fueling the polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 12
A reciprocal polarization strategy reinforces existing cleavages and deepens affective partisan polarization.
“A reciprocal polarization strategy engages in an actionreaction cycle that ends up reinforcing the cleavages already politicized by the incumbent and deepening the affective partisan polarization characterized by mutual dislike and distrust among the partisan camps.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20
Active depolarizing strategies attempt to mobilize a winning majority by redefining politics alongside new plural axes of polarization that devitalize cleavages politicized by the incumbent.
“Active depolarizing strategies attempt to mobilize a winning majority by redefining politics alongside new plural axes of polarization that devitalize the cleavages politicized by the incumbent and, in this way, depolarize politics.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 16
Elite consensus-seeking efforts accompanying democratic transition may mask persistent underlying societal polarization that later reemerges to threaten democratic resilience.
“Such elite consensus-seeking efforts accompanying democratic transition may actually mask persistent underlying societal polarization that will later reemerge to threaten democratic resilience,”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 7
Including fixed effects terms for each year accounts for global trends to and away from democracy without including imprecise, time-specific measures such as the global mean value of liberal democracy.
“Also including fixed effects terms for each year, we can more easily account for global trends to and away from democracy, i.e. democratic waves, without including imprecise, time-specific measures such as the global mean value of liberal democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 24
A risk of transformative repolarizing strategy is voters' fear that repolarization around a transformative agenda will be too radical to be a winning electoral strategy and instead allow an autocratizing incumbent to remain in place.
“The risks of such a strategy include voters' fear that repolarization around a transformative agenda will be too radical to be a winning electoral strategy and instead allow an autocratizing incumbent to remain in place.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 17
Perceptions of a zero-sum game lock both sides into a downward spiral of pernicious polarization.
“The resulting perceptions of a zero-sum game lock both sides into a downward spiral of pernicious polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25
Democratic outcomes depend on the subsequent steps by both opposition and incumbent.
“Democratic outcomes then depend on the subsequent steps by both opposition and incumbent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 24
The 2019 presidential victory of Caputova in Slovakia exemplifies successful use of strategies of building on civic resistance with messages of inclusion and refusing to engage in reciprocating discourse of denigration and disinformation from populist rivals.
“The 2019 presidential victory of a littleknown female politician over right-wing populist rivals in Slovakia exemplifies the successful use of such strategies: Caputova built on a powerful civic resistance movement with messages of inclusion and a refusal to engage in the reciprocating discourse of denigration and disinformation from her populist rivals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [53]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Study design and conductnone given§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 6
The V-Dem political polarization measure correlates in a statistically significant manner at α=0.05 with previously used measures of 'range of consultation' and 'respect counterarguments' from V-Dem, ρ = -0.339 and -0.267 respectively.
“It correlates in a statistically significant manner - at the α=0.05 level - with previously used measures of 'range of consultation' and 'respect counterarguments' from V-Dem - ρ = -0.339 and -0.267 respectively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 12
At earlier stages of polarization-cum-autocratization, when legal-constitutional accountability institutions retain independence, courts or oversight agencies including the media may contain abuses by a polarizing executive and prevent pernicious polarization.
“At earlier stages of polarization-cum-autocratization, when legalconstitutional mechanisms of accountability still retain their independence and before societies polarize in their very perceptions of such institutions, courts or oversight agencies including the media may serve to contain abuses by a polarizing executive and prevent pernicious polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 6
As the level of polarization rises, however gradually, it is more likely to affect social relations.
“Yet, as the level of polarization rises, however gradually, it is more likely to affect social relations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 18
The effectiveness and impact of practical instruments for proactive counter-polarization vary by the severity of polarization and democratic erosion.
“Their effectiveness and impact also vary by the severity of polarization and democratic erosion.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20
The CHP strategy may not have worked in Istanbul elections without the support of a strong grassroots organization that mobilized voters and defended ballot boxes.
“A critical ingredient of opposition innovation also pertained to party organization; arguably, the strategy may not have worked in Istanbul elections without the support of a strong grassroots organization built up in recent years that successfully mobilized and communicated with voters and defended ballot boxes, despite Erdoğan's attempts to reverse the election results.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [47] source
- Interpretationnone given§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 18
Elite depolarizations through power-sharing agreements or concessions that fail to deliver political gains risk fragmenting the opposition through internal rivalries, likely strengthening an autocratizing incumbent.
“Elite depolarizations through power-sharing agreements or concessions that fail to deliver political gains, risk fragmenting the opposition through internal rivalries, likely to strengthen an autocratizing incumbent.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 18
What differentiates successful proactive counter-polarization strategies is their degree of innovation, including in communication tools, campaign strategies, alliances, recruitment, emotion, symbols, and narratives.
“What differentiates successful proactive counterpolarization strategies, however, is their degree of innovation. Innovation in communication tools, campaign strategies and alliances with social movements and civic organization, recruitment methods, use of emotion and symbols, and narratives are key to proactive counter-polarization strategies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20
The emerging CHP strategy displayed precursors of a transformative strategy aiming to redefine politics based on social class and economic development.
“Hence, this emerging opposition strategy adopted by the CHP leadership also displayed precursors of an emerging 'transformative' strategy aiming to redefine politics based on an axis of social class and economic development.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25
Active depolarizing politics may fail to energize and excite the opposition's own base sufficiently to defeat the incumbent.
“The risk of active depolarizing politics is similar to the risks of passive depolarization: it may fail to energize and excite the opposition's own base sufficiently to defeat the incumbent”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 23
Transformative repolarizing strategy holds particular promise for reversing severe polarization that has facilitated serious autocratization, provided it creates a binary choice over democracy or justice without demonizing the Other.
“Yet we expect that this strategy holds particular promise for reversing severe polarization that has facilitated serious autocratization, as long as it creates a binary choice over democracy or justice, without demonizing the 'Other'.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 12
The difference in outcomes for democracy depends on how each goal and strategy addresses the polarization dynamic, which works as an intervening variable.
“The difference in outcomes for democracy has to do with how each goal and strategy addresses the polarization dynamic, working as an intervening variable, as explained below.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusions · p. 27
Proactive counter-polarization strategies are expected to more effectively reduce pernicious polarization and reverse autocratization trends, particularly if opposition actors use innovation in their strategies and practices.
“We expect these strategies to more effectively reduce pernicious polarization and reverse autocratization trends, particularly if the opposition actors use innovation in their strategies and practices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusions · p. 27
Creating new electoral coalitions and crafting messages that may either unify and actively depolarize, or repolarize around a transformative pro-democracy agenda, can succeed in challenging the incumbent party as long as elections retain some element of uncertain outcomes.
“Creating new electoral coalitions and crafting messages that may either unify and actively depolarize, or repolarize around a transformative pro-democracy agenda, can succeed in challenging the incumbent party as long as elections retain some element of uncertain outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ Conclusions · p. 27
Passively avoiding polarization through withdrawal or through elite cooperative mechanisms could depolarize the country at the elite level.
“Likewise, passively avoiding polarization through withdrawal or through elite cooperative mechanisms could depolarize the country at the elite level”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusions · p. 27
If a reactive counter-polarization strategy is successful at removing the incumbent but using extra-constitutional means, it could actually kill democracy.
“If it is successful at removing the incumbent but using extra-constitutional means, it could actually kill democracy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- May combine two claims. 35
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 34
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 23The Budapest candidate ran and won on a platform of representing the people against the seat of power, a pro-Europe and green agenda, and willingness to work with the national government.
“The Budapest candidate ran and won on a platform of representing the people against the seat of power, a pro-Europe and green agenda, and a willingness to work in a partnership with the national government.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [49] source
The 2018 electoral victory section discusses Malaysia’s Pakatan Harapan campaign and manifesto, not a Budapest candidate. Searches for the Budapest candidate and the claimed pro-Europe, green, and national-government partnership platform found no passage addressing those points in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
Findingown data§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 8The effect of polarization on liberal democracy diminishes in influence the further from the analysis year, but remains substantial.
“The effect appears to diminish in influence the further from the analysis year, but it remains substantial nonetheless.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 15These elite failures fragmented the Venezuelan opposition, demoralized its supporters, and strengthened Chavez's hold on power.
“Instead, these elite failures fragmented the opposition and demoralized its supporters, while strengthening the incumbent's hold on power.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [33] McCoy Jennifer, 2019, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20Turkish opposition parties have struggled to achieve unity around a democracy-authoritarianism cleavage and to coordinate candidate selections.
“Finally, the Turkish opposition parties have struggled to achieve some unity around a 'democracy-authoritarianism cleavage' and by coordinating their candidate selections.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [48] source
May combine two claims.
Findingreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20The CHP's campaigns in 2019 local elections represented a shift to active-depolarizing politics and the first electoral victory for the opposition in more than a decade, with partial exception of June 2015.
“The opposition CHP's campaigns in 2019 local elections represented a shift to active-depolarizing politics, and the first electoral victory for the opposition in more than a decade, with the partial exception of June 2015 elections.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20The CHP campaign manual 'The Book of Radical Love' focused on defusing polarization through cross-cutting axes and responding to hate with love.
“Perhaps the most notable innovation was the CHP campaign manual called 'The Book of Radical Love'. The strategy was focused on defusing polarization through new and cross-cutting axes of politics, and responding to the politics of hate and resentment with 'love'.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [45] source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 11The crucial decision pro-democratic oppositions need to make is not merely to choose between engaging in or avoiding polarizing politics-the former risks deepening the downward spiral and the latter risks demotivating or fragmenting opposition.
“We argue that the crucial decision pro-democratic oppositions need to make is not merely to choose between engaging in or avoiding polarizing politics -- the former risks deepening the downward spiral and the latter risks demotivating or fragmenting opposition”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Abstract · p. 1The specific tools employed to pursue these goals and strategies are crucial, though the effectiveness of available institutional accountability and mobilizational tools will change as the process of polarization advances.
“The specific tools employed to pursue these goals and strategies are also crucial. though the effectiveness of available institutional accountability and mobilizational tools will change as the process of polarization advances.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Introduction · p. 3Polarization can be facilitated by exogenous factors such as economic, institutional, and informational environments, preexisting social-political cleavages, and historical memory.
“we acknowledge that polarization can be facilitated by exogenous factors such as economic, institutional, and informational environments, preexisting social-political cleavages, and historical memory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Introduction · p. 3Opposition resilience comprises not only their ability to choose the right strategies but also to cooperate around a common strategy.
“Hence, opposition resilience comprises not only their ability to choose the right strategies but also to cooperate around a common strategy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 9Polarization is always an intervening variable and strategies to reciprocate, avoid, reduce or transform it are choices for actors with consequences not only for polarizing dynamics but for democracy itself.
“Polarization is thus always an intervening variable and strategies to reciprocate, avoid, reduce or transform it are choices for actors with consequences not only for the polarizing dynamics but for democracy itself.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 5The new V-Dem political polarization measure captures the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions, thereby encapsulating affective polarization that can turn pernicious.
“Crucially, it captures 'the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions,' thereby encapsulating affective polarization that can turn pernicious.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Iyengar and Westwood. 'Fear and Loathing';
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Iyengar et al. 'Consequences of Affective Polarization.'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ The Endogenous Nature of Polarization and Negative Consequences for Democracy · p. 4Severe polarization changes actor incentives and fosters internal transformations within both incumbent and opposition groups in an authoritarian direction.
“Hence, severe polarization changes actor incentives and even fosters internal transformations within both the incumbent and opposition groups in an authoritarian direction.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Opposition Dilemmas and Challenge · p. 9Some anti-authoritarian policies, even though ethically acceptable and feasible in early stages, will not be recommendable at later stages because they are expected to reinforce polarization and thus backfire, or because they have already been disarmed by severe polarization.
“We argue that some anti-authoritarian policies, even though ethically acceptable and feasible in early stages, will not be recommendable at later stages precisely because we expect them to reinforce polarization and thus backfire, or because they have already been disarmed by severe polarization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 24Innovative tools and practices can overcome the risks of transformative repolarizing strategy.
“We posit, however, that innovative tools and practices can overcome these risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25An opposition can overreach, as happened with the Venezuelan successful unity campaign in the 2015 National Assembly elections in which they won a super-majority.
“An opposition can overreach, such as happened with the Venezuelan successful unity campaign in the 2015 National Assembly elections in which they won a super-majority.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20In this way, oppositions can de-fang the Us vs Them wedge, reestablish balance of power with would-be autocrats, and mobilize a winning majority on a democratizing agenda.
“In this way, oppositions can 'de-fang' the power of the Us vs Them wedge magnified by the incumbent, reestablish the balance of power with would-be autocrats on a new axis, and mobilize a winning majority of the electorate on a democratizing agenda.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoning§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 7The fixed effects approach is theoretically most appropriate as the paper is primarily concerned with the 'within' estimator for each country.
“At the expense of efficiency, the fixed effects approach is theoretically most appropriate as we are primarily concerned with the 'within' estimator for each country - the effect of polarization on democratic quality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 23Providing a binary choice based on principles and policies can open the tent to disaffected incumbent supporters while energizing opposition supporters around a positive vision of the future.
“in contrast, providing a binary choice based on principles and policies, such as democracy vs authoritarianism, hope vs fear, justice vs impunity can open the tent to disaffected incumbent supporters while energizing opposition supporters around a positive vision of the future.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25If leaders do not address underlying grievances and cleavages, divisions are likely to resurge at some point in the future.
“but if leaders do not address underlying grievances and cleavages, divisions are likely to resurge at some point in the future.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20For more advanced stages of polarization and autocratization, democratic oppositions may need to rebundle and redefine cleavages along a new axis of polarization based on a pro-democratic program.
“For the more advanced stages of polarization and autocratization, the political challenge that democratic oppositions face may be to find the organizational and discursive ways to rebundle and redefine cleavages and politics along a new axis of polarization based on a pro-democratic program.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoning§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 6The V-Dem political polarization measure is the most appropriate available capturing polarization both longitudinally and cross-sectionally, including states from the Global South, and features large numbers of cross-checking and complementary questions.
“While imperfect and suffering from some weaknesses like any other measures constructed using expert opinion surveys, this measure is the most appropriate available capturing polarization both longitudinally and cross-sectionally, including states from the Global South, and can be commended for featuring large numbers of cross-checking and complementary questions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 18Proactive counter-polarization strategies seek to change the axis of polarization and thus affect democratic outcomes.
“In line with their generative goals, proactive counter-polarization strategies seek to change the axis of polarization and thus also affect democratic outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationcitation§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 24Refusing to vilify supporters of the polarizing incumbent, and countering the narrative rather than responding to personal insults or amplifying specific lies and disinformation, can help defuse the Us vs. Them binary fueled by deliberate provocation and disinformation.
“Refusing to vilify supporters of the polarizing incumbent, and countering the narrative rather than responding to personal insults or amplifying specific lies and disinformation can also help to defuse the Us vs. Them binary fueled by deliberate provocation and disinformation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [52] source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 23Mobilizing against the incumbent by vilifying the incumbent and their supporters based on their values, attitudes and identities may make people feel excluded based on socioeconomic or cultural background.
“Mobilizing against the incumbent by vilifying the incumbent and their supporters based on their values, attitudes and identities may make people feel excluded based on socioeconomic or cultural background”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 18Passive depolarizing politics risks failing to mobilize the opposition's own base enough to defeat the incumbent in elections, and may be seen as too soft and legitimizing the incumbent's divisive behavior.
“The risk of passive depolarizing politics that aims to avoid polarization is that it may fail to mobilize the opposition's own base enough to defeat the incumbent in elections, and it demoralization, or apathy. Withdrawal from engagement, including election boycotts, is also may be seen as too soft and legitimizing the incumbent's divisive and antidemocratic behavior.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 17Successful extra-constitutional ousters of polarizing elected leaders may lead to outright democratic collapse, as in Thailand 2014 and Egypt 2013, which may depolarize society short-term but at the cost of killing democracy.
“Alternatively, successful extra-constitutional ousters of polarizing elected leaders may lead to outright democratic collapse, as happened when the military intervened to remove polarizing incumbents in Thailand in 2014 or Egypt in 2013, which may serve to depolarize society in the short-term, but at the cost of killing democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 18The depolarization variety of proactive strategy seeks to dismantle reinforcing cleavages from Us vs. Them polarization and construct cross-cutting ties more amenable to pluralist democracy.
“The depolarization variety seeks to dismantle the reinforcing cleavages resulting from the simplified politics of Us vs. Them polarization, and actively seeks through social and political action to construct cross-cutting ties more amenable to pluralist democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 24If a transformative repolarizing strategy proves successful, supporters of the losing incumbent could feel excluded and become alienated or engage in obstructionist politics.
“or that supporters of the losing incumbent feel excluded and become alienated or engage in obstructionist politics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 18A proactive strategy can only succeed if supported by appropriate practices.
“Once again, a proactive strategy can only succeed if supported by appropriate practices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 17Reactive polarizing politics, even to prevent democratic erosion, risks deepening polarization and moving to a pernicious equilibrium.
“Reactive polarizing politics, even to prevent democratic erosion, risks deepening polarization and moving to a pernicious equilibrium.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 17At a minimum, pernicious polarization generates government paralysis and dysfunction.
“At a minimum, pernicious polarization generates government paralysis and dysfunction.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25If active depolarization is successful in the early stages of polarization, it may contain polarization at tolerable levels and even return a country to the cross-cutting ties of pluralism.
“If active depolarization is successful in the early stages of polarization, it may contain polarization at tolerable levels and even return a country to the cross-cutting ties of a pluralism”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 24Creating new alliances between social movement and civic resistance, and political parties and campaigns, can reinforce a transformative campaign by providing a visionary platform of real change.
“Creating new alliances between social movement and civic resistance, and political parties and campaigns can reinforce a transformative campaign by providing a visionary platform of real change.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25In the 2019 Istanbul and Budapest mayoral opposition upsets, the incumbent recognized the victory of the opposition but then prevented them from carrying out their innovative strategies, blocking the democratizing moment.
“Alternatively, the incumbent may recognize the victory of the opposition as happened in the 2019 Istanbul and Budapest mayoral opposition upsets, but then prevent them from carrying out their innovative strategies, blocking the democratizing moment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [54]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisereasoning§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 6A spike of polarization can often happen around election years, and is more likely to include cases of temporary polarization with neutral or potentially positive effects on democracy.
“A spike of polarization, tested by H2 can often happen around election years, and is more likely to include cases of temporary polarization with neutral or potentially positive effects on democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25Maduro reacted by suppressing the Assembly's authority through Supreme Court rulings, eventually usurping its authority almost completely as well as suppressing the legal-institutional mechanism of a recall referendum, moving Venezuela to authoritarianism.
“Maduro reacted by suppressing the Assembly's authority through Supreme Court rulings, eventually usurping its authority almost completely as well as suppressing the legal-institutional mechanism of a recall referendum, moving the country to authoritarianism.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 12Actors pursuing a preservative goal can be expected to choose reactive counter-polarization strategies, while those pursuing a generative goal can be expected to choose proactive counter-polarization strategies.
“The actors pursuing a preservative goal can be expected to choose reactive counter-polarization strategies, while those pursuing a generative goal can be expected to choose proactive counter-polarization strategies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Oppositions to polarizing and autocratizing incumbents seek to gain power.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Oppositions have different goals about using that power.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 16Such power-sharing strategies are unlikely to depolarize society or politics in the long run if the junior partner feels marginalized, democratizing agreements are not implemented, or supporters feel sold out.
“Such strategies are unlikely to depolarize either society or politics in the long run, however, if the junior partner feels marginalized, democratizing agreements are not implemented or their supporters feel sold out.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 23If a transformative repolarizing strategy demonizes the Other, the logic of polarization will kick in again, including perceptions of the Other as an existential threat and enemy to be eliminated, tempting both sides to violate democratic norms to gain or retain power.
“Otherwise the logic of polarization will kick in again, including perceptions of the 'Other' as an existential threat and enemy to be eliminated, tempting both sides to violate democratic norms to gain or retain power.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25Active depolarizing politics may be seen as too soft and legitimizing the incumbent's divisive and antidemocratic behavior.
“and it may be seen as too soft and legitimizing the incumbent's divisive and antidemocratic behavior.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 17Manichean discourse strengthens tribalism and affective polarization, making the two camps more rigid with less communication and fluid movement.
“This Manichean discourse strengthens tribalism and affective polarization and the simplification of politics makes the two camps more rigid, with less communication and even less fluid movement between them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 15In advanced autocratization, incumbents use loyal institutions to burnish pseudo-democratic credentials, while oppositions distrust such institutions and must be creative in devising anti-authoritarian strategies.
“The polarized perceptions of these institutions are thus the reverse of the context of still-independent institutions; now, autocratizing incumbents use loyal institutions to burnish their pseudo-democratic credentials in the eyes of their supporters and the world, while oppositions distrust such institutions and must be creative in devising their anti-authoritarian strategies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Choices of Polarization Strategies and Tools · p. 17Reciprocal counter-polarization responses can backfire by mobilizing opposition supporters but also causing incumbent supporters to close ranks.
“Reciprocal counter-polarization responses in particular can backfire: they may mobilize the opposition's supporters but also cause the incumbent's supporters to close ranks to defend 'Ours against Theirs.'”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 20Democratic oppositions may sometimes have to respond through polarizing politics of their own, but need a different axis based on a programme with democratizing consequences.
“That is, democratic oppositions may sometimes have to respond through polarizing politics of their own, but they need to find a different axis of polarization based on a programme that can have democratizing consequences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 23In Hungary, a similar movement toward active depolarization strategies in the 2019 mayoral elections may suggest a pattern of local-level success and a learning process.
“In Hungary, a similar movement toward active depolarization strategies in the 2019 mayoral elections in Hungary may suggest a pattern of local level success and a learning process at work.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 18The polarizing variety of proactive strategy seeks to change the axis of polarization away from the Manichean line toward a more flexible and programmatic axis, such as democratic or social justice principles.
“The polarizing variety seeks to change the axis of polarization away from the Manichean line emphasized by the polarizing incumbent and toward one that is more flexible and programmatic, such as those based on democratic or social justice principles.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ Empirical Relationship between Polarization and Democratic Quality · p. 7The effects of polarization may be delayed or otherwise manifest primarily around election years.
“the effects of polarization may be delayed or otherwise manifest primarily around election years.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 24If a transformative repolarizing strategy proves successful, the winning coalition could be tempted to resort to the 'revanchist' and Manichean divisive discourse of pernicious polarization.
“A related risk is that if a transformative repolarizing strategy proves successful, the winning coalition could be tempted to resort to the 'revanchist' and Manichean divisive discourse of pernicious polarization”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25If active depolarization fails to energize the opposition base, it will strengthen the polarizing incumbent's hand and demoralize the opposition, leaving the polarization dynamic with one pole and likely resulting in further autocratization.
“Such a failure will strengthen the polarizing incumbent's hand and demoralize the opposition, leaving the polarization dynamic with one 'pole' and likely resulting in further autocratization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Proactive Counter-Polarization Strategies · p. 25When active depolarization is successful at later stages of polarization and autocratization, it is likely to be first at the local or legislative level.
“When active depolarization is successful at later stages of polarization and autocratization, it is likely to be first at the local or legislative level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusions · p. 26Agency and learning matter, and the willful strategic decisions and actions by both incumbents and oppositions will together shape the unfolding of the polarization process and its effect on a democracy.
“Because we view polarization as an endogenous factor, we argue that agency and learning matter, and the willful strategic decisions and actions by both incumbents and oppositions will together shape the unfolding of the polarization process and its effect on a democracy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Polarization is an endogenous factor.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusions · p. 27Reactive counter-polarization strategies, often associated with preservative ideological-programmatic goals to restore the status quo ante, are most likely to deepen and entrench pernicious polarization, and in turn, to damage democratic quality.
“we posit that reactive counter-polarization strategies, often associated with preservative ideological-programmatic goals to restore the status quo ante , are most likely to deepen and entrench pernicious polarization, and in turn, to damage democratic quality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusions · p. 27Transformative repolarization and active depolarization, contingent on contextual factors, are the most promising and democratizing strategies for opposition forces.
“We thus view transformative repolarization and active depolarization, contingent on contextual factors, as the most promising and democratizing strategies for opposition forces.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ Conclusions · p. 27In the 2019 municipal elections in Istanbul and Budapest, even seemingly unassailable incumbents conceded when faced with well-organized oppositions and decisive defeat.
“Examples such as the 2019 municipal elections in Istanbul and Budapest suggest that even seemingly unassailable incumbents concede when faced with well-organized oppositions and decisive defeat.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ Conclusions · p. 27If elite cooperation is done on an unequal basis or fails to address underlying grievances, the outcome could strengthen the autocratizing incumbent or simply suspend polarization until it resurges in the future.
“but if that cooperation is done on an unequal basis or fails to address underlying grievances, the outcome could actually strengthen the autocratizing incumbent or simply suspend polarization until it resurges in the future.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
The effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.
“We assume that the effect of polarization is consistent across groups and across time.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Oppositions to polarizing and autocratizing incumbents seek to gain power.
“We start by assuming that oppositions to polarizing and autocratizing incumbents seek to gain power”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Oppositions have different goals about using that power.
“but that they do so with different goals about using that power”
The paper relies on this without support.
Polarization is an endogenous factor.
“Because we view polarization as an endogenous factor”
The paper relies on this without support.
Polarizing politics is a common strategy of intentionally autocratizing actors.
“Particularly because polarizing politics is a common strategy of intentionally autocratizing actors”
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A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?
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Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship between Elections and Social Movements
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Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes
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Unpacking nonviolent campaigns
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Turkey: The Slippery Slope from Reformist to Revolutionary Polarization and Democratic Breakdown
Somer, M. (2018) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716218818056 · Cited by 186 · see citing works
Self-citationSelçuk, O., & Hekimci, D. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1803841 · Cited by 145 · see citing works
Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela
Gamboa, L. (2017) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.5129/001041517821273044 · Cited by 142 · see citing works
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Self-citationBacklash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction against Indigenous Mobilization
Eaton, K. H. (2007) · Politics & Society · doi:10.1177/0032329206297145 · Cited by 133 · see citing works
Killing Competitive Authoritarianism Softly: The 2019 Local Elections in Turkey
Esen, B., & Gümüşçü, Ş. (2019) · South European Society & Politics · doi:10.1080/13608746.2019.1691318 · Cited by 97 · see citing works
Opposition in transition: pre-electoral coalitions and the 2018 electoral breakthrough in Malaysia
Ufen, A. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1666266 · Cited by 74 · see citing works
State Crisis in Fragile Democracies
Handlin, S. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108233682 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Sources of resistance to democratic decline: Indonesian civil society and its trials
Mietzner, M. (2020) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1796649 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
South Korea's Democratic Decay
Shin, G. (2020) · Journal of democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2020.0048 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
The Pushback Against Populism: Running on "Radical Love" in Turkey
Wuthrich, F. M., & Ingleby, M. (2020) · Journal of democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2020.0034 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
Polarizing Figures: Executive Power and Institutional Conflict in Asian Democracies
Slater, D., & Arugay, A. A. (2018) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/0002764218759577 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Institutional stepping stones for democracy: how and why multipartyism enhances democratic change
Teorell, J., & Wahman, M. (2018) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2017.1318279 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Competition in a Populist Authoritarian Regime: The June 2018 Dual Elections in Turkey
Sözen, Y. (2019) · South European Society and Politics · doi:10.1080/13608746.2019.1688515 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Brumberg, D., & Salem, M. B. (2020) · Journal of democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2020.0025 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Ginsburg, T., & Huq, A. Z. (2018) · Journal of democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2018.0059 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Conceptualizing and Measuring Autocratization Episodes
Pelke, L., & Croissant, A. (2021) · Swiss Political Science Review · doi:10.1111/spsr.12437 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
The Enduring Vulnerability of Liberal Democracy
Galston, W. A. (2020) · Journal of democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2020.0042 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Yarwood, J. (2016) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0041 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Elite Conflict, Compromise, and Enduring Authoritarianism: Polarization in Zimbabwe, 1980–2008
LeBas, A., & Munemo, N. (2018) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716218813897 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Gorokhovskaia, Y. (2019) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1577380 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
International mediation in Venezuela
(2012) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-5325 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
State Crisis in Fragile Democracies: Polarization and Political Regimes in South America
Handlin, S. (2017) · Cited by 14 · see citing works
In Bolivia, the Right Returns with a Vengeance
Farthing, L. (2020) · NACLA Report on the Americas · doi:10.1080/10714839.2020.1733217 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
The Pushback Against Populism: Reclaiming the Politics of Emotion
Kuisz, J., & Wigura, K. (2020) · Journal of democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2020.0035 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
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Conceptualizing and Measuring Autocratization EpisodesPreprint
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V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018. Democracy for All?
Lührmann, A., Dahlum, S., Lindberg, S. I. I., et al. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3345071
Venezuela: An Unstable Equilibrium
Pantoulas, D., & McCoy, J. (2019) · Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) · doi:10.4067/s0718-090x2019000200391
Self-citationPersistent Ethnic Polarization in Kenya
khadiagala, G. M. (2019) · Democracies Divided · doi:10.5040/9780815750819.ch-002
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Resilience of democracies: responses to illiberal and authoritarian challenges
Merkel, W., & Lührmann, A. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.1928081 · Cited by 204 · see citing works
The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence
Orhan, Y. E. (2022) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.2008912 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Democratic Hypocrisy and Out-Group Threat: Explaining Citizen Support for Democratic Erosion
Simonovits, G., Mccoy, J., & Littvay, L. (2022) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/719009 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Self-citationState of the world 2021: autocratization changing its nature?
Boese, V. A., Lundstedt, M., Morrison, K., Sato, Y., & Lindberg, S. I. (2022) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2022.2069751 · Cited by 141 · see citing works
Tomini, L., Gibril, S., & Bochev, V. (2022) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2022.2115480 · Cited by 148 · see citing works
Rethinking Political Polarization
Schedler, A. (2023) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.1093/psquar/qqad038 · Cited by 115 · see citing works
McCoy, J., & Somer, M. (2021) · Journal of democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2021.0012 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Self-citationPolitical polarization and health
Bavel, J. J. V., Gadarian, S. K., Knowles, E. D., & Ruggeri, K. (2024) · Nature Medicine · doi:10.1038/s41591-024-03307-w · Cited by 81 · see citing works
How well does ‘resilience’ apply to democracy? A systematic review
Holloway, J., & Manwaring, R. (2022) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2022.2069312 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
“…Wigell (2021), Worschech (2021), Lieberman et al. (2022), McCoy and Somer (2022) Innovation Rosenthal (2016), Sisk (2017), IDEA (2017), Daly (2020), Somer et al. (2021) Transformation Merkel and Lührmann (2021), Worschech (2021) underpin national abilities to weather crises and bounce back:…”
BackgroundInfluentialBernaerts, K., Blanckaert, B., & Caluwaerts, D. (2022) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2022.2117300 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
Political Oppositions in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes: A State-of-the-Field(s) Review
Helms, L. (2022) · Government and Opposition · doi:10.1017/gov.2022.25 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
“…strategy ’ , or defusing the dominant axis ‘ by (re) creating cross-cutting ties in a plural polarization ’ , which are identified as ‘ the most promising and democratizing strategies for opposition forces ’ fighting polarization-based forms of autocratization (Somer et al. 2021: 943 – 944).”
State of the world 2024: 25 years of autocratization – democracy trumped?
Nord, M., Angiolillo, F., Good God, A., & Lindberg, S. I. (2025) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2487825 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
A new regime divide? Democratic backsliding, attitudes towards democracy and affective polarization
Gessler, T., & Wunsch, N. (2025) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12751 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
The Forum: Global Challenges to Democracy? Perspectives on Democratic Backsliding
Bartels, L. M., Daxecker, U., Hyde, S., Lindberg, S. I., & Nooruddin, I. (2023) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1093/isr/viad019 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Personalist ruling parties in democracies
Frantz, E., Kendall-Taylor, A., Li, J., et al. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.2019711 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Chan, M., & Yi, J. (2024) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2024.2325423 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
“In this study, we adopted the more holistic measures of country-level political polarization that were applied in previous research (e.g., Humprecht et al., 2020; Somer et al., 2021).”
InfluentialCitizen support for democracy, anti‐pluralist parties in power and democratic backsliding
Jacob, M. S. (2024) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12703 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
Nai, A., & Maier, J. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197681756.001.0001 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Pathways of Democratic Backsliding, Resistance, and (Partial) Recoveries
Riedl, R. B., McCoy, J., Roberts, K., & Somer, M. (2024) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/00027162251319909 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
“…tomini 2024; Wunsch and Blanchard 2023), democratic resilience (holloway and Manwaring 2022; Lührmann and Merkel 2023; Merkel and Lührmann 2021; Volacu and Aligica 2023), and democratic backsliding and opposition behavior (cleary and Öztürk 2022; Gamboa 2022; Somer et al. 2021; tomini et al. 2022).”
Self-citationCroissant, A., & Lott, L. (2025) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.1177/00323217251345779 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
“Furthermore, citizens’ common sense of belonging and a shared citizenship agreement strengthen civic allegiance to democracy and render it more difficult for anti-system alternatives to gain political traction (Riedl et al., 2024; Somer et al., 2021).”
State of the world 2023: democracy winning and losing at the ballot
Angiolillo, F., Lundstedt, M., Nord, M., & Lindberg, S. I. (2024) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2024.2341435 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Controlling Territory, Controlling Voters
Wahman, M. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198872825.001.0001 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Countering autocratization: a roadmap for democratic defence
van Lit, J., van Ham, C., & Meijers, M. J. (2023) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2023.2279677 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
The Two-Way Effects of Populism on Affective Polarization
Davis, B., Goodliffe, J., & Hawkins, K. A. (2024) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140241237453 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
“Either way, populism provokes its opponents to embrace polarizing strategies that deepen the spiral of con fl ict (Somer et al., 2021).”
Introduction: The New Polarization in Latin America
Sarsfield, R., Moncagatta, P., & Roberts, K. M. (2024) · Latin American Politics and Society · doi:10.1017/lap.2024.15 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
“In this conception, each political group perceives its counterpart to be an existential threat to the nation or to the ways of life they consider superior (Somer, McCoy, and Luke 2021).”
Agents of resistance: resolve and repertoires against autocratization in Asia
Truong, N., Ong, E., & Shum, M. (2024) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2024.2318384 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Partisan Sentiments and Political Trust: A Longitudinal Study of Spain
Torcal, M., & Carty, E. (2022) · South European Society & Politics · doi:10.1080/13608746.2022.2047555 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Bringing critical social psychology to the study of political polarization
Balinhas, D. (2022) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12721 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Kovarek, D., & Dobos, G. (2022) · Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society · doi:10.1093/cjres/rsac044 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
In defence of democracy: parliamentary opposition and democratic resilience in Poland
Muliavka, V., Kwiatkowska, A., & Plisiecki, H. (2024) · East European Politics · doi:10.1080/21599165.2024.2415633 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“…to the recent wave of democratic backsliding focused mainly on the scenarios of strategic actions (e.g. Cleary and Öztürk 2022; Lührmann 2021; Somer, McCoy, and Luke 2021; Somer and Tekinırk 2024), we supplement existing scholarship by introducing an empirical discursive perspective as a…”
Kovarek, D. (2025) · East European Politics · doi:10.1080/21599165.2025.2468693 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“…LMP decided to nominate a former Fidesz politician and Secretary of State for Mayor of Budapest (Panzano, Benazzo, and Bochev 2024, 8–9), who similarly positioned himself as a technocrat between the two bipolar blocks, using an active-depolar-ising electoral strategy (Somer, McCoy, and Luke 2021).”
von Malmborg, F. (2024) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su16125272 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Dodging the autocratic bullet: enlisting behavioural science to arrest democratic backsliding
Abels, C. M., Huttunen, K. J. A., Hertwig, R., & Lewandowsky, S. (2024) · Behavioural Public Policy · doi:10.1017/bpp.2024.43 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
How opposition parties unite in competitive authoritarian regimes: the role of an intermediary party
Musil, P. A. (2023) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2023.2260762 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
The Subversion Dilemma: Why Voters Who Cherish Democracy Participate in Democratic BackslidingPreprint
Braley, A., Lenz, G., Adjodah, D., Rahnama, H., & Pentland, A. (2021) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/my987 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Tweeting apart: Democratic backsliding, new party cleavage and changing media ownership in Turkey
Metin, O. F., & Morales, P. R. (2022) · Party Politics · doi:10.1177/13540688221135019 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
“Prior academic works already documented the mobilization of opposition parties amid fast-declining democratic standards in Turkey (Selçuk and Hekimci, 2020; Sayar ı , 2016; Esen and Gumuscu, 2019; Somer et al., 2021; Selçuk et al., 2019).”
BackgroundResistance under confinement: resilience of protests and their limits in authoritarian Turkey
Arslanalp, M., & Erkmen, T. D. (2024) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/01436597.2024.2355163 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“As the burgeoning literature on opposition to autocratisation underlines, protests and other means of contention can play important roles in resisting, halting and reversing autocrati-sation (Laebens and Lührmann 2021; Tomini, Gibril, and Bochev 2022; Somer, McCoy, and Luke 2021).”
Populist autocratization and populist electoral autocracies: towards a unified conceptual framework
Benedek, I. (2024) · Comparative European Politics · doi:10.1057/s41295-024-00401-8 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“…on the interplay between populism and hybrid regimes (Balderacchi 2018; Castaldo 2018; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Robinson and Milne 2017), as well as on the relationship between political polarization and democratization/autocratization (Boese et al. 2022; Casal and Rama 2021; Somer et al. 2021).”
Toward a New Transition Theory: Opposition Dilemmas and Countering Democratic ErosionPreprint
Somer, M., McCoy, J., & Tuncel, O. (2022) · doi:10.33774/apsa-2022-nr4mz · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Self-citationElite polarization and democratic backsliding in Tunisia: tracing agency-driven mechanisms
Escartin, A. R. (2023) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2023.2284873 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Regime uncertainty, democratic erosion and resilience, and Turkish opposition actors
Somer, M., & Tekinırk, M. (2024) · Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft · doi:10.1007/s12286-024-00595-x · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“Instead, a president gradually produces the same outcome by making piecemeal changes to laws and bylaws, packing the courts, weakening democratic norms and polarizing society to produce a mass base willing to endorse its transgressions over time (Somer et al. 2021).”
Self-citationRevisiting the authoritarian pattern in Turkey: transition to presidential system
Çilliler, Y. (2021) · Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies · doi:10.1080/14683857.2021.1993625 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“From this point of view, the third wave of autocratization unfolds more clandestinely and incrementally than its historical precedents and tends to operate under a legal disguise that makes it quite problematic to pinpoint the onset (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019, 1098; Somer et al. 2021, 2).”
BackgroundPhantom state in Haiti: criminal sovereignty and the mercenary remedy
Niño, C., & González, C. (2022) · Trends in Organized Crime · doi:10.1007/s12117-022-09460-3 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“The use of mercenaries has appeared as a worry - ing political resource for radical oppositions in democracies (Somer et al. 2021 ), but also as a means to break the resilience of authoritarian regimes.”
Development of Democratic Attitudes in Panama (2012-2021)
García-Rendón, S., & Subinas, J. (2023) · Revista Latinoamericana de Opinión Pública · doi:10.14201/rlop.31382 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Democracy in the digital public sphere: disruptive or self-corrective?
Trenz, H. (2023) · Communication Theory · doi:10.1093/ct/qtad009 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Schopmans, H., & Ebetürk, I. (2023) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2023.2258803 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Local democratic resistance to autocratisation: evidence from Budapest, Banja Luka, and Zagreb
Panzano, G., Benazzo, S., & Bochev, V. (2024) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2024.2425457 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“As autocratisation processes have been recognised as open-ended (i.e. not automatically leading to democratic breakdown), a related strand of this research comprises works focusing on democratic resilience and resistance (Boese et al., 2021; Helms, 2021; Somer et al., 2021).”
Building Tolerance for Backsliding by Trash-Talking Democracy: Theory and Evidence From Mexico
Cella, L., Çınar, İ., Stokes, S. C., et al. (2025) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140251328024 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“This dynamic leads to the kind of downward spiral of “ pernicious polarization ” that scholars of democratic erosion warn about (see Somer et al., 2021).”
Social capital and polarization: The case of Polish think tanks
Sörbom, A., & Jezierska, K. (2023) · Journal of Civil Society · doi:10.1080/17448689.2023.2242517 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“Among the wealth of studies on polarization, most have focused on party political polarization and/or voters ’ preferences (e.g., Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Esmer, 2019; McCoy et al., 2018; McCoy & Somer, 2021; Somer et al., 2021; Svolik, 2019; Vachudova, 2019).”
Liberal Democratic Mayors in Illiberal Populist Regimes: Istanbul’s Challenges
Deets, S. (2023) · Nationalities Papers · doi:10.1017/nps.2023.56 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Some passive depolarization may occur through narratives of city initiatives benefiting all and increases in public participation, but effective depolarization requires deliberate action (Somer et al 2021).”
InfluentialZhu, Z., Zhang, N., Ding, M., & Chen, L. (2023) · Information Systems Journal · doi:10.1111/isj.12486 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“From the dynamic process perspective, SMIP's endogenous nature in the United States indicates that polarization has not self-corrected but has instead worsened (Pierson & Schickler, 2020; Somer et al., 2021).”
BackgroundCountering Authoritarian Behavior in Democracies
HOBOLT, S. B., & Osnabrügge, M. (2024) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-024-09971-5 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Lührmann (2021) identifies four main strategies for addressing authoritarian politicians: inclusion, counter-mobilization, ignoring, and exclusion (see also Somer et al., 2021).”
Al-Fadhat, F., & Choi, J. (2023) · Journal of Contemporary Asia · doi:10.1080/00472336.2023.2164937 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Hence, the 2022 presidential election was indicative of a “pernicious polarisation” in South Korean society – a condition where people are divided into mutually distrustful “Us” versus “Them” cleavage in which political preference becomes an aspect of class identity (Somer et al. 2021).”
BackgroundA Long Battle: Turkey’s Backsliding and Resistance Through Trench Warfare
Somer, M. (2024) · The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/00027162251318839 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“As a growing body of literature argues, opposition actors can contribute to backsliding through their own behavior (Gamboa 2017, 2022; Selçuk et al. 2019; Cleary and Öztürk 2021; Somer et al. 2021, 2022; Jiménez 2023; Somer and Tekinırk 2024).”
InfluentialSelf-citationHajnal, Á. (2025) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00323217251324306 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Does partisan polarisation predict economic growth? Evidence from 27 European countries
Patkós, V. (2021) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2021.1992100 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“As the accountability deficit of incumbents in a polarized context opens the room for abuses of power and makes it easier for them to remain in office, political actors benefit from their polarizing activity (Carothers & O’Donohue, 2019; Körösényi, 2013; Slater & Arugay, 2018; Somer et al., 2021).”
BackgroundInfluentialAffective polarization in Latin America: A research note
Bergman, M., & Fernández, P. (2024) · Latin American Politics and Society · doi:10.1017/lap.2024.51 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“Studies have documented the growing negative attitude and evaluations of out-group partisan which denote fractures in the social fabric and defies the foundations of democracies in Europe and the United States (Hartveld et al. 2022; Somer et al. 2021).”
How democratic backsliding and populism affect trust in democratic institutions
Palacios, I. (2025) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2494246 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Liberal Democratic Mayors in Illiberal Regimes: Budapest’s Challenges
Deets, S. (2023) · Problems of Post-Communism · doi:10.1080/10758216.2023.2241617 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“It did emerge in some experimental activities, but often the approach fell into “passive depolariza-tion” (Somer, McCoy, and Luke 2021), which is unlikely to strengthen democracy.”
InfluentialOpposing autocratization in Turkey: from exclusionary to inclusive discourse
Korkmaz, S. S. (2023) · Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft · doi:10.1007/s12286-023-00584-6 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Another significant issue was the CHP’s depolarizing, inclusive campaign (Demiralp and Balta 2021; Somer et al. 2021).”
Religious polarization and justification of belief in invisible scientific versus religious entities
Payir, A., Soley, G., Serbest, O., Corriveau, K. H., & Harris, P. L. (2024) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/cdev.14118 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
(De)Polarization Entrepreneurs? Think Tanks and Pernicious Polarization in Central Europe
Jezierska, K., Krizsán, A., & Sörbom, A. (2024) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592724001397 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“3 Polarization in Hungary and Poland is endogenous, i.e., it is “ primarily driven by political actors deliberately employing polarizing politics to achieve their aims ” (Somer, McCoy, and Luke 2021, 2), exploiting and exaggerating preexisting cleavages.”
InfluentialBenedek, I. (2026) · Comparative European Politics · doi:10.1057/s41295-026-00460-z · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Does External Threat Unify? Chinese Pressure and Domestic Politics in Taiwan and South Korea
Carothers, C. (2022) · Foreign Policy Analysis · doi:10.1093/fpa/orac039 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
What makes voters willing to tolerate undemocratic behaviours? Survey experiment from South Korea
Song, S.-H., & Kim, N. K. (2024) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2024.2436016 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Civil Society and the Contentious Politics of Democratisation and Autocratisation in Myanmar
Stokke, K. (2023) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780367422080-9 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Participatory Democratic Innovations in Southeast Europe
Fiket, I., Markov, Č., Ilić, V., & Draško, G. P. (2024) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003426103 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Hostility and democratic erosion: introducing the Political Hostility Scale (PHOS)
Dodeigne, J. (2025) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2581840 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Ethics and Affect in Resistance to Democratic Regressions
Wolkenstein, F. (2023) · Analyse & Kritik · doi:10.1515/auk-2023-2008 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“…occur in polities plagued by toxic levels of political polarization, where rival political camps regard each other as enemies and exhibit little or no willingness to cooperate (e.g., Boese et al. 2022, 31–5; Gora and de Wilde 2022; McCoy and Somer 2019; Somer, McCoy, and Luke 2021; Vegetti 2019).”
BackgroundMilačić, F. (2022) · Nations and Nationalism · doi:10.1111/nana.12861 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Ong, E., & Rahmad, S. B. (2023) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2023.2223142 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Polarisation over the meaning of democracy: The case of political parties in Turkey
Akboğa, S., Şahin, O., & Arık, E. (2023) · Politics · doi:10.1177/02633957231191445 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Political polarisation that has been on the rise across democracies (Bosco and Verney, 2020; Campbell, 2016; McCoy and Somer, 2019) has a negative impact on the quality of democracy (Somer et al., 2021).”
The Agrarian Conflicts and Food Crises Nexus in Contemporary Latin America
Zimerman, A. (2024) · Journal of Politics in Latin America · doi:10.1177/1866802x231223754 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“This form of polarization, often referred to as pernicious polarization , distinguishes itself from other types by its detrimental impact on democracy and the process of democratization (Somer et al., 2021).”
From capacity to performance: pathways of democratic resilience in Asia
Croissant, A., & Waldner, N. (2025) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2025.2459515 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“…in which political parties or movements and their supporters generally interact in a hostile manner have a weaker capacity to be resilient as societies in which supporters of opposing political camps are willing to engage in friendly interactions (Medzihorsky & Lindberg, 2024; Somer et al., 2021).”
Żuk, P., & Pacześniak, A. (2022) · Frontiers in Political Science · doi:10.3389/fpos.2022.1040616 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
A new regime divide? Partisan affect and attitudes towards democratic backslidingPreprint
Gessler, T., & Wunsch, N. (2023) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/nbwmj · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Corrales, J., & Salas-Díaz, R. J. (2025) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2546620 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
There and back again: democratization, autocratization and democratic resilience
Sika, N., & Szent-Iványi, B. (2026) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2026.2628860 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Social Media and Political Polarization: A Panel Study of 36 Countries from 2014 to 2020
Lu, J., Sun, M., & Liu, Z. (2024) · Social Indicators Research · doi:10.1007/s11205-024-03367-y · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“The measure of political polarization has been used in prior regression analyses, confirming its construct validity (Fang et al., 2020 ; Davis & Vila-Henninger, 2021; Somer et al., 2021).”
Polarization and rule of law crisis—insights from Poland
Solska, M. (2025) · Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft · doi:10.1007/s12286-025-00630-5 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Second, polarizing politics consolidates the most radical voices over potential bridge-builders within each camp (Somer et al. 2021, p. 931).”
Influentialvan der Breggen, M. M., Gonçalves, J., & Boeren, D. (2025) · Journal of Information Technology & Politics · doi:10.1080/19331681.2025.2544653 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
The political communication of polarizing leaders. Evidence from Italy
Mariotti, C., & Stanziano, A. (2024) · Contemporary Italian Politics · doi:10.1080/23248823.2024.2362487 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“The discourse on pernicious polarization, introduced by Somer and McCoy in 2018 and further explored by (Somer, McCoy, and Luke 2021), has significantly enriched the debate with its comparative approach.”
Democracy-Reinforcing Hardball: Can Breaking Democratic Norms Preserve Democratic Values?
Bateman, D. (2025) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/00104140241312107 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Pro-democratic actors, then, should prioritize winning elections (Tomini et al., 2023, 129) by building broad coalitions that downplay other ideo-logical or policy differences, stressing the threat to democracy, corruption, or engaging in “ transformative polarization ” (Somer et al., 2021).”
Revisiting the authoritarian pattern in Turkey: transition to presidential system
Çilliler, Y. (2021) · Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies · doi:10.1080/14683857.2021.1992908 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Did the Arab Spring generate affective polarization? Experimental evidence from five Arab countries
Hassan, M., Amin, E., Mansour, S., & Nicklisch, A. (2023) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2022.2163992 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
The Unintended Consequences of Amplifying the Radical Right on Twitter
Fernandes, J. M., & Won, M. (2023) · Political Communication · doi:10.1080/10584609.2023.2232752 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Instead of engaging in a tit-for-tat self-defeating strategy (Somer et al., 2021), liberal citizens whose goal is to hollow the radical right should engage in what Somer et al. (2021) dub “passive polarization,” that is, refraining from fueling the debate.”
BackgroundSimon, J., & Sonnicksen, J. (2024) · Politische Vierteljahresschrift · doi:10.1007/s11615-023-00527-6 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
The ‘Nasty Politics’ of Swedish Climate Governance: A Threat to the Climate and DemocracyPreprint
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Affective polarization and democratic identity: a comparison of Italy and Norway
Bein, S. (2025) · Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft · doi:10.1007/s12286-024-00623-w · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Identity-based affective polarization is thus linked to the loss of democratic quality and dysfunctional democratic decision-making mechanism (Somer et al. 2021).”
Sander, C., & Degner, J. (2023) · Journal of Applied Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/jasp.13011 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Wealth, Political Inequality, and Resilience: Revisiting the Democratic Argument for Limitarianism
Volacu, A. (2023) · Res Publica · doi:10.1007/s11158-023-09646-8 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“To start with, we can frame limitarianism in the wider classification of strategies which can be used by pro-democracy actors to mitigate pernicious polarization, proposed by Somer et al. (2021).”
InfluentialPercepción económica y polarización política en tiempos de crisis
Rodríguez-Virgili, J., Miguel, A. V., & Sierra, A. (2024) · Más poder local · doi:10.56151/maspoderlocal.203 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
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El difícil camino hacia una democratización en Venezuela
Jiménez, M. (2022) · doi:10.33960/issn-e.1885-9119.dt61 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Somer et al. (2021) muestran como las estrategias opositoras que pretenden disminuir la polarización y promueven una repolarización transformativa en torno a valores democráticos pueden ser más constructivas para prevenir más autocratización (Somer et al., 2021).”
BackgroundIlliberal Democracies and Democratic Backsliding
Self, D. (2022) · doi:10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0352 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Galais, C., & Balinhas, D. (2024) · International Journal of Public Opinion Research · doi:10.1093/ijpor/edae059 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
When does the opposition unite? An examination of Lebanon’s 2022 parliamentary election
Deets, S., Harb, L. A., & Skulte‐Ouaiss, J. (2025) · Mediterranean Politics · doi:10.1080/13629395.2025.2533068 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Bernaerts, K., & Caluwaerts, D. (2025) · International Political Science Review · doi:10.1177/01925121251355894 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
That’s not my truth!: epistemic relativism and political polarization in the United States
Avendaño, D., Holford, D. L., Karlsson, L. C., Lewandowsky, S., & Fasce, A. (2026) · Current Psychology · doi:10.1007/s12144-025-08626-w · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“This kind of “pernicious” polarization is defined by Somer et al. (2021 ) as an oversimplification of the complexity of politics and social relations, turning society into two antagonistic and inflexible factions.”
Aid without roots: international support and the hollowing out of party accountability
Walecka, K. (2026) · Policy Studies · doi:10.1080/01442872.2026.2635579 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“This is often coupled with disrespect for political opponents, feeding polarisation, and the use of government machinery to spread disin-formation (Somer and McCoy 2021).”
- Authors
- Somer, M., McCoy, J. L., & Luke, R. E.
- Affiliations
- Koç University (TR)
- Georgia State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- McCoy, Jennifer L.
- Venue
- Democratization
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2021-01-12
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 929-948
- ISSN
- 1351-0347 (ISSN-L)
- 1743-890X
- OpenAlex
- W3120050906
- Cited by
- 220
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 68 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 10
- FWCI
- 50.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Democratization (publishedVersion)
- Digital Collections portal (Koç University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Keywords
- autocratization, democratic opposition, opposition strategy, political polarization, liberal democracy, institutional accountability, mobilization, electoral autocracy, democratic resilience, political identity
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