Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
on Jul 22 2019 (see record 2019-43753-001). In the article, a printer error did not enable the authors to correct various errors before publication. Tables 1 and 2 have been corrected. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moralistic outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8,440) report more outrage in response to others' selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)-such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by influencing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6,076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. Moreover, and importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy toward selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3,422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and-among individuals who rely on heuristics-costly punishment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037//0003-066x.56.3.218 · Cited by 18,025 · cited 1×
“This proposal is not mutually exclusive with the idea that outrage is experienced genuinely, but it supports theories of emotions as adaptive motivators of action (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Fredrickson, 2001; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991), and moral outrage specifically as a motivator of punishment (Carlsmith et al.”
BackgroundThe weirdest people in the world?
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0999152x · Cited by 12,641
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348 · Cited by 11,929
The emerging field of emotion regulation: an integrative review
Gross, J. J. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.3.271 · Cited by 9,916 · cited 5×
“, 1994), and that these gaps can reflect that some individuals respond to “misfiring” by adaptively engaging in emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b; Gross & John, 2003).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
Mate selection—A selection for a handicap
Zahavi, A. (1975) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 · Cited by 5,251 · cited 1×
“One particular way that TPP may confer reputational benefits is by serving as a costly signal (Zahavi, 1975) of trustworthiness (i.”
BackgroundGross, J. J. (1998) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.74.1.224 · Cited by 4,671
The self-importance of moral identity
Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423 · Cited by 3,522
Measurement of social-evaluative anxiety.
Watson, D., & Friend, R. (1969) · Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0027806 · Cited by 3,467
Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior
Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145 · Cited by 3,222
The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633 · Cited by 2,875
Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4 · Cited by 2,417
A brief version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale
Leary, M. R. (1983) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167283093007 · Cited by 2,178 · cited 5×
“The other eight items in our general reputation concerns scale were designed by us to mirror these eight BFNE items, but measure the desire for positive evaluation.”
MethodInfluentialAntisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., et al. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1127333 · Cited by 1,771
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks
Brady, W. J., Wills, J. A., Jost, J. T., Tucker, J. A., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1618923114 · Cited by 1,580
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., & Lerner, J. S. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.853 · Cited by 1,400
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
Yamagishi, T. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 · Cited by 1,359
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334
Self-citationMoral credentials and the expression of prejudice.
Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.33 · Cited by 1,086
Toward a rational and mechanistic account of mental effort
Shenhav, A., Musslick, S., Lieder, F., Kool, W., Griffiths, T. L., Cohen, J. D., & Botvinick, M. M. (2017) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-072116-031526 · Cited by 1,077 · cited 2×
“In general, deliberation allows people to tailor their behavior to the specific situation they are in and, thus, can serve to inhibit typically advantageous responses in atypical contexts where they will be costly (Kahneman, 2011; Rand et al., 2014, 2017; Shenhav et al., 2017; Stanovich, 2005).”
Background(2001) · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 · Cited by 803
Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06723 · Cited by 718
Self-citationPunishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
Nikiforakis, N. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008 · Cited by 711
The moral emotions: A social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt.
Hutcherson, C. A., & Gross, J. J. (2011) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0022408 · Cited by 609
Rodebaugh, T. L., Woods, C. M., Thissen, D. M., Heimberg, R. G., Chambless, D. L., & Rapee, R. M. (2004) · Psychological Assessment · doi:10.1037/1040-3590.16.2.169 · Cited by 477 · cited 1×
“The eight straightforwardly worded BFNE items have been shown to correlate more strongly with theoretically related measures than reverse-worded items (Rodebaugh et al., 2004).”
BackgroundDisgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., Knobe, J., & Bloom, P. (2009) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/a0015960 · Cited by 466
Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage?
Batson, C. D., Kennedy, C. L., Nord, L., Stocks, E. L., Fleming, D. A., Marzette, C. M., Lishner, D. A., Hayes, R. E., Kolchinsky, L. M., & Zerger, T. (2007) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.434 · Cited by 373
Audience effects on moralistic punishment
Kurzban, R., DeScioli, P., & O'Brien, E. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001 · Cited by 360
(2003) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195126013.003.0045 · Cited by 343
Roseman, I. J. (2011) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073911410744 · Cited by 200 · cited 2×
“This result that is consistent with evidence that emotion feelings do not always translate to emotion-related behaviors (Roseman, 2011; Roseman et al., 1994), and that these gaps can reflect that some individuals respond to “misfiring” by adaptively engaging in emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b; Gross & John, 2003).”
BackgroundResultImplicit self-concept and moral action
Perugini, M., & Leone, L. (2009) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2009.03.015 · Cited by 169
Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself
FeldmanHall, O., Sokol-Hessner, P., Van Bavel, J. J., & Phelps, E. A. (2014) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms6306 · Cited by 106
Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so
Raihani, N. J., & Bshary, R. (2015) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/evo.12637 · Cited by 101
Hypocrisy by association: When organizational membership increases condemnation for wrongdoing
Effron, D. A., Lucas, B. J., & O’Connor, K. (2015) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.05.001 · Cited by 60
Cited by
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2021.02.007 · Cited by 1,360
“The preference-based account is rooted in the idea that people place their preference for political identity (or related motives such as virtue signaling [64]) above the truth, and thus share politically consistent false content on social media despite recognizing that it is probably not true.”
BackgroundSelf-citationBrady, W. J., Crockett, M. J., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620917336 · Cited by 417
“It can also serve the function of signaling important elements of one’s social identity or social norms to their social community, which may increase their stature within the community (Jordan & Rand, 2020).”
BackgroundHow social learning amplifies moral outrage expression in online social networks
Brady, W. J., McLoughlin, K., Doan, T. N., & Crockett, M. J. (2021) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abe5641 · Cited by 375
“Crucially, our experimental data suggest that the context of social media makes the interaction of network norms and reinforcement learning especially likely to affect learning of expressions that convey reputational information to one’s social group, like moral outrage (55).”
BackgroundJordan, J. J., Yoeli, E., & Rand, D. G. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-97617-5 · Cited by 350
Self-citationJordan, J., Yoeli, E., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/yuq7x · Cited by 348
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Jordan, J. J., & Rand, D. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 2020-01
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-88
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2921545035
- Cited by
- 148
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 33.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.