Cited by 1,077Neural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesBehavioral Health and InterventionsFree Will and Agency

Toward a rational and mechanistic account of mental effort

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Shenhav, Amitai, Musslick, Sebastian, Lieder, Falk, Kool, Wouter, Griffiths, Thomas L., Cohen, Jonathan D., Botvinick, Matthew M.·2017·Annual Review of Neuroscience

Abstract

In spite of its familiar phenomenology, the mechanistic basis for mental effort remains poorly understood. Although most researchers agree that mental effort is aversive and stems from limitations in our capacity to exercise cognitive control, it is unclear what gives rise to those limitations and why they result in an experience of control as costly. The presence of these control costs also raises further questions regarding how best to allocate mental effort to minimize those costs and maximize the attendant benefits. This review explores recent advances in computational modeling and empirical research aimed at addressing these questions at the level of psychological process and neural mechanism, examining both the limitations to mental effort exertion and how we manage those limited cognitive resources. We conclude by identifying remaining challenges for theoretical accounts of mental effort as well as possible applications of the available findings to understanding the causes of and potential solutions for apparent failures to exert the mental effort required of us.

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Crossref · 10.1146/annurev-neuro-072116-031526

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196 of 196 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Modern theories of motivation describe motivational states as the output of a computation where expected value of an action is weighed against anticipated costs (energetic, opportunity, hedonic).

    “Consequently, modern theories of motivation increasingly describe motivational states as the output of a computation (calculation), where the expected value of an action is weighed against anticipated costs. These include energetic costs, as all goal pursuit will require the expenditure of metabolic energy, opportunity costs, as the pursuit of one goal might block progress towards another, hedonic”

    From Motivation in the Service of Allostasis: The Role of Anterior Mid-Cingulate Cortex (2019) · cites this paper as Shenhav et al., 2017

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Authors
Shenhav, A., Musslick, S., Lieder, F., Kool, W., Griffiths, T. L., Cohen, J. D., & Botvinick, M. M.
Affiliations
  • Brown University (US)
  • Princeton University (US)
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Google DeepMind (United Kingdom) (GB)
Corresponding author
Shenhav, Amitai
Venue
Annual Review of Neuroscience
Published
2017-07-25
Volume
40
Issue
1
Pages
99-124
ISSN
  • 0147-006X (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-4126
OpenAlex
W2600886565
Cited by
1,077
References
196
Citations by year
2026: 124 · 2025: 122 · 2024: 149 · 2023: 117 · 2022: 123 · 2021: 124 · 2020: 112 · 2019: 117 · 2018: 60 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 3
FWCI
9.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Review of Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
cognitive effort, cognitive control, effort cost, cognitive resource allocation, aversive experience, cognitive limitations
MeSH terms
Cognition, Decision Making, Humans, Motivation, Reward, Prefrontal Cortex, Executive Function

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