Winners don’t punish
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Abstract
A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
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“While punishment can be beneficial to populations by encouraging the emergence of cooperation, its use incurs costs on both the punisher and the punished [13, 14], ultimately reducing the combined reward and overall productivity of the population [33, 51].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [51]
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Gallo, E., Riyanto, Y. E., Roy, N., & Teh, T. (2022) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.015 · Cited by 12
The Effects of Extra-Somatic Weapons on the Evolution of Human Cooperation towards Non-Kin
Phillips, T. J., Li, J., & Kendall, G. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095742 · Cited by 10
The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery
Fang, Y., Perc, M., & Xu, H. (2020) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110345 · Cited by 12
“, 2017), evidence suggesting that rewards may be as effective as punishment and lead to higher total earnings are accumulating (Dreber et al., 2008; Szolnoki and Perc, 2015; Hu et al., 2020).”
BackgroundExtortion, intuition, and the dark side of reciprocity
Bernhard, R. M., & Cushman, F. A. (2022) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105215 · Cited by 16
The effects of individual and context on aggression in repeated social interaction
Martin, J. M., Juvina, I., Lebiere, C. J., & González, C. (2012) · Applied Ergonomics · doi:10.1016/j.apergo.2012.04.014 · Cited by 11
Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USAPreprint
Ellingsen, T., Herrmann, B., Nowak, M. A., Rand, D. G., & Tarnita, C. E. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2179575 · Cited by 12
Self-citationA solution concept for games with altruism and cooperationPreprint
Capraro, V. (2013) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1302.3988 · Cited by 10
“the parameter µ plays the role of a reward for cooperating. The intuition, motivated by similar experiments conducted on the Traveler’s Dilemma (cf. Example 4.6) or on the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma [DRFN08], suggests that humans should play the selfish strategy D for very small values of µ and tend to cooperate for v…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSalahshour, M., Oberhauser, V., & Smerlak, M. (2022) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0263028 · Cited by 9
“Behavioral experiments further confirm that humans are willing to use costly punishment instruments to establish social norms [11–16], although perhaps not in all circumstances [17–19].”
Collective punishment promotes resource conservation if it is not enforced
Safarzyńska, K. (2020) · Forest Policy and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2020.102121 · Cited by 9
Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: The impact of asymmetric punishment
Guo, T., Du, C., & Ши, Л. (2023) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2023.128350 · Cited by 10
Strategy revision phase with payoff threshold in the public goods game
Javarone, M. A., & Singh, S. (2024) · Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment · doi:10.1088/1742-5468/ad2449 · Cited by 9
“To cite a few, in [10] authors proposed the presence of weak cooperators and weak defectors, in [11–14] authors studied the effect of punishing defectors, in [15– 17] a conformist attitude revealed to sustain cooperation, in [18] authors investigated costly-access environments, in [19, 20] authors…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 452
- Issue
- 7185
- Pages
- 348-351
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2292414
- OpenAlex
- W2113546393
- Cited by
- 718
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 58 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 64 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 123.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- costly punishment, evolution of cooperation, repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, retaliation, reputation, social norms, experimental economics, public goods game, reciprocity
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Female, Game Theory, Humans, Male, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Risk Assessment
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.