Winners don’t punish
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Abstract
A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
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“While punishment can be beneficial to populations by encouraging the emergence of cooperation, its use incurs costs on both the punisher and the punished [13, 14], ultimately reducing the combined reward and overall productivity of the population [33, 51].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [51]
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“Relatedly, the costs of sanctions sometimes exceed the benefits of increased cooperation, thus reducing overall welfare (Dreber et al. 2008).”
BackgroundMATHEMATICS OF KIN- AND GROUP-SELECTION: FORMALLY EQUIVALENT?
Traulsen, A. (2009) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2009.00899.x · Cited by 63
“Behavioral experiments with humans are also routinely based on game theory (Yamagishi 1986; Semmann et al. 2005; Dreber et al. 2008).”
MethodHUMAN COOPERATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT REPUTATION
dos Santos, M., Rankin, D. J., & Wedekind, C. (2013) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/evo.12108 · Cited by 51
“Recent theory predicts that punishment has either evolved in another context than cooperation (Dreber et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2009) or that reputational effects compensate for the costs of punishment (Hilbe and Sigmund 2010; dos Santos et al. 2011).”
BackgroundLearning moral values: Another’s desire to punish enhances one’s own punitive behavior.
FeldmanHall, O., Otto, A. R., & Phelps, E. A. (2018) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000405 · Cited by 51
Moral reasoning in schizophrenia: An explorative study into economic decision making
Wischniewski, J., & Brüne, M. (2011) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546805.2010.539919 · Cited by 53
“In an entirely different context, it has been demonstrated that in a repeatedly played Prisoner's Dilemma game that examines people's likelihood to cooperate or to defect based on predictions of reciprocality of the other player, winners tend not to use costly punishment strategies (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2…”
BackgroundIndirect reciprocity with optional interactions
Ghang, W., & Nowak, M. A. (2014) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.09.036 · Cited by 56
Self-citationInductive Game Theory and the Dynamics of Animal Conflict
DeDeo, S., Krakauer, D. C., & Flack, J. C. (2010) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000782 · Cited by 54
“quantify how well different variants of C(2,1) reproduce the data. We consider P(A), the frequency of appearance of individual A, and Pc(AB), the connected pair correlation, Pc(AB) = P(AB) −P(A)P(B), (6) where P(AB) is the frequency of appearance of the pair P(AB). (The use of only the connected part reduces the covari…”
BackgroundCollective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation
Gao, L., Wang, Z., Pansini, R., Li, Y., & Wang, R. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep17752 · Cited by 54
Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding
Pal, S., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-33551-y · Cited by 50
“As a result, overall payoffs in experiments with punishment often tend to be lower than in experiments without it 48,49 (for an exception, see ref.”
On the interaction of the stick and the carrot in social dilemmas
Milinski, M., & Rockenbach, B. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.014 · Cited by 56
“At the individual level punishers have the lowest immediate net gain (Dreber et al., 2008).”
BackgroundThird Party Reward and Punishment: Group Size, Efficiency and Public GoodsPreprint
Almenberg, J., Dreber, A., Apicella, C. L., & Rand, D. G. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 58
Self-citationPunishers May Be Chosen as Providers But Not as Recipients
Horita, Y. (2010) · Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science · doi:10.5178/lebs.2010.2 · Cited by 49
Short- and long-run goals in ultimatum bargaining: impatience predicts spite-based behavior
Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., Herrmann, B., & Brañas‐Garza, P. (2015) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00214 · Cited by 55
“This procedure was checked and approved by the Vice-dean of Research of the School of Economics of the University of Granada; the institution hosting the experiment.”
The coevolutionary ultimatum game
Gao, J., Li, Z., Wu, T., & Wang, L. (2011) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/93/48003 · Cited by 48
The Sanctioning Dilemma: A Quasi-Experiment on Social Norm Enforcement in the Train
Przepiorka, W., & Berger, J. L. (2016) · European Sociological Review · doi:10.1093/esr/jcw014 · Cited by 61
“These findings have been contested in their empirical and methodical validity (Levitt and List, 2007; Dreber et al. 2008; Herrmann, Tho¨ni and G € achter, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; West, El Mouden and Gardner, 2011; Guala, 2012; Krasnow et al., 2012).”
Gordon, D. S., Madden, J. R., & Lea, S. E. G. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110045 · Cited by 52
Reciprocity, Culture, and Human Cooperation: Previous Insights and a New Crosscultural Experiment
Gekhter, S., & Херрманн, Б. (2009) · Психология Журнал Высшей школы экономики · Cited by 45
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private
Bhaskar, V., Fréchette, G. R., & Aoyagi, M. (2015) · OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive) (Osaka University) · Cited by 45
Power Asymmetries and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with Variable Cooperative Investment
Bone, J. E., Wallace, B., Bshary, R., & Raihani, N. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155773 · Cited by 45
“Instead, previous studies have shown that players may often either continue to defect [3], or even retaliate [2, 3, 15, 16], when they are punished for cheating.”
BackgroundResultInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 452
- Issue
- 7185
- Pages
- 348-351
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2292414
- OpenAlex
- W2113546393
- Cited by
- 718
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 58 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 64 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 123.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- costly punishment, evolution of cooperation, repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, retaliation, reputation, social norms, experimental economics, public goods game, reciprocity
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Female, Game Theory, Humans, Male, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Risk Assessment
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.