Winners don’t punish
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“While punishment can be beneficial to populations by encouraging the emergence of cooperation, its use incurs costs on both the punisher and the punished [13, 14], ultimately reducing the combined reward and overall productivity of the population [33, 51].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [51]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Hardin, G. (1968) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.162.3859.1243 · Cited by 25,167
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
Fischbacher, U. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 · Cited by 9,510
Hardin, G. (2009) · Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research · doi:10.1080/19390450903037302 · Cited by 6,367
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Self-citationAltruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964229 · Cited by 2,063
A gentle introduction to quantile regression for ecologists
Cade, B. S., & Noon, B. R. (2003) · Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment · doi:10.1890/1540-9295(2003)001[0412:agitqr]2.0.co;2 · Cited by 1,855
Cited by
Items 501–600 of 707
Outraged AI: Large language models prioritise emotion over cost in fairness enforcementPreprint
Liu, H., Dai, Y., Tan, H., Yu, L., Zhou, Y., & Wu, Z. (2025) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/fnk57_v3 · Cited by 4
Determinants of economic preferences
Almenberg, A. D. (2009) · Cited by 5
Hou, G., Wang, F., Shi, J., Chen, W., & Yu, J. (2018) · PsyCh Journal · doi:10.1002/pchj.259 · Cited by 3
Costly signals can facilitate cooperation and punishment in the prisoner’s dilemma
Guan, K., Chen, Y., Zheng, W., Zeng, L., & Ye, H. (2022) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2022.127997 · Cited by 3
Wen, Y., He, Z., Shen, C., & Tanimoto, J. (2025) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013068 · Cited by 4
“Nevertheless, researchers continue to explore mechanisms to sustain cooperation, particularly through costly punishment[6, 20].”
InfluentialEvolutionary dynamics of trust with voluntary participation and group-shared sanctions
Liu, Y., Wang, L., Guo, R., Hua, S., Liu, L., Zhang, L., & Chen, X. (2025) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2025.130030 · Cited by 4
Ohdaira, T. (2016) · Journal of Information Processing · doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.24.534 · Cited by 3
“[2] propose that punishment causes the loss of the average payoff of all players.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialZhu, J., & Liu, C. (2024) · Acta Psychologica · doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2024.104620 · Cited by 13
Group identity and cooperation in infinitely repeated games
Chen, B., Li, S. X., & Liu, T. X. (2026) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-025-01699-5 · Cited by 3
“…identity and strategic risks interact in other game environments, such as coordination games (e.g., Chen and Chen 2011), principal-agent problems, gift-exchange games, repeated games with imperfect monitoring (Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009), and those involving costly punishment (Dreber et al. 2008).”
18. Comparing Consequences of Carrots and Sticks on Cooperation in Repeated Public Good Games
Barrera, D., Buskens, V., & de Rover, V. (2020) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110647495-018 · Cited by 3
Crimes against Humanity: The Role of International Courts
Schneider, É. M., Iglesias, J. R., Hallberg, K., & Kuperman, M. N. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099064 · Cited by 3
The norm game: punishing enemies and not friends
KUŁAKOWSKI, K. (2009) · Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination · doi:10.1007/s11403-009-0045-y · Cited by 4
The establishment of communication systems depends on the scale of competition
dos Santos, M., Rodrigues, J. F. M., Wedekind, C., & Rankin, D. J. (2011) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.09.007 · Cited by 4
Strategy preference promotes cooperation in spatial evolutionary games
Zhang, S., Zhang, Z., Wu, Y., Yan, M. G., & Li, Y. (2018) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.09.068 · Cited by 4
Jiang, F., Zhao, X., & Bai, Q. (2018) · Concurrency and Computation Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/cpe.5097 · Cited by 6
Will you cooperate in case the payoff can be guaranteed?
Zhang, X., Chen, T., Chen, Q., & Xue-ya, L. (2019) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109423 · Cited by 3
Essentialist Views of Criminal Behavior Predict Increased Punitiveness
Martin, J. W., Charles, S., & Heiphetz, L. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009001021.019 · Cited by 3
Time Pressure Weakens Social Norm Maintenance in Third-Party Punishment
Zhou, X., Wang, Y., He, W., Li, S., Jia, S., Feng, C., Gu, R., & Luo, W. (2023) · Brain Sciences · doi:10.3390/brainsci13020227 · Cited by 3
Robots and Resentment: Commitments, Recognition and Social Motivation in HRI
Castro, V. F., & Pacherie, É. (2023) · Technikzukünfte, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-37641-3_8 · Cited by 3
“Several authors have argued that punishment can be ineffective to sustain compliance and even can produce an erosion in cooperation (Dreber et al., 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992).”
BackgroundCross-cultural differences in retaliation: Evidence from the soccer field
Schläpfer, A. (2024) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.05.010 · Cited by 6
Makovi, K., Bonnefon, J., Oudah, M., Sargsyan, A., & Rahwan, T. (2025) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2025.112833 · Cited by 7
Individual differences in motives for costly punishment
Claessens, S., Atkinson, Q. D., & Raihani, N. (2026) · Communications Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44271-025-00372-w · Cited by 3
“For example, if targets interpret punishment as serving a competitive motive, it may elicit retaliation rather than encourage cooperation 6,10,76 .”
Internalized Contribution Norms and Learning in A Public Goods Experiment in Ghana
Akpalu, W., & Johansson‐Stenman, O. (2010) · Public Finance and Management · doi:10.1177/152397211001000207 · Cited by 3
“In order to sustain cooperation in the long run, ere is also much evidence that some kind of social d (Dreber et al., 2008; Gürerk et al., 006).”
BackgroundTanimoto, J. (2018) · Evolutionary economics and social complexity science · doi:10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8_2 · Cited by 4
Women Tend to Defect in a Social Dilemma Game in Southwest China
Pansini, R., Ши, Л., & Wang, R. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166101 · Cited by 3
Phase transition properties for the spatial public goods game with self-questioning mechanism
Yang, B., Fan, M., Liu, W., & Chen, X. (2017) · Acta Physica Sinica · doi:10.7498/aps.66.196401 · Cited by 3
Reply to Rankin et al.: The efficiency ratio of costly punishment
Tao, Y., Li, C., Wu, J., & Cressman, R. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0912928107 · Cited by 3
Turning the Other Cheek: Leniency and Forgiveness in an Uncertain WorldPreprint
Rand, D. G. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 3
Self-citationFeinberg, M. (2012) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 4
Cooperation increases with the benefit-to-cost ratio in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiments.Preprint
Capraro, V., Jordan, J., & Rand, D. G. (2014) · arXiv (Cornell University) · Cited by 4
Self-citationTheory of Hyper-Rational ChoicePreprint
Gordji, M. E., & Askari, G. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3099441 · Cited by 3
Intelligence, Errors and Strategic Choices in the Repeated Prisoners' DilemmaPreprint
Proto, E., Rustichini, A., & Sofianos, A. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3534473 · Cited by 3
An Experiment: Voluntary Separation in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma GamePreprint
Lee, H. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3207669 · Cited by 3
Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness – the punishment of selfishness is notPreprint
Przepiorka, W., & Liebe, U. (2023) · SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/fapqd · Cited by 3
The Sanctioning Dilemma: A Quasi-Experiment on Social Norm Enforcement in the TrainPreprint
Przepiorka, W., & Berger, J. L. (2023) · SocArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/jmy8x · Cited by 3
Massively Parallel Model of Extended Memory Use in Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Randles, A. P., Rand, D. G., Lee, C., Morrisett, G., Sircar, J., Nowak, M. A., & Pfister, H. (2013) · IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS) · doi:10.1109/ipdps.2013.102 · Cited by 2
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics of spatial optional public goods games with non-participant externalities
Dai, X., Liu, H., Gao, S., Bai, H., Jia, D., & Shen, C. (2026) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2026.118250 · Cited by 2
Binder, L., Schultze, M., Chen, F. S., & Windmann, S. (2026) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-026-46603-w · Cited by 2
Evolutionary path from a prisoner’s dilemma to a harmony game via hawk–dove games
Király, B., Varga, T., & Garay, J. (2026) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-026-47565-9 · Cited by 2
“A third direction equips the players with additional options to influence outcomes besides choosing their strategy, such as voluntary participation 17 or the ability to punish non-cooperative players at an extra cost 18,19 .”
Evolutionary branching and consistency in group cooperation
Glaubitz, A., & Fu, F. (2026) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2523204123 · Cited by 5
The Reconsideration of the Altruistic Decision Based on the Notion of the Bounded Rationality
Ohdaira, T. (2014) · Journal of Information Processing · doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.22.186 · Cited by 2
“[22] proposes that recent studies regarding the evolutionary significance of costly punishment [38], [39] are problematic, and that punishment still has the possibility of becoming the rule for the evolution of cooperation.”
BackgroundCollective Action and the Detrimental Side of Punishment
Shutters, S. T. (2013) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/147470491301100204 · Cited by 2
“Thus, the full ramifications of punishment may not be well understood.”
BackgroundHellberg, D. (2017) · Open Review of Educational Research · doi:10.1080/23265507.2017.1365622 · Cited by 2
The Dose Does it: Punishment and Cooperation in Dynamic Public-Good Games
Rockenbach, B., & Wolff, I. (2019) · Review of Behavioral Economics · doi:10.1561/105.00000084 · Cited by 3
“Second, researchers like Dreber et al. (2009) have pointed out that in most studies, the costs of punishment lead to average earnings that are even lower than in the corresponding treatments where punishment is not available. Yet, Gächter et al. (2008) show that when the time horizon is long enough, this is no longer…”
BackgroundCoordination of network heterogeneity and individual preferences promotes collective fairness
Han, X., Ma, S., Wang, W.-X., Sánchez, Á., Stanley, E., Cao, S., & Zhang, B. (2025) · Patterns · doi:10.1016/j.patter.2025.101293 · Cited by 3
Weighing Reward and Punishment—Response
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Drew Fudenberg, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.326.5960.1632-b · Cited by 2
Self-citationThe Effects of Inducing Strategies on Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Sun, F., Song, Q., & Jing, L. (2013) · International Conference on Intelligent Human-Machine Systems and Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/ihmsc.2013.222 · Cited by 2
Coevolution of strategy and structure on social networks
Zhang, C., Zhang, J., Xie, G., & Wang, L. (2010) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc.2010.5717078 · Cited by 2
Revenge, even though it is not your fault
Yu, R. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000623 · Cited by 2
“Revenge may ultimately hurt the seeker as much as the victim (Dreber et al. 2008).”
BackgroundPunishment and status in collective action: How status hierarchies f oster optimal punishment use
Vincent, A. D. (2017) · Sociology Compass · doi:10.1111/soc4.12478 · Cited by 2
Reputation for Complex Societies
Giardini, F., Conte, R., & Paolucci, M. (2017) · Understanding complex systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66948-9_18 · Cited by 2
“Although effective in many contexts, costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average pay-off of the group (Dreber et al. 2008).”
BackgroundEzeigbo, I. C. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-17481-0 · Cited by 2
Designing Behavioural Artificial Intelligence to Record, Assess and Evaluate Human Behaviour
Hildmann, H. (2018) · Multimodal Technologies and Interaction · doi:10.3390/mti2040063 · Cited by 3
“Some consider it to be a key aspect of human behaviour [45,46].”
Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors
Ghang, W., Olejarz, J. W., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Mathematical Biosciences · doi:10.1016/j.mbs.2018.12.005 · Cited by 2
Self-citationZeng, W., Ai, H., & Man, Z. (2019) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.04.067 · Cited by 2
Awareness of wealth inequalities breeds animosity
Zhang, M., Ma, Y., Tao, Y., Wang, Z., Ши, Л., & Wang, R. (2019) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109398 · Cited by 3
Governing the Commons: Why Self-Administered Farm Outlets Flourish in Switzerland
Franzén, A., Mäder, S., & Bahr, S. (2019) · International Journal of the Commons · doi:10.5334/ijc.960 · Cited by 2
Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation
Laferrière, V., Montez, J. V., Roux, C., & Thöni, C. (2024) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20210377 · Cited by 3
Computational Modeling of (un)Cooperation: The Role of Emotions
Cavicchio, F. (2010) · Unitn-eprints PhD (University of Trento) · doi:10.15168/11572_368345 · Cited by 2
The coevolution of renewable resources and institutions - implications for policy design
Richter, A. P. (2011) · doi:10.18174/163232 · Cited by 2
Efficient Coordination in Repeated Games: Behavioral MaximsPreprint
Demichelis, S. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2322757 · Cited by 2
Difficult choices : essays on economic behavior
Almenberg, J. (2009) · Cited by 3
Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture
MacLeod, W. B., Lara, V. V., & Zehnder, C. (2020) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w27857 · Cited by 2
Economic Preferences 2.0: Connecting Competition, Cooperation and Inter-Temporal PreferencesPreprint
Esppn, A., SSnchez, A., & Herrmann, B. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2932821 · Cited by 5
Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated InteractionsPreprint
Lambrecht, M., Proto, E., Rustichini, A., & Sofianos, A. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4168498 · Cited by 3
Payoffs, Beliefs and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated GamesPreprint
Andres, M., Bruttel, L. V., & Nithammer, J. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4491762 · Cited by 2
Public Goods with Punishment & Payment for Relative RankPreprint
Burnham, T. C. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2623763 · Cited by 3
It pays to be nice: The benefits of cooperating in markets
Serdarevic, N., Strømland, E., & Tjøtta, S. (2020) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2020.101595 · Cited by 2
Monetary Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Complex Networks
Pei, H., Yan, G., & Wang, H. (2020) · International Conference on Computer and Communication Systems (ICCCS) · doi:10.1109/icccs49078.2020.9118505 · Cited by 1
Combining decision-level data from multiple experiments: what is the pooled estimator doing?
Bland, J. R. (2026) · Journal of the Economic Science Association · doi:10.1017/esa.2026.10031 · Cited by 1
Chen, F., Nave, G., & Wang, L. (2020) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-024-05865-y · Cited by 1
Which Matters More: Intention or Outcome? The Asymmetry of Moral Blame and Moral Praise
Li, Z.-M., Xiao, L., & Sun, H.-Y. (2025) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs15091265 · Cited by 1
“For the blamer, making wrongful accusations may result in varying degrees of social ostracism, damage or rupture of their social relationships, and even physical punishment and retaliation by others (Dreber et al., 2008; McCullough et al., 2013).”
How to React in the Case of Powerful Transgressors: Kill Them With Kindness or Punishment?
Houdek, P., Bahník, Š., Vranka, M. A., & Zielina, M. (2026) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.70074 · Cited by 1
Individual strategy choice in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Backhaus, T., & Breitmoser, Y. (2026) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2026.105407 · Cited by 1
Free Riders and Strong Reciprocators Coexist in Public Goods Experiments: Evolutionary Foundations
Antoci, A., Russu, P., & Zarri, L. (2009) · Economics bulletin · Cited by 2
Ohdaira, T. (2014) · Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical · doi:10.1088/1751-8113/47/27/275101 · Cited by 1
Severe Punishment for Those Who Were Caught
Deng, K., Li, Z., & Chu, T. (2010) · IEEE International Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS) · doi:10.1109/iceccs.2010.53 · Cited by 1
“The former makes the welfare of the population rapidly deteriorate, and the latter makes winners be those who never punish [13].”
BackgroundThe Analysis of Collusive Tendering Based on the Application of Spatial Game
Ohdaira, T., & Terano, T. (2011) · IEEJ Transactions on Electronics Information and Systems · doi:10.1541/ieejeiss.131.689 · Cited by 1
Order Ethics—An Experimental Perspective
Rusch, H., & Uhl, M. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-33151-5_5 · Cited by 1
Anger Management: Aggression and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods
Gee, L., Lyu, X., & Urry, H. L. (2017) · Games · doi:10.3390/g8010005 · Cited by 1
“1See Dreber et al. (2008); Gächter and Fehr (1999); Fehr and Gachter (2000); Gächter et al. (2008); Egas and Riedl (2008).”
BackgroundOliver, A. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108647755.006 · Cited by 1
Antoci, A., & Zarri, L. (2015) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463115576138 · Cited by 1
“However, in a lively interdisciplinary debate currently involving economists, biologists, and social psychologists (see on this Fehr and Henrich, 2003), critics argue that strong reciprocity is maladaptive, in the sense that it is evolutionarily weak and has no adaptive power (Dreber et al., 2008).”
BackgroundResultThe Effect of Peer Punishment on the Evolution of Cooperation
Nakamaru, M. (2022) · Theoretical biology · doi:10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1_3 · Cited by 1
Is an eye truly for an eye? Magnitude differences affect moral praise more than moral blame
Tan, L., Anderson, R. A., & Basu, S. (2024) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2024.106040 · Cited by 1
A norm about harvest division is maintained by a desire to follow tradition, not by social policing
Yan, M., Li, Z., Li, Y., Boyd, R. T., & Mathew, S. (2025) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2413214122 · Cited by 4
Enterprise Architecture as a Public Goods Dilemma
Beese, J., Haki, K., Aier, S., & Winter, R. (2020) · Lecture notes in business information processing · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-37933-9_7 · Cited by 1
Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information
Berger, U., & Silva, H. D. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0253344 · Cited by 1
“It has been shown, however, that stabilizing cooperative social outcomes by threats of punishment often fails to work, and costly punishment has therefore been suggested to have evolved for other reasons [46, 47].”
Counterpunishment Revisited: An Evolutionary ApproachPreprint
Wolff, I. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1460707 · Cited by 1
Inequality-Seeking PunishmentPreprint
Houser, D. E., & Xiao, E. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1608246 · Cited by 1
Ball, P. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/news.2009.955 · Cited by 1
The Social EgoistPreprint
Boschini, A. D., Muren, A., & Persson, M. (2013) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1
Strong reciprocity, social structure, and the evolution of cooperative behavior
Shutters, S. T. (2009) · doi:10.13140/2.1.5185.7920 · Cited by 2
Gender, Punishment, and Cooperation: Men Hurt Others to Advance Their InterestsPreprint
Burnham, T. C. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2966376 · Cited by 2
Low competitive status elicits aggression in healthy young men: behavioral and neural evidencePreprint
Buades‐Rotger, M., Göttlich, M., Weiblen, R., Petereit, P., Scheidt, T., Keevil, B. G., & Krämer, U. M. (2020) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2020.06.20.162586 · Cited by 1
Growth and inequality in public good games
Gächter, S., Mengel, F., Tsakas, E., & Vostroknutov, A. (2013) · Research Publications (Maastricht University) · doi:10.26481/umagsb.2013070 · Cited by 1
The Social Neuroscience of CooperationPreprint
Bavel, J. J. V. (2018) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/8kcd4 · Cited by 1
A cooperative culture may affect trustworthiness assessments derived from the human facePreprint
Berger, S., Schlöder, F., & Wyss, A. M. (2021) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/tp8gw · Cited by 1
Nikiforakis, N. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19650-3_1621 · Cited by 1
Leighton, G. M. (2015) · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 452
- Issue
- 7185
- Pages
- 348-351
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2292414
- OpenAlex
- W2113546393
- Cited by
- 718
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 58 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 64 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 123.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- costly punishment, evolution of cooperation, repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, retaliation, reputation, social norms, experimental economics, public goods game, reciprocity
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Female, Game Theory, Humans, Male, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Risk Assessment
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.