Winners don’t punish
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Abstract
A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
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“While punishment can be beneficial to populations by encouraging the emergence of cooperation, its use incurs costs on both the punisher and the punished [13, 14], ultimately reducing the combined reward and overall productivity of the population [33, 51].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [51]
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Adoption of different strategies in diversity-optimized populations promotes cooperation
Sun, L., & Yang, D. (2013) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2013.09.042 · Cited by 4
Proportional cost for punishment enhances spatial reciprocity in evolutionary games
Luo, J.-S., & Zhao, M. (2013) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.016 · Cited by 4
Wang, J., Xu, W., Zhang, X., Zhao, N., & Yu, F. (2022) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2022.128371 · Cited by 4
Intranasal oxytocin interacts with testosterone reactivity to modulate parochial altruism
Cherki, B. R., Winter, E., Mankuta, D., Zerbib, S., & Israel, S. (2024) · Communications Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44271-024-00066-9 · Cited by 4
“However, at the group level, groups com-posedmostlyofaltruistswilloutcompetegroupswhosemembersaremainlyself-interested 8 .”
BackgroundClimate clubs in the laboratory
Casari, M., & Tavoni, A. (2024) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2024.102211 · Cited by 5
Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals
Masuda, N. (2014) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.02.003 · Cited by 5
“For example, some humans are cooperative in the public goods game and others are not (e.g., Fischbacher et al. (2001); Jacquet et al. (2012)), and some punish non-cooperators more than others do (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Dreber et al., 2008).”
BackgroundSpatial modes of cooperation based on bounded rationality
Pan, Q., Wang, L., Shi, R., Wang, H., & He, M. (2014) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2014.07.058 · Cited by 4
“Subsequent studies also considered both complexity of the strategy, such as reward [9–12] or punishment [9,11,13–17] to change the pay-off matrix.”
BackgroundSanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
Matsuzawa, R., & Tanimoto, J. (2018) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2018.03.029 · Cited by 4
Rare Third-Party Punishment Promotes Cooperation in Risk-Averse Social Learning Dynamics
Nakamura, M. (2019) · Frontiers in Physics · doi:10.3389/fphy.2018.00156 · Cited by 5
Cluster evolution in public goods game with fairness mechanism
Zhang, B., Cui, Z., & Yue, X. (2019) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2019.121796 · Cited by 4
Chávez, C. A., Murphy, J. J., & Stranlund, J. K. (2021) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-021-00591-9 · Cited by 4
Selfishness Level of Strategic Games
Apt, K. R., & Schäfer, G. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_2 · Cited by 4
“…to cooperate depends on certain parameters of the underlying game (like group-size, magnitude of payoffs, etc.); see, e.g., Isaac and Walker (1988), Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1996), Goeree and Holt (2001), Becker, Carter, and Naeve (2005), and Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, and Nowak (2008).”
BackgroundHow Does Social Network Position Influence Prosocial Behavior?
FeldmanHall, O. (2017) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.05.005 · Cited by 4
Zhang, J., Zhu, Y., Li, Q., & Chen, Z. (2018) · International Journal of Systems Science · doi:10.1080/00207721.2018.1498554 · Cited by 4
The impact of peer ratings on cooperation: The role of information and cost of rating
Faillo, M., Grieco, D., & Zarri, L. (2019) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/jpet.12384 · Cited by 4
Collaborating with Strangers: How Personal Values Affect Generalized ExchangePreprint
Levine, S. S., & Baker, W. E. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3679618 · Cited by 4
Human Cooperation, Evolution of
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 452
- Issue
- 7185
- Pages
- 348-351
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2292414
- OpenAlex
- W2113546393
- Cited by
- 718
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 58 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 64 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 123.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- costly punishment, evolution of cooperation, repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, retaliation, reputation, social norms, experimental economics, public goods game, reciprocity
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Female, Game Theory, Humans, Male, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Risk Assessment
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Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.