Winners don’t punish
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
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“While punishment can be beneficial to populations by encouraging the emergence of cooperation, its use incurs costs on both the punisher and the punished [13, 14], ultimately reducing the combined reward and overall productivity of the population [33, 51].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [51]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 452
- Issue
- 7185
- Pages
- 348-351
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2292414
- OpenAlex
- W2113546393
- Cited by
- 718
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 58 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 64 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 123.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- costly punishment, evolution of cooperation, repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, retaliation, reputation, social norms, experimental economics, public goods game, reciprocity
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Female, Game Theory, Humans, Male, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Risk Assessment
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