Winners don’t punish
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Abstract
A key aspect of human behaviour is cooperation. We tend to help others even if costs are involved. We are more likely to help when the costs are small and the benefits for the other person significant. Cooperation leads to a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the group. A group does better if everyone cooperates, but each individual is tempted to defect. Recently there has been much interest in exploring the effect of costly punishment on human cooperation. Costly punishment means paying a cost for another individual to incur a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment promotes cooperation even in non-repeated games and without any possibility of reputation effects. But most of our interactions are repeated and reputation is always at stake. Thus, if costly punishment is important in promoting cooperation, it must do so in a repeated setting. We have performed experiments in which, in each round of a repeated game, people choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment. In control experiments, people could only cooperate or defect. Here we show that the option of costly punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average payoff of the group. Furthermore, there is a strong negative correlation between total payoff and use of costly punishment. Those people who gain the highest total payoff tend not to use costly punishment: winners don't punish. This suggests that costly punishment behaviour is maladaptive in cooperation games and might have evolved for other reasons.
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“While punishment can be beneficial to populations by encouraging the emergence of cooperation, its use incurs costs on both the punisher and the punished [13, 14], ultimately reducing the combined reward and overall productivity of the population [33, 51].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [51]
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“For instance, in public goods games, individuals vary in their contributions despite anonymity [66] and do not necessarily defect in the presence of free riders or punish those that contribute little [111].”
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Talbot, C. F., Price, S. A., & Brosnan, S. F. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4939-3216-0_21 · Cited by 27
Competition among networks highlights the power of the weak
Iranzo, J., Buldú, J. M., & Aguirre, J. (2016) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms13273 · Cited by 24
“The emergence of cooperation, defection or altruism can be investigated by linking game theory to network science 9–12 .”
BackgroundThe Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private
Aoyagi, M., Bhaskar, V., & Fréchette, G. R. (2019) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20160304 · Cited by 24
Coevolutionary dynamics of phenotypic diversity and contingent cooperation
Wu, T., Wang, L., & Fu, F. (2017) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005363 · Cited by 24
Information Transmission under the Shadow of the Future: An Experiment
Wilson, A. J., & Vespa, E. (2020) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20170403 · Cited by 27
“Dreber et al. (2008) finds that where costly punishments are used, they do not succeed at supporting better outcomes.”
BackgroundÚbeda, F., & Duéñez‐Guzmán, E. A. (2010) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01194.x · Cited by 27
“Recently, it has been argued that costly punishment is inefficient because even when it increases the amount of cooperation in a social group, it does not increase the mean payoff of its members (Dreber et al. 2008; Ohtsuki et al. 2009).”
BackgroundThe Role of Learning in Punishment, Prosociality, and Human Uniqueness
(2013) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9033.003.0021 · Cited by 33
Efficient Reconstruction of Heterogeneous Networks from Time Series via Compressed Sensing
Ma, L., Han, X., Shen, Z., Wang, W.-X., & Di, Z. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142837 · Cited by 23
Prosocial punishment bots breed social punishment in human players
Shen, C., He, Z., Ши, Л., Wang, Z., & Tanimoto, J. (2024) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2024.0019 · Cited by 27
“For example, the question of whether peer punishment can promote cooperation [12,71], as well as scale-free topologies can promote cooperation compared with a lattice structure [72], and whether introducing peer punishment to networks can promote cooperation [73].”
BackgroundEvolutionary snowdrift game incorporating costly punishment in structured populations
Chan, N. W. H., Xu, C., Tey, S. K., Yap, Y. J., & Hui, P. M. (2012) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2012.07.078 · Cited by 25
Tolerance-based punishment and cooperation in spatial public goods game
Zhang, S., Zhang, Z., Wu, Y., Yan, M. G., & Xie, Y. (2018) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2018.03.036 · Cited by 23
Salahshour, M. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0254860 · Cited by 23
“However, just as cooperation does, altruistic punishment, being costly, goes against an individual’s selfinterest, and its evolution is yet another puzzle [16, 17].”
BackgroundEMOTIONAL STRATEGIES AS CATALYSTS FOR COOPERATION IN SIGNED NETWORKS
Righi, S., & Takács, K. (2014) · Advances in Complex Systems · doi:10.1142/s0219525914500118 · Cited by 24
Ohdaira, T. (2017) · Chaos, Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2016.12.008 · Cited by 21
Deterrence through punishment can resolve collective risk dilemmas in carbon emission games
Jiang, L.-L., Chen, Z., Perc, M., Wang, Z., Kurths, J., & Moreno, Y. (2023) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0147226 · Cited by 21
Costly punishment and cooperation in the evolutionary snowdrift game
Xu, C., Ji, M., Yap, Y. J., Zheng, D., & Hui, P. M. (2011) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.12.044 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 452
- Issue
- 7185
- Pages
- 348-351
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2292414
- OpenAlex
- W2113546393
- Cited by
- 718
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 58 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 64 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 123.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- costly punishment, evolution of cooperation, repeated games, prisoner's dilemma, retaliation, reputation, social norms, experimental economics, public goods game, reciprocity
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Female, Game Theory, Humans, Male, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Risk Assessment
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