The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Open accessAbstract
The paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier (1) has superior information about the cost of the project and (2) invests in cost reduction. The main result states that, under risk neutrality, the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns. This (optimal) contract moves toward a fixed-price contract as the announced cost decreases. An investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate-of-return regulation is studied.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1986-06
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 3, Part 1
- Pages
- 614-641
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1973465190
- Cited by
- 1,206
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 29.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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