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Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life

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Ciaunica, Anna, Safron, Adam, Delafield-Butt, Jonathan · 2021 · Neuroscience of Consciousness
Cited by 77

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Most theoretical and empirical discussions about the nature of consciousness are typically couched in a way that endorses a tacit adult-centric and vision-based perspective. This paper defends the idea that consciousness science may be put on a fruitful track for its next phase by examining the nature of subjective experiences through a bottom-up developmental lens. We draw attention to the intrinsic link between consciousness, experiences and experiencing subjects, which are first and foremost embodied and situated organisms essentially concerned with self-preservation within a precarious environment. Our paper suggests that in order to understand what consciousness ‘is’, one should first tackle the fundamental question: how do embodied experiences ‘arise’ from square one? We then highlight one key yet overlooked aspect of human consciousness studies, namely that the earliest and closest environment of an embodied experiencing subject is the body of another human experiencing subject. We present evidence speaking in favour of fairly sophisticated forms of early sensorimotor integration of bodily signals and self-generated actions already being established in utero. We conclude that these primitive and fundamentally relational and co-embodied roots of our early experiences may have a crucial impact on the way human beings consciously experience the self, body and the world across their lifespan.

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Ciaunica, A., Safron, A., & Delafield-Butt, J.
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Published
2021-01-01
Volume
2021
Issue
2
Pages
niab037-niab037
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3205803144
Cited by
77
References
37
FWCI
7.93
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
gold
Funders
  • Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (PTDC/FER-FIL/4802/2020)
  • Royal Society of Edinburgh

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/nc/niab037
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Ciaunica, A., Safron, A., & Delafield-Butt, J. (2021). Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life. Neuroscience of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niab037

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