Affective Polarization or Partisan Disdain?
Abstract
Recent scholarship suggests that American partisans dislike other party members so much that partisanship has become the main social divide in modern politics. We argue that at least one measure of this “affective polarization” conflates a dislike for members of the other party with a dislike for partisanship in general. The measure asks people how they feel about their child marrying someone from another party. What seems like negative affect toward the other party is, in fact, negative affect toward partisans from either side of the aisle and political discussion in general. Relying on two national experiments, we demonstrate that although some Americans are politically polarized, more simply want to avoid talking about politics. In fact, many people do not want their child to marry someone from their own party if that hypothetical in-law were to discuss politics frequently. Supplementary analyses using ANES feeling thermometers show that inparty feeling thermometer ratings have decreased in recent years among weak and leaning partisans. As a result, the feeling thermometer results confirm the conclusion from the experiments. Polarization is a phenomenon concentrated in the one-third of Americans who consider themselves strong partisans. More individuals are averse to partisan politics. The analyses demonstrate how affective polarization exists alongside weakening partisan identities.
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Opposition to marriage between people of the same party increases when they are informed that the person in question frequently discusses politics.
“Del mismo modo, la oposición al matrimonio entre personas del mismo partido aumenta cuando se les informa que la persona en cuestión discute frecuentemente sobre política.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Klar, Krupnikov y Ryan (2018)
For Klar, Krupnikov and Ryan (2018), social distance measures are not clean measures of affective polarization because they could imply both partisan animosity and mere aversion to politics in general.
“Para Klar, Krupnikov y Ryan (2018), las medidas de distancia social no resultan medidas limpias de polarización afectiva, ya que podrían implicar tanto animosidad partidaria como una mera aversión a la política en general.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Klar, Krupnikov y Ryan (2018)
Klar, Krupnikov and Ryan (2018) found that when respondents are told before the question that the potential spouse lacks political motivation, their dissatisfaction falls notably.
“De hecho, Klar, Krupnikov y Ryan (2018) encontraron que cuando a los encuestados se les dice antes de la pregunta que el posible cónyuge posee falta de motivación política, su insatisfacción cae notoriamente.”
From El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica (2022) · cites this paper as Klar, Krupnikov y Ryan (2018)
When people are asked about their child marrying someone from the opposing party, they assume that partisanship is a salient part of that person's identity.
“When people are asked about their child marrying someone from the opposing party, they assume that partisanship is a salient part of that person's identity.”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Klar et al. 2018
When respondents are told prior to the question that the potential spouse is largely apolitical, their opposition falls sharply.
“When respondents are told prior to the question that the potential spouse is largely apolitical, their opposition falls sharply.”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Klar et al. 2018
Their opposition to same-party marriage rises when they are told the person frequently discusses politics.
“Similarly, their opposition to same-party marriage rises when they are told the person frequently discusses politics.”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Klar et al. 2018
Social distance measures conflate partisan animus and a dislike of politics.
“However, Klar et al. (2018) show that social distance measures conflate partisan animus and a dislike of politics:”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Klar et al. 2018
The critique by Klar et al. (2018) could not explain why these social distance measures have changed over time, unless the desire for political agreement has increased.
“However, the critique by Klar et al. (2018) could not explain why these social distance measures have changed over time, unless the desire for political agreement has increased.”
From The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States (2019) · cites this paper as Klar et al. 2018
People may not necessarily hold negative attitudes towards out-party members in particular, but rather towards any person or group that is highly partisan.
“(It may be that people do not necessarily hold negative attitudes towards out-party members in particular, but rather towards any person or group that is highly partisan54.)”
From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [54]
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The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States
Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 · Cited by 3,317 · see citing works
Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems
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Gidron, N., Adams, J., & Horne, W. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108914123 · Cited by 481 · see citing works
Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts
Jost, J. T., Baldassarri, D. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00093-5 · Cited by 276 · see citing works
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Política, uso de medios y polarización afectiva en España
Crespo-Martínez, I., Melero-López, I., Mora-Rodríguez, A., & Rojo-Martínez, J.-M. (2024) · Revista Mediterránea de Comunicación · doi:10.14198/medcom.26681 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
El estudio de la polarización afectiva: una mirada metodológica
Freidin, E., Moro, R., & Silenzi, M. I. (2022) · REVISTA SAAP · doi:10.46468/rsaap.16.1.a2 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2026) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.70152 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., & Ryan, J. B.
- Affiliations
- University of Arizona (US)
- Stony Brook University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Ryan, John Barry
- Venue
- Public Opinion Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2018
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 379-390
- ISSN
- 0033-362X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5331
- OpenAlex
- W2804662890
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 40 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 94.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Public Opinion Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- affective polarization, feeling thermometers
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