Them’ without ‘us’: Negative identities and affective polarization in Brazil
Open accessAbstract
High levels of hostility between those on opposing sides of politics have led to a burgeoning literature on the concept of affective polarization. Though a globally widespread phenomenon, extant literature has generated theoretical expectations and empirical findings mostly inspired by the United States and Western Europe. By studying the case of Brazil, I argue and show that traditional explanations do not provide satisfactory accounts of affective polarization in contexts where politics is only weakly structured by ideology or partisan attachments. I argue and show that in such contexts the concept of negative political identities can provide a much better explanation for why politics is so divisive. Using both the 2014 and 2018 waves of the Brazilian Electoral Studies (BES) and independently collected survey data (N = 1732), I provide robust empirical findings supporting the primacy of negative political identities over traditional explanations. Negative identification with the out-party/leader has a strong effect on dislike towards out-voters even when controlling for instrumental evaluations of political elites. This paper contributes to the comparative research agenda on affective polarization outside Western contexts, as well as to the study of negative political identities.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that affective polarization in Brazil is driven less by ideology or positive partisan identities than by negative political identities—rejection of the opposing party or leader. Using BES 2014/2018 and an original online survey, it finds negative identification strongly predicts out-voter dislike even when controlling for out-party dislike.
Key findings
- Negative identification with the out-party/leader strongly predicts out-voter dislike: a one-standard-deviation increase raises out-voter dislike by 0.86 points on an 11-point scale (p = 0.000); across its interquartile range, it raises dislike by 1.29 points. Its effect is significantly stronger than positive identification (F = 8.73).
- Traditional explanations perform poorly: the full BES model has adjusted R² = 0.08; ideological distance across its interquartile range changes out-party dislike by only 0.3 points (0.10 SD), and issue constraint is minimal and statistically insignificant. In the online survey, adjusted R² rises from 0.13 in the base model to 0.40 when negative identification is added, and 0.42 in the full model.
- Negative identities are more prevalent than positive ones: 53% of Bolsonaro voters agreed they would describe themselves as “anti-PT,” while 19% described themselves as bolsonaristas; 88% of PT voters described themselves as “anti-Bolsonaro,” but only 8% as petistas.
- Out-party dislike correlates only 0.56 with out-partisan dislike and 0.45 with out-voter dislike, supporting the paper’s distinction between elite-directed and citizen-directed hostility. Social sorting is significant in the BES model (p = 0.03) but not in the survey model (p = 0.09).
Methods
- Design: tests traditional affective-polarization explanations against negative political identities in Brazil, using the 2014 and 2018 waves of the Brazilian Electoral Study (BES) and an independently collected online survey fielded in April–May 2020.
- Data: BES final analytic sample is 2,870 respondents; the online survey is reported as N = 1,732 in the abstract and 1,728 in the data section, with the main survey model using N = 865. The online sample skews male, white, higher income, higher education, and younger.
- Analysis: OLS models with sample weights. The BES dependent variable is reverse-coded out-party affect; the online survey dependent variable is out-voter dislike. Predictors include ideological distance, party-issue constraint, social sorting, and positive/negative identity scales; models control for out-party affect. Factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis assess the identity scales.
Limitations
- Stated: ideology measures infer distance and alignment from aggregate positions rather than directly exposing respondents to opposing views; social sorting uses objective demographics rather than subjective identification; the online sample’s skew cannot be fully corrected, so findings might be driven by high-socioeconomic-status respondents; future work should use experiments and study media effects.
- Evident: the online survey is nonrepresentative—90% had some tertiary education versus 28% in BES 2018, and only 23% reported voting for Bolsonaro versus the actual 55% vote share. The text also reports inconsistent online survey Ns (1,732 vs. 1,728).
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 73 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
Traditional explanations for affective polarization perform particularly poorly in the Brazilian context.
“I show that these lines of explanation perform particularly poorly in the Brazilian context.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
“traditional explanations do not provide satisfactory accounts of affective polarization in contexts where politics is only weakly structured by ideology or partisan attachments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Abstract · plain
- Findingown data
Negative identification with the out-party/leader has a strong effect on dislike towards out-voters even when controlling for instrumental evaluations of political elites.
“Negative identification with the out-party/leader has a strong effect on dislike towards out-voters even when controlling for instrumental evaluations of political elites.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
These negative identities are the primary mechanism through which Brazilians dislike their fellow citizens.
“and that these negative identities are the primary mechanism through which Brazilians dislike their fellow citizens.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A deep rejection of the opposing side's party/leader constitutes a prevalent form of social identity (e.g. antipetista and antibolsonarista).
“I show that a deep rejection of the the opposing side's party/leader constitutes a prevalent form of social identity (e.g. antipetista and antibolsonarista)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the single-item PID/NID model, negative identification had a statistically significant stronger effect than positive identification on out-voter dislike (F = 8.73).
“Negative identification still returned a stronger effect (, p = 0.000) than positive identification (, p = 0.01), which was confirmed by a robust F-test for the difference in coefficients between these two variables.”
- Also stated in: § Results · boosted
“The results confirm that negative identification has a statistically significant stronger effect size on out-voter dislike, in line with Hypothesis 3 (F = 8.73, ).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Results · boosted
- Findingown data
Interacting education with all independent variables in the BES model yields no statistically significant effects.
“I address this issue by interacting education with all independent variables inserted into the following BES model (i.e. ideological distance, issue constraint, social sorting and partisanship strength), and find no statistically significant effects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Brazilians do not seem to like or identify with their own 'side' to any significant degree.
“Similarly, Brazilians do not seem to like or identify with their own ‘side’ to any significant degree.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the main survey model with the 'noisy' PID scale, the effect of negative identities on affective polarization is stronger than that of positive identification.
“While this is obviously the case in the main survey model with the ‘noisy’ PID scale, I further analyse the model that uses only the single-item PID and NID measures.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Even in the BES model the effect of ideological distance is substantively small: varying ideological distance across its interquartile range only increases the predicted value of out-party dislike by 0.3 points on the 11-point affective scale, or 0.10 standard deviations.
“Whilst these results are inconclusive, even in the BES model the effect of ideological distance is substantively small. Varying ideological distance across its interquartile range (i.e. 25th to 75th percentile) whilst holding every other variable at their mean only increases the predicted value of out-party dislike by 0.3 points in the 11-point affective scale, or 0.10 standard deviations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In an alternative model using only the fourth items from the NID and PID scales, positive identification returns a statistically significant association with out-voter dislike (p = 0.000).
“In this model, positive identification returns a statistically significant association with out-voter dislike (, p = 0.000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
PT voters consistently return lower affective evaluations of their political out-group, regardless of self-reported levels of political interest.
“Additionally, PT voters consistently return lower affective evaluations of their political out-group, regardless of self-reported levels of political interest.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The full BES model has an adjusted R2 of 0.08, meaning 8% of variation in affective polarization is explained by its predictors.
“The full BES model, which tests hypotheses related to ideology and (positive) social identities, returns an adjusted- of only 0.08, meaning that only 8% of the variation in affective polarization can be explained by the predictors (accounting for the number of predictors inserted into the model).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Adding the PID measure to the baseline model increases adjusted R2 to 0.21.
“Adding the PID measure to the baseline model increases the adjusted- to 0.21.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Brazilians disliked their out-party significantly more than Americans did in 2016.
“It is noteworthy that even this imperfect party-based measure still manages to capture the significant rise in out-group hostility at the 2018 elections, with Brazilians disliking their out-party significantly more than Americans did in 2016.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Initial results from both models do not find evidence that a strong sense of identification with one's in-party predicts higher levels of out-group hostility.
“Initial results from both models do not find evidence for this hypothesis, which was tested via a partisanship strength variable (BES) and the Partisan Identity Scale (Online Survey).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Across its interquartile range, negative identification increases out-voter dislike by 1.29 points, almost equal to a full standard deviation on the outcome variable.
“Across its interquartile range, negative identification increases out-voter dislike by 1.29 points, almost equal to a full standard deviation on the outcome variable ()”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The strong effect of negative identification on out-voter dislike remains in a model using only the single 'I would describe myself as anti [out-party]' item.
“However, in a model foreshadowed above where only the single ‘I would describe myself as anti [out-party]’ item is used, this strong effect remains.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Negative political identity returns a strong and statistically significant association with out-voter dislike: a one standard deviation increase in negative identification increases out-voter dislike by 0.86 on the 11-point dislike scale (p = 0.000).
“The key independent variable in the main survey model, negative political identity, returns a strong and statistically significant association with out-voter dislike. A one standard deviation increase in negative identification increases out-voter dislike by 0.86 on the 11-point dislike scale (p = 0.000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A sense of negative identification with one's out-party or leader is significantly and substantively correlated with high levels of dislike towards out-voters.
“A sense of negative identification with one's out-party or leader is significantly and substantively correlated with high levels of dislike towards out-voters.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The eigen decomposition procedure suggested the existence of 2 separate factors that account for the variation in the eight identity items.
“In the first step, the eigen decomposition procedure suggested the existence of 2 separate factors that account for the variation in the eight items.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Once PID is included in the model with negative identification, there is no change in adjusted R2.
“Once PID is included in this model, there is no change in the adjusted-.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Adding negative identification to the base model without PID results in adjusted R2 of 0.40.
“More importantly, however, is that adding negative identification to the base model (i.e. without PID) results in a much higher adjusted- of 0.40.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The survey base model has an adjusted R2 of 0.13.
“The 0.13 adjusted- indicates that, even without partisanship, this iteration outperforms the BES model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Negative identities can emerge out of an independent and primary sense of differentiation from an out-group in the absence of in-group belonging.
“In the absence of in-group belonging, however, negative identities can emerge out of an independent and primary sense of differentiation from an out-group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Negative political identities can exert strong independent effects on political behaviour.
“and can exert strong independent effects on political behaviour.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Bolsonaro's extreme policies and rash populist rhetoric can foster a need for distinctiveness even amongst voters who did not particularly like the PT or the political left.
“Bolsonaro's extreme policies and rash populist rhetoric can foster a need for distinctiveness even amongst voters who did not particularly like the PT or the political left (and thus lack any clear in-group).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Bischof and Wagner (2019)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Gidron et al. (forthcoming)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Meléndez and Kaltwasser (2021) source
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- Interpretationcitation
Negative partisanship is particularly important for understanding political attitudes in Eastern Europe and several Latin American countries, contexts in which positive identification with parties is low and political competition is often dichotomized.
“Negative partisanship is particularly important for understanding political attitudes in Eastern Europe (Rose and Mishler 1998) and several Latin American countries (Haime and Cantú 2022), contexts in which positive identification with parties is low and political competition is often dichotomized.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Mainstream explanations, based on ideology and in-group attachment, are unlikely to produce a satisfactory account of the roots of affective polarization in Brazil.
“In short, mainstream explanations, based on ideology and in-group attachment, are unlikely to produce a satisfactory account of the roots of affective polarization in Brazil.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Negative identities are likely to have significant effects on out-group hostility.
“Since negative identities are primarily informed by one's need to differentiate oneself from a particular group, they are likely to have significant effects on out-group hostility (Leonardelli and Toh 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Leonardelli and Toh 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Both positive and negative party attachments in Brazil have long revolved around the PT.
“As Samuels and Zucco (2018) argue, both positive and negative party attachments in Brazil have long revolved around the PT”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018 source
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- Premisecitation
As citizens turn away from parties, negative political identities are an increasingly important factor structuring political competition both in new and advanced democracies alike.
“As citizens turn away from parties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002), negative political identities are an increasingly important factor structuring political competition both in new (Haime and Cantú 2022) and advanced democracies alike (Bankert 2021).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Dalton and Wattenberg 2002
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Haime and Cantú 2022 source
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- cites Bankert 2021
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- Interpretationown data
Brazilians dislike 'them' even without a clearly defined sense of 'us'.
“indicating that Brazilians dislike ‘them’ even without a clearly defined sense of ‘us’.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Brazilian politics is only weakly structured by ideology.
“Brazilian politics is only weakly structured by ideology (Oliveira and Turgeon 2015)”
- Also stated in: § Traditional explanations for affective polarization · plain
“Political competition in Brazil, however, is only weakly structured by ideological considerations”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Oliveira and Turgeon 2015 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Also stated in: § Traditional explanations for affective polarization · plain
- Interpretationreasoning
The high salience of their out-party fostered a need for distinctiveness, the bases of negative identity formation.
“The high salience of their out-party, in turn, fostered a need for distinctiveness, the bases of negative identity formation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Negative identities have a higher effect than positive ones in fostering negative feelings towards individuals associated with the out-group label.
“Zhong et al. (2008) find that negative identities have a higher effect than positive ones in fostering negative feelings towards individuals associated with the out-group label.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zhong et al. 2008 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
An anti-Bolsonaro identity is not dependent on prior attachment to the PT.
“An anti-Bolsonaro identity, however, is not dependent on prior attachment to the PT.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
A strong rejection of the 'other side's' party or figurehead acts as a significant driver of out-group hostility.
“and acts as a significant driver of out-group hostility.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The Brazilian party system is weakly institutionalized.
“The Brazilian party system is weakly institutionalized (Mainwaring et al. 2018)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mainwaring et al. 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
The Populist Radical-Right party family has the highest number of negative identifiers in Western Europe.
“Indeed, Meléndez and Kaltwasser (2021) have recently shown that the Populist Radical-Right party family has the highest number of negative identifiers in Western Europe.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Meléndez and Kaltwasser (2021) source
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- Premisenone given
A strong rejection of the 'other side's' party or figurehead constitutes a meaningful form of social identity.
“I posit that a strong rejection of the ‘other side's’ party or figurehead constitutes a meaningful form of social identity”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Far-right parties can motivate individuals to signal their disapproval for their extreme policies and discourse, fostering a need for differentiation.
“Bischof and Wagner (2019), for instance, argue that far-right parties can motivate individuals to signal their disapproval for their extreme policies and discourse, fostering a need for differentiation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bischof and Wagner (2019)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
There is no direct measure of negative identities in any existing dataset, aside from Bankert (2021)'s study.
“Bankert (2021)'s study aside, there is no such measure in any existing dataset, and works on negative partisanship have either used like/dislike scales or question-items indicating which party a respondent would never vote for.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bankert (2021)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Negative political identities emerge independently out of a strong rejection of the opposing side's party or political figurehead.
“Negative political identities emerge independently out of a strong rejection of the opposing side's party or political figurehead”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Partisan attachments in Brazil are primarily connected to leaders' personal appeals and party performance rather than a strong sense of identification.
“Partisan attachments are primarily connected to leaders' personal appeals and party performance rather than a strong sense of identification (Baker et al. 2016)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Baker et al. 2016
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Brazil is one of many potential cases where affective polarization may be better understood through the lenses of negative partisanship rather than strong in-group attachments or ideological disagreements.
“Therefore, rather than acting as a unique example, Brazil is one of many potential cases where affective polarization may be better understood through the lenses of negative partisanship rather than strong in-group attachments or ideological disagreements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Stable partisan identities have largely failed to take root in Brazil.
“stable partisan identities have largely failed to take root (Samuels and Zucco 2018)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018 source
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- Premisecitation
Ideological self-placement is highly endogenous to presidential candidate affect.
“past research has consistently found ideological self-placement to be highly endogenous to presidential candidate affect (e.g. Baker et al. 2016; Borges and Vidigal 2018)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Baker et al. 2016
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- cites Borges and Vidigal 2018 source
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- Premisecitation
Antipetismo is not primarily grounded in ideological beliefs.
“not to be primarily grounded in ideological beliefs (Ribeiro, Carreirão, and Borba 2016; Samuels and Zucco 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Positive and negative identities may emerge 'symbiotically', with the prevalence of the former informing the latter.
“Following Samuels and Zucco (2018)'s argument, positive and negative identities may emerge ‘symbiotically’, with the prevalence of the former informing the latter.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018 source
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- Interpretationreasoning
The social sorting mechanism is unlikely to be a substantive driver of out-group hostility in Brazil.
“the social sorting mechanism is unlikely to be a substantive driver of out-group hostility in Brazil.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Individuals can define themselves negationally, in terms of who they are not, even if no prior in-group identification is present.
“Zhong et al. (2008), however, argue that individuals can also define themselves negationally, in terms of who they are not, even if no prior in-group identification is present.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zhong et al. 2008 source
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- Premisecitation
Antipetismo is a strong rejection of the centre-left PT, in structuring voters' behaviour.
“scholars have long emphasized the relevance of antipetismo, a strong rejection of the centre-left PT, in structuring voters' behaviour.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018 source
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- Premisecitation
Antipetismo acts as a source for perceptual bias and motivated reasoning.
“it has been shown to act as a source for perceptual bias and motivated reasoning (Samuels and Zucco 2018)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018 source
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- Interpretationcitation
The rise of negative partisanship in Western Europe and the United States suggests negative partisanship can exert independent effects on political behaviour even in more established, high-partisan polities.
“Further, the rise of negative partisanship in Western Europe (Meléndez and Kaltwasser 2021) and the United States (Abramowitz and Webster 2016) suggests negative partisanship can exert independent effects on political behaviour even in more established, high-partisan polities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Brazilian parties lack clear linkages with distinct social groups.
“parties lack clear linkages with distinct social groups (Zucco and Power 2020)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Zucco and Power 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisenone given
Works on negative partisanship have either used like/dislike scales or question-items indicating which party a respondent would never vote for.
“Bankert (2021)'s study aside, there is no such measure in any existing dataset, and works on negative partisanship have either used like/dislike scales or question-items indicating which party a respondent would never vote for.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Negative political identities can indeed be reliably measured through survey items, much like their positive counterpart.
“This suggests that negative political identities can indeed be reliably measured through survey items, much like their positive counterpart.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Disliking the other side can act as an important motivation for political participation.
“Disliking the other side can act as an important motivation for political participation (Caruana, McGregor, and Stephenson 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Caruana, McGregor, and Stephenson 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationcitation
The effects of negative identities are not restricted to a mere dislike of the out-group.
“The effects of these negative identities are not restricted to a mere dislike of the out-group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Bankert 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Spoon and Kanthak 2019 source
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- Study design and conductown data
The online survey sample is skewed in terms of 2018 vote choice: only 23% (n = 289) of reported valid votes went towards Jair Bolsonaro, in contrast to the actual 55% vote share at the election.
“The sample is also skewed in terms of 2018 vote choice, with only 23% (n = 289) of reported valid votes going towards Jair Bolsonaro (in contrast to the actual 55% vote share at the election).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Negative identities can hamper satisfaction with democracy when the opposition is in power.
“Past research has shown that negative identities can hamper cross-party cooperation (Bankert 2021) and satisfaction with democracy when the opposition is in power (Spoon and Kanthak 2019), spelling a worrying future for the quality and stability of Brazilian democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Spoon and Kanthak 2019 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The BES model does very poorly in accounting for affective polarization in Brazil.
“Put simply, the BES does very poorly in accounting for affective polarization in Brazil.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The BES and Online Survey models are comparable enough for their adjusted R2 values to be meaningfully compared despite different operationalizations of the dependent variable and possible sample bias.
- Interpretationown data
Negative identification has by far the strongest explanatory value in predicting affective polarization in Brazil.
“In sum, negative identification has by far the strongest explanatory value in predicting affective polarization in Brazil.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
These findings highlight the weak explanatory power of ideology-based mechanisms in explaining affective polarization in Brazil.
“Put together, these findings highlight the weak explanatory power of ideology-based mechanisms in explaining affective polarization in Brazil.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Explanations widely applied to the United States and Western Europe cannot satisfactorily account for why Brazilians of different sides of politics feel hostile towards each other.
“The findings presented here suggest that explanations widely applied to the contexts of the United States and Western Europe cannot satisfactorily account for why Brazilians of different side of politics feel hostile towards each other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Negatively identifying with the out-party/leader increases out-voter dislike even when accounting for an instrumental dislike of one's out-party/leader.
“This result suggests that negatively identifying with the out-party/leader increases out-voter dislike even when accounting for an instrumental dislike of one's out-party/leader.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Positive political identities do play a role in fostering affective polarization in Brazil.
“In line with Hypothesis 2a, this alternative model suggest that positive political identities do play a role in fostering affective polarization in Brazil.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning
Though unrepresentative of the Brazilian population, the survey data should allow for relatively robust tests of the mechanisms under analysis.
“In sum, though unrepresentative of the Brazilian population, the survey data should allow for relatively robust tests of the mechanisms under analysis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Hating 'the other' is only weakly related to how much Brazilians like their own side.
“After remaining mostly constant between 2002 and 2014, out-party ratings plummeted in 2018 whilst in-party ratings saw no significant changes, serving as further circumstantial evidence that hating ‘the other’ is only weakly related to how much Brazilians like their own side.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Out-party cues can be just as strong as in-party cues in influencing individuals' policy views.
“In addition, out-party cues can be just as strong as in-party cues in influencing individuals' policy views (Samuels and Zucco 2018), such that negative identities can mirror partisan attachments (Levendusky 2010) in inducing greater constraint in the ideologically inconsistent Brazilian electorate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018 source
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- Interpretationown data
The evidence presented here tentatively points towards negative political identities as a still overlooked and underdeveloped concept in political science.
“The evidence presented here tentatively points towards a still overlooked and underdeveloped concept in political science: negative political identities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Negative identities are a much better explanation for affective polarization in Brazil than explanations following from mainstream hypotheses.
“Given the weak explanatory power of other independent variables, these results strongly suggest that negative identities are, indeed, a much better explanation for affective polarization in Brazil than those following from mainstream hypotheses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning
The weighting procedure cannot satisfactorily account for sample bias introduced by the high baseline levels of education in the sample.
“This does mean that the weighting procedure cannot satisfactorily account for sample bias introduced by the high baseline levels of education in my sample.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductown data
The effects of negative identities on out-group hostility are robust to several different specifications and a hard set of controls.
“Though robust to several different specifications and a hard set of controls, the effects of negative identities on out-group hostility can be better assessed by, for instance, priming subjects' need for distinctiveness through an experiment, with a view to both confirming the mechanism and causally testing its effects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Inter-citizen hostility is only moderately captured by affective ratings of political elites.
“In other words, inter-citizen hostility is only moderately captured by affective ratings of political elites.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
To the extent that ideology does drive out-group hostility, this seems to happen not via respondents' alignment with their own 'side', but rather through being distant from 'the other'.
“To the extent that ideology does drive out-group hostility, this seems to happen not via respondents' alignment with their own ‘side’, but rather through being distant from ‘the other’.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Negative identities can hamper cross-party cooperation.
“Past research has shown that negative identities can hamper cross-party cooperation (Bankert 2021) and satisfaction with democracy when the opposition is in power (Spoon and Kanthak 2019), spelling a worrying future for the quality and stability of Brazilian democracy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bankert 2021
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationown data
At least when other variables and demographics are controlled for, highly educated individuals do not behave any differently when it comes to the hypothesized relationships.
“This indicates that, at least when other variables and demographics are controlled for, highly educated individuals do not behave any differently when it comes to the hypothesized relationships.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
From Brazil to Poland, from Kenya to India, political divides are becoming increasingly hostile.
“From Brazil to Poland, from Kenya to India, political divides are becoming increasingly hostile (Carothers and O'Donohue 2019).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Carothers and O'Donohue 2019 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Negative identities can mirror partisan attachments in inducing greater constraint in the ideologically inconsistent Brazilian electorate.
“In addition, out-party cues can be just as strong as in-party cues in influencing individuals' policy views (Samuels and Zucco 2018), such that negative identities can mirror partisan attachments (Levendusky 2010) in inducing greater constraint in the ideologically inconsistent Brazilian electorate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Levendusky 2010 source
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The survey base model outperforms the BES model even without partisanship.
“The 0.13 adjusted- indicates that, even without partisanship, this iteration outperforms the BES model.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The BES and Online Survey models are comparable enough for their adjusted R2 values to be meaningfully compared despite different operationalizations of the dependent variable and possible sample bias.
- Premisecitation
Second-round voting captures the most relevant lines of political competition in Brazil, pitting the centre-left PT against right-wing and centre-right competitors since 1989.
“Second-round voting captures the most relevant lines of political competition in Brazil, pitting the centre-left PT against right-wing and centre-right competitors since 1989 (Mello and Spektor 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mello and Spektor 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
- May combine two claims. 49
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 24
The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataThe effects of negative identities far surpass those of ideological disagreements and in-group attachments.
“Further, the effects of negative identities far surpass those of ideological disagreements and in-group attachments”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataSocially sorted individuals display higher levels of affective polarization in the BES model (p = 0.03), though in the survey model the coefficient is substantively large but not statistically significant (p = 0.09).
“This is indeed the case in the BES model (, p = 0.03), though in the survey model the coefficient is substantively large but not statistically significant (, p = 0.09).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor PT voters, 88% described themselves as 'anti-Bolsonaro', but only 8% as petistas.
“For PT voters, 88% described themselves as ‘anti-Bolsonaro’, but only 8% as petistas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataBoth the positive and negative identity scales returned scalability scores above conventional 0.6 cut-off points, with NID presenting a slightly higher coefficient than the tried-and-tested PID.
“Both the positive and negative identity scales returned scalability scores above conventional 0.6 cut-off points, with NID even presenting a slightly higher coefficient than the tried-and-tested PID.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe effects of issue constraint (Hypothesis 1b) in both models is minimal and statistically insignificant.
“Further, the effects of issue constraint (Hypothesis 1b) in both models is minimal and statistically insignificant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataRemoving items 2 and 3 from the PID scale returns a two-factor model with both RMSEA and RMSR below 0.08, and Tucker Lewis and Comparative Fit Indices above 0.95.
“Removing items 2 and 3 from the PID scale, however, returns a two-factor model with both RMSEA and RMSR below 0.08, and Tucker Lewis and Comparative Fit Indices above 0.95 (see Table A10).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOut-party dislike is correlated at only 0.56 with out-partisan dislike, and even lower at 0.45 with out-voter dislike.
“Out-party dislike, the traditional measure of affective polarization in extant literature, is correlated at only 0.56 with out-partisan dislike, and even lower at 0.45 with out-voter dislike.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe second and third PID items had slightly stronger factor loadings on the 'negative' dimension and had generally weaker loadings altogether, suggesting a poor fit with the proposed factors.
“Conversely, the second and third PID items in Table 1 had slightly stronger factor loadings on the ‘negative’ dimension and had generally weaker loadings altogether, suggesting a poor fit with the proposed factors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationRespondents clearly differentiated between voters, partisans and parties, with out-voters receiving higher affective scores.
“In line with Druckman and Levendusky (2019) and Kingzette (2021), respondents clearly differentiated between voters, partisans and parties, with out-voters receiving higher affective scores.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Druckman and Levendusky (2019) source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kingzette (2021)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe eight-item, two-dimensional model overperforms a one-dimensional model through a confirmatory factor analysis but does not meet conventional measures of model fit.
“This eight-item, two-dimensional model overperforms a one-dimensional model through a confirmatory factor analysis (see Table 2) but does not meet conventional measures of model fit.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the BES model, the association between ideological distance and affective polarization is statistically significant (p = 0.000), but in the opposite direction and without reaching statistical significance in the survey model (p = 0.36).
“In the BES model this association is statistically significant (, p = 0.000), but in the opposite direction and without reaching statistical significance in the survey model (, p = 0.36).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAfter remaining mostly constant between 2002 and 2014, out-party ratings plummeted in 2018 whilst in-party ratings saw no significant changes.
“After remaining mostly constant between 2002 and 2014, out-party ratings plummeted in 2018 whilst in-party ratings saw no significant changes, serving as further circumstantial evidence that hating ‘the other’ is only weakly related to how much Brazilians like their own side.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe full model adds the out-party dislike variable and results in a final adjusted R2 of 0.42.
“Finally, the full model adds the out-party dislike variable, which served as a hard constraint on negative identification, resulting in the final adjusted- of 0.42.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the model using only single-item PID and NID measures, both positive and negative identification were statistically and substantively significant predictors of affective polarization.
“In this model both variables were statistically and substantively significant in predicting affective polarization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data53% of Bolsonaro voters agreed or heavily agreed that they would describe themselves as 'anti-PT', and around 19% described themselves as bolsonaristas.
“More importantly, 53% of Bolsonaro voters agreed or heavily agreed that they would describe themselves as ‘anti-PT’, and around 19% described themselves as bolsonaristas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIdeological distance, alignment between ideology and party of choice, and social divisions are only inconsistently associated with affective polarization and provide very little explanatory power.
“Ideological distance, alignment between ideology and party of choice, and social divisions are only inconsistently associated with affective polarization, providing very little explanatory power.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationBrazil displays none of the features of highly institutionalized party systems, programmatic patterns of political competition, strong linkages between social groups and political parties, and entrenched and stable partisan identities.
“Like most of Latin American (Kitschelt et al. 2010) and Eastern European (Rose and Mishler 1998) countries, Brazil displays none of the above features.”
- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
“Such contexts are characterized by highly institutionalized party systems (Dalton and Weldon 2007), programmatic patterns of political competition (Kitschelt 2000), strong linkages between social groups and political parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), and entrenched and stable partisan identities (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationNegative information may exert greater effect on attitudes than positive information.
“a vast literature on the concept of negativity bias (e.g. Soroka 2014) suggests negative information may exert greater effect on attitudes than positive information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Soroka 2014 source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationBrazilian parties derive their support from pork-barrel politics, leader's evaluations, clientelism, or the state of the economy.
“with parties deriving their support from pork-barrel politics (Ibid.), leader's evaluations (Baker et al. 2016), clientelism (Mainwaring 1999), or the state of the economy (see Carreirão and Renno 2018 for a review).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Mainwaring et al. 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Baker et al. 2016
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Mainwaring 1999 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe number of partisans in Brazil has been unstable and comparatively low, reaching 50% of the electorate in its peak, but generally hovering at around 30%.
“Firstly, the number of partisans in Brazil has been unstable and comparatively low, reaching 50% of the electorate in its peak, but generally hovering at around 30% (Samuels and Zucco 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe strength of negative political identities amongst the Brazilian electorate bespeaks an increasingly hostile and uncompromising polity.
“The strength of negative political identities amongst the Brazilian electorate bespeaks an increasingly hostile and uncompromising polity”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningIt would be pure tautology to show that 'never voting for a party' is associated with negative feelings towards that party.
“Since it would be pure tautology to show that ‘never voting for a party’ is associated with negative feelings towards that party, we also need to operationalize affective polarization as hostility towards other citizens.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe PT's electoral success and deliberate efforts to cultivate a clear brand made it a clear and salient party to either like or dislike.
“as the party's electoral success and deliberate efforts to cultivate a clear brand made it a clear and salient party to either like or dislike.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNon-supporters of the PT lacked any clear party to belong to and thus could not satisfy their need for in-group belonging.
“This meant that non-supporters of the PT lacked any clear party to belong to and thus could not satisfy their need for in-group belonging.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThrough a need for distinctiveness, Brazilians 'negatively identify' with the party/leader that symbolizes the 'other side' of politics, which is theorized to have strong effects on out-group hostility.
“Through a need for distinctiveness, Brazilians ‘negatively identify’ with the party/leader that symbolizes the ‘other side’ of politics, which is theorized to have strong effects on out-group hostility.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPolitical parties in Brazil have seldom tried to convey group-based appeals and have been largely unsuccessful when they did try, resulting in heterogeneous social bases of support without clear linkages with specific social groups.
“Political parties have seldom tried to convey group-based appeals and have been largely unsuccessful when they did try, resulting in rather heterogeneous social bases of support without clear linkages with specific social groups (Mainwaring 1999).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mainwaring 1999 source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationPartisan attachments in Brazil are not widespread nor linked to politicized social identities.
“This is not the case in Brazil, however, where partisan attachments are not widespread nor linked to politicized social identities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationRadical-right parties in Western Europe tend to be more disliked than their ideological extremism would predict.
“Similarly, Gidron et al. (forthcoming) show that radical-right parties in Western Europe tend to be more disliked than their ideological extremism would predict.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gidron et al. (forthcoming)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe notion of a clear and recent bolsonarista identity is far more concrete, laying the grounds for a negative antibolsonarista social identity.
“The notion of a clear and recent bolsonarista identity, however, is far more concrete (Rennó 2020), laying the grounds for a negative antibolsonarista social identity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rennó 2020 source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThere exists an 'out-group-only' categorization, where an individual perceives a cohesive group as 'the other' to which she does not belong, without a corresponding in-group.
“Leonardelli and Toh (2015) argue for the existence of an ‘out-group-only’ categorization, where an individual perceives a cohesive group as ‘the other’ to which she does not belong, without a corresponding in-group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Leonardelli and Toh 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBrazilian partisans are few in quantity and low in terms of social identification, making partisanship an unlikely explanation for out-group hostility in the country.
“In other words, Brazilian partisans are few in quantity and low in terms of social identification, making partisanship an unlikely explanation for out-group hostility in the country.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPT sympathizers or left-leaning Brazilians lacked a clear out-group, since no other mainstream party cultivated a partisan base to stand in contrast to that of the PT.
“I argue that this was due to a lack of a clear out-group for PT sympathizers or left-leaning Brazilians, since no other mainstream party cultivated a partisan base to stand in contrast to that of the PT.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenContextual political factors - such as lack of efforts on the part of elites to develop partisan identification, non-programmatic political competition, extreme policies and divisive rhetoric - can make in-group belonging less likely for a significant portion of voters, whilst at the same time fostering a need for these individuals to distance themselves from relevant political actors.
“Contextual political factors — such as lack of efforts on the part of elites to develop partisan identification, non-programmatic political competition, extreme policies and divisive rhetoric — can make in-group belonging less likely for a significant portion of voters, whilst at the same time fostering a need for these individuals to distance themselves from relevant political actors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationSocial cleavages in Brazil have not been strongly articulated into politics, nor properly mobilized by political actors.
“these cleavages have not been strongly articulated into politics, neither have they been properly mobilized by political actors (Samuels and Zucco 2014a).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2014a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationBrazilians lack a basic understanding of left and right and show low levels of issue constraint.
“Similarly, Brazilians are said to lack a basic understanding of left and right and to show low levels of issue constraint (Ames and Smith 2010; Kearney and Machado 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationThe rise in the number of 'far-right' Brazilians might be an artefact of a growing identification with Jair Bolsonaro rather than a meaningful change in ideological beliefs.
“such that the rise in the number of ‘far-right’ Brazilians might be an artefact of a growing identification with Jair Bolsonaro rather than a meaningful change in ideological beliefs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThere is little ideological differentiation between partisan camps in Brazil, with issue positions being only weakly related to vote choice or party affect.
“several past studies (e.g. Borges and Vidigal 2018; Oliveira and Turgeon 2015) have found little ideological differentiation between partisan camps, with issue positions being only weakly (if at all) related to vote choice or party affect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Borges and Vidigal 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Oliveira and Turgeon 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBrazilians seem to dislike 'them' without having or particularly liking any clearly defined 'us'.
“Whilst affective polarization is often framed as a battle between ‘us’ versus ‘them’, Brazilians seem to dislike ‘them’ without having or particularly liking any clearly defined ‘us’.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe case of Brazil suggests that factors such as weak party system institutionalization, non-programmatic and dichotomized competition, and low levels of political trust may foster the formation of negative identities.
“Further, the case of Brazil suggests that factors such as weak party system institutionalization, non-programmatic and dichotomized competition, and low levels of political trust may foster the formation of negative identities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningReversing the PID scale items to measure negative identification makes the measures directly comparable and allows for a robust test of their independent effects.
“Firstly, it makes the measures directly comparable and thus allows for a robust test of their independent effects (see Hypothesis 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataThe final analytic sample for BES consisted of 2870 respondents.
“The final analytic sample consisted of 2870 respondents.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenThe measurement approach taken to assess the effects of ideology-based explanations infers both distance and alignment from aggregate measures, and does not directly expose individuals to different views held by their fellow citizens.
“The measurement approach taken to assess the effects of ideology-based explanations infers both distance and alignment from aggregate measures, and does not directly expose individuals to different views held by their fellow citizens.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataResults from the BES model provide a more robust test of social sorting, and the significant effect of social sorting is in line with the increased demographic polarization found by Layton et al. (2021).
“Results from the BES model provide a more robust test of this particular variable, and the significant effect of social sorting is in line with the increased demographic polarization found by Layton et al. (2021).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Layton et al. (2021) source
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe theoretical and empirical findings of this paper go well beyond the particular case of Brazil.
“The theoretical and empirical findings of this paper go well beyond the particular case of Brazil.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningControlling for out-party affective ratings isolates the independent effect of negative identification from instrumental evaluations, and negatively identifying with the out-party should still return a strong effect on out-voter dislike even when accounting for how much a respondent dislikes their out-party.
“In order to isolate the independent effect of negative identification from instrumental evaluations in the online survey models, I control for out-party affective ratings. In short, it means that, even when accounting for how much a respondent simply ‘dislikes’ their out-party or candidate, negatively identifying with it should still return a strong effect on out-voter dislike.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenTraditional explanations might tell us little about the roots of affective polarization beyond the United States and Western Europe.
“Traditional explanations might tell us little about the roots of affective polarization beyond the United States and Western Europe.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningBy 'triangulating' the empirical results, findings can be supported by both external and internal validity.
“By ‘triangulating’ the empirical results, findings can be supported by both external and internal validity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The BES samples are of high quality.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataInconsistencies in the PID items may be adding random noise to the scale, potentially masking the impact of positive identities on affective polarization.
“However, inconsistencies in the PID items may be adding random noise to the scale, potentially masking the impact of positive identities on affective polarization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataAll NID items loaded strongly on the same dimension and very weakly in the second factor, suggesting that the negative identity scale is internally cohesive and captures an independent latent trait.
“All NID items loaded strongly on the same dimension and very weakly in the second factor (See Tables A8 and A9 in Appendix), further suggesting that the negative identity scale is internally cohesive and captures an independent latent trait.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe biggest source of bias in the online survey is education: 90% of survey respondents had some tertiary education, compared to 28% of BES 2018 respondents.
“The biggest source of bias is, by far, education — while only 28% of BES 2018 respondents had some level of tertiary education, this was true for 90% of survey respondents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationIn an era of weakening partisan ties, negative partisanship is an increasingly relevant factor determining political behaviour in contexts such as the US, Canada, and across Anglo and European democracies.
“In an era of weakening partisan ties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002), negative partisanship is an increasingly relevant factor determining political behaviour in contexts such as the US (Abramowitz and Webster 2016), Canada (Caruana, McGregor, and Stephenson 2015), and across Anglo (Medeiros and Noël 2014) and European (Mayer 2017) democracies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Dalton and Wattenberg 2002
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Abramowitz and Webster 2016 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Caruana, McGregor, and Stephenson 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductcitationMeasures of social sorting capture objective social demographics rather than an individual's subjective sense of identification with his or her social category.
“Similarly, measures of social sorting captures objective social demographics rather than an individual's subjective sense of identification with his or her social category (see Mason and Wronski 2018), which future research should also address.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mason and Wronski 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenNegative partisanship can be conceptualized and measured as a type of social identity, exerting strong independent effects on political attitudes.
“Much like its positive counterpart, negative partisanship can also be conceptualized and measured as a type of social identity, exerting strong independent effects on political attitudes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The literature on negative partisanship lacks an integrated theoretical framework and robust conceptualization.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataNegative identities were much more prevalent than positive ones, especially amongst PT voters.
“In sum, negative identities were much more prevalent than positive ones, especially amongst PT voters.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe online survey respondents were more male, white, of higher income and educational levels, and younger than the BES 2018 sample.
“In short, the online survey respondents were more male, white, of higher income and educational levels, and younger.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenThe findings might be driven by the skewness of the sample towards individuals of higher socio-economic status, and this cannot be fully discarded.
“Thirdly, though several measures were taken to account for the less-than-ideal survey sample, we cannot fully discard that findings might be driven by the skewness of the sample towards individuals of higher socio-economic status.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataNo measures of negative identification were present in the BES data, and thus Hypothesis 3 cannot be tested with BES data.
“No measures of negative identification were present, and thus Hypothesis 3 cannot be tested with BES data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningA proper test of Hypothesis 3 requires a more fine-grained operationalization of both negative identities and out-group hostility than the ones that are commonly found in existing datasets.
“A proper test of Hypothesis 3, thus, requires a more fine-grained operationalization of both negative identities and out-group hostility than the ones that are commonly found in existing datasets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThese findings remained the same if using the entire PID and NID scales and across levels of self-reported political interest.
“These findings remained the same if using the entire PID and NID scales (i.e. summing the individual items and taking the overall mean for each scale), and across levels of self-reported political interest.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe traditional left-right scale is 'notoriously noisy' in Brazil's non-programmatic context and has been shown to be highly endogenous to (especially presidential) affect.
“The traditional left-right scale, however, is ‘notoriously noisy’ in Brazil's non-programmatic context (Samuels and Zucco 2018, p. 40), and has been shown to be highly endogenous to (especially presidential) affect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Samuels and Zucco 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe direct comparability of the reversed PID scale means that the tried-and-tested PID scale can serve as an 'anchor': if NID can also be reliably measured amongst the same respondents, this can add robustness to its measurement properties and alleviate sample bias concerns.
“Secondly, this direct comparability means that the tried-and-tested PID scale can serve as an ‘anchor’: if NID can also be reliably measured amongst the same respondents, this can add robustness to its measurement properties and alleviate sample bias concerns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe mass protests of recent years indicate politics is increasingly salient to Brazilians, who had previously shown low and decreasing levels of engagement with political activities.
“The mass protests of recent years indicate politics is increasingly salient to Brazilians, who had previously shown low and decreasing levels of engagement with political activities (Borba and Ribeiro 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Borba and Ribeiro 2018 source
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningUsing out-voter dislike as the dependent variable separates feelings towards elites from those directed at citizens, which can alleviate endogeneity problems in the proposed relationship.
“In the following analyses I use out-voter dislike as the dependent variable so as to separate feelings towards elites from those directed at citizens, which can alleviate endogeneity problems in the proposed relationship (i.e. negative identification and out-group dislike).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningPolitical interest should capture much of the biases introduced by high levels of education, and the variation in responses allows weights to reasonably account for over-representation of highly educated respondents.
“Political interest should capture much of the biases introduced by high levels of education, and the variation in responses allows weights to reasonable account for over-representation of highly educated respondents.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataThe online survey reached a total of 1728 Brazilians aged 18 or above.
“The online questionnaire was circulated throughout April and May 2020, reaching a total of 1728 Brazilians aged 18 or above.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The BES samples are of high quality.
“This analytic strategy can leverage the high quality of the BES samples and the fine-grained measures provided by my survey data.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The BES and Online Survey models are comparable enough for their adjusted R2 values to be meaningfully compared despite different operationalizations of the dependent variable and possible sample bias.
“This difference may lie on different operationalisations of the dependent variable (out-party for BES, out-voter for Online Survey) or sample bias, and thus this model primarily serves as the baseline for other iterations.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The literature on negative partisanship lacks an integrated theoretical framework and robust conceptualization.
“This literature, however, still suffers from the lack of an integrated theoretical framework and robust conceptualization.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
People can hold strong affect for certain political groups even without strong social identities.
“Focusing on Brazil, for example, Areal (2022) finds that people can hold strong affect for certain political groups even without strong social identities.”
From Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures (2026) · cites this paper as Areal, 2022
The theoretical framework (‘Social identities in Brazil: rare and non-politicized’; page unavailable) says strong attachments to political in-groups are uncommon in Brazil, while the Results report substantial out-party dislike. But the paper attributes that hostility in part to negative political identities, which it treats as social identities. It supports the claim if ‘social identities’ means positive in-group identities, not social identities of any kind. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Social-sorting description counts one extra demographic dimension
MinorThe paper lists six demographic dimensions, but says that after calculating the religious dimension it repeats the procedure for the "other six." That would require seven dimensions in total.
“I repeat this procedure for the other six social demographic dimensions and calculate a mean social sorting score.”
“Social sorting reflects how ‘sorted’ into their own partisan a camp a respondent is in terms of social demographics (sex, race, income, education, religion and region of residence).”
Online survey sample size differs by four respondents
MinorThe abstract reports 1,732 survey respondents, while the data section says the questionnaire reached 1,728 Brazilians.
“independently collected survey data (N = 1732)”
“The online questionnaire was circulated throughout April and May 2020, reaching a total of 1728 Brazilians aged 18 or above.”
Cites
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Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 11
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Measuring affective polarization: Matching concepts to measures
Druckman, J. N., Klar, S., Krupnikov, Y., Levendusky, M., & Ryan, J. B. (2026) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.70152 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Areal, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Mannheim (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Areal, João
- ORCID
- Areal, João
- Venue
- Political Research Exchange
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2022-09-05
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 2117635-2117635
- ISSN
- 2474-736X (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC9484554
- OpenAlex
- W4294969135
- Cited by
- 22
- References
- 80
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 1
- FWCI
- 10.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Political Research Exchange (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- MADOC (University of Mannheim) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (016.Veni.195.159)
- Dutch Research Council
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Populism, Right-Wing Movements
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Dynamics in Latin America
- Keywords
- affective polarization, political hostility, ideology, Brazilian politics
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