The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ownership and Control of German Corporations
Abstract
In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relationship of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the United Kingdom and the United States. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.
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Cited by
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
International Corporate Governance
Denis, D. K., & McConnell, J. J. (2003) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/4126762 · Cited by 1,358
The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies
Estrin, S., Hanousek, J., Kočenda, E., & Svejnar, J. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.3.699 · Cited by 926
A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups
ALMEIDA, H. V., & WOLFENZON, D. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01001.x · Cited by 833
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
Metadata
- Authors
- Franks, J., & Mayer, C.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2001-10
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 943-977
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W3122060417
- Cited by
- 568
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 154.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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