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Public Trading and Private Incentives:
Abstract
This article studies the link between public trading and the activity of a firm's large shareholder who can affect firm value. Public trading results in the formation of a stock price that is informative about the large shareholder's activity. This increases the latter's incentives to engage in value-increasing activities. Indeed, if he has to liquidate part of his stake before the effect of his activity is publicly observed, a more informative price rewards him for his activity. Implications are derived for the decision to go public, capital structure, and security design.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Faure-Grimaud, A., & Gromb, D.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-04-02
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 985-1014
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2141139383
- Cited by
- 259
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 27.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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