Cited by 209Action Observation and SynchronizationChild and Animal Learning DevelopmentEmotions and Moral Behavior

Are strong empathizers better mentalizers? Evidence for independence and interaction between the routes of social cognition

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Kanske, Philipp, Böckler, Anne, Trautwein, Fynn-Mathis, Parianen Lesemann, Franca H., Singer, Tania·2016·Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

Abstract

Although the processes that underlie sharing others' emotions (empathy) and understanding others' mental states (mentalizing, Theory of Mind) have received increasing attention, it is yet unclear how they relate to each other. For instance, are people who strongly empathize with others also more proficient in mentalizing? And (how) do the neural networks supporting empathy and mentalizing interact? Assessing both functions simultaneously in a large sample (N = 178), we show that people's capacities to empathize and mentalize are independent, both on a behavioral and neural level. Thus, strong empathizers are not necessarily proficient mentalizers, arguing against a general capacity of social understanding. Second, we applied dynamic causal modeling to investigate how the neural networks underlying empathy and mentalizing are orchestrated in naturalistic social settings. Results reveal that in highly emotional situations, empathic sharing can inhibit mentalizing-related activity and thereby harm mentalizing performance. Taken together, our findings speak against a unitary construct of social understanding and suggest flexible interplay of distinct social functions.

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Crossref · 10.1093/scan/nsw052

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  1. Kanske, 2015, Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences – Social Behavior from Rodents to Humans: Neural Foundations and Clinical Implications, 1

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Authors
Kanske, P., Böckler, A., Trautwein, F.-M., Parianen Lesemann, F. H., & Singer, T.
Affiliations
  • Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences (DE)
  • University of Würzburg (DE)
  • Department of Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
Venue
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
Published
2016-04-28
Volume
11
Issue
9
Pages
1383-1392
ISSN
  • 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
  • 1749-5024
OpenAlex
W2342413551
Cited by
209
References
65
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 5
FWCI
26.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
Funders
Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
Keywords
empathy, mentalization, theory of mind, social cognition, artificial neural networks, dynamic causal modeling, emotional events, social understanding, neural inhibition
MeSH terms
Adult, Cognition, Emotions, Empathy, Female, Humans, Individuality, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Middle Aged, Nerve Net, Social Behavior, Social Perception, Theory of Mind

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